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Agency Law. Credit Union Central Falls v. Lawrence S. Groff,
966 A.2d 1262 (R.I. 2009). A clever, albeit ultimately
unsuccessful, intervention by a former client sheds light into
attorney relationships and duties regarding borrowers, lending
institutions, and title insurers. Arising from the embezzlement of
funds entrusted to an attorney, this case deals with Credit Union
Central Falls' ("CUCF') suit against former attorney Lawrence S.
Groff ("Groff').1 The allegations include malpractice/negligence,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. 2 The
true hinge of this opinion, however, pertains to an issue between
Mortgage Guarantee and Doris Riendeau, a former client of
Groffs, 3 in which both are vying for the funds in Groffs clients'
trust account.4  Ultimately, the Court holds that, despite
Riendeau's claim to the contrary, an insurer steps into the shoes of
a mortgage company upon triggering of an insurance policy, and
in doing so, attains the right to file suit on behalf of the mortgage
company.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Groff was a real estate attorney, and for many years, was
recommended to borrowers by CUCF as an attorney who could
conduct closings for home loans and real estate transactions. In
2003, the volume of loan refinancing became so onerous that
CUCF went to the extent of allowing Groff to perform these
services at his own office. 6 Moreover, to better expedite this
process, CUCF sent checks to closing attorneys in the attorney's
name for the total loan amount, from which the attorney was to
disburse the money appropriately (via the terms of the agreement)
between the lender and the borrower.
Upon such refinancing and subsequent disbursement, Groff
1. Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1262.
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often had the duty to discharge other outstanding loans of the
borrowers with the newly acquired money.7 In two situations
(those previously at issue in this case), Groff paid the continued
mortgage payments of the loans he was supposed to have
discharged, and illegally appropriated the remainder of the funds
for his private use.8 The perpetual payments of the mortgages
produced the fagade that the loan was discharged, however, these
masked activities were soon uncovered.9
In addition to this duty of disbursement, Groff also secured
title insurance for borrowers of the affected loans and properties.10
These policies were purchased from Mortgage Guarantee & Title
Insurance Company ("Mortgage Guarantee").11
As Groffs scheme quickly unraveled, CUCF filed insurance
claims on the affected policies and shortly thereafter filed suit
against Groff under the aforementioned claims. 12 Having to pay
over $223,000, Mortgage Guarantee joined in these claims via
subrogation (pursuant to the terms of the insurance policies). 13
Shortly after this, CUCF filed for summary judgment on all
claims.14 Heavily opposing this motion, Ms. Riendeau entered the
stage at this point.15
Also falling victim to Groff's less than savory ways, Ms.
Reindeau, in a separate trial related to a probate matter, filed suit
against Groff and obtained a judgment of over $85,000.16 In a
clear move to avoid being squeezed out of recovering this
judgment, she then claimed that the instant summary judgment
motion should not be granted as more discovery was required to
delineate the relationships between the various parties.17 Cutting
to the essence of her argument, she claimed that Groff was an
"agent/approved attorney" for Mortgage Guarantee and that
Mortgage Guarantee was vicariously liable to CUCF due to Groffs
7. Credit Union Central Falls, 966 A.2d at 1262.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1265.
12. Id. at 1264.
13. Credit Union Central Falls, 966 A.2d at 1265.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1264.
17. Id. at 1266.
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actions. 18 Following this logic, Mortgage Guarantee allegedly
could not, at the same time, be the subrogee of the lender, and was
ultimately precluded from recovery. 19
The lower court granted the summary judgment motion;
however, it did not address the issues of whether an attorney such
as Groff (the closing attorney) represents the lender and/or the
mortgagor. 20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
As with all trial decisions to grant summary judgment, review
is made on a de novo basis. 21 Thus, Ms. Riendeau had a lighter
burden (as opposed to an abuse of discretion standard) of showing
that there existed an issue of material fact that remained
disputed.22
The instant appeal quickly analyzes the ethical ramifications
of Groffs apparent representation of both the lender and the
borrower,23 determining that, such representation is allowed
where there is full disclosure. 24 The Court then looks at the
instant situation to determine whether such proper disclosures
were made and whether CUCF was in fact "represented" by
Groff.25 Although many documents (particularly those required to
be signed by the borrowers) do indicate that CUCF took proper
precautions concerning attorney selection and expressly stated
that they were not clients of Groff, the Court refuses to affirm the
summary judgment solely on this point.26 It does, however,
indicate that Groff did not legally represent CUCF in a client-
attorney relationship. 27
Thus, the Court looks at Groffs duties to CUCF as a non-
client.28 In order for CUCF to have a valid claim, and ultimately
for Mortgage Guarantee to have a claim, CUCF must prove that
18. Id.
19. Credit Union Central Falls, 966 A.2d at 1266.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1267.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1268.
24. Id.
25. Credit Union Central Falls, 966 A.2d at 1270.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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"the actual intent of the client to benefit the non-client was a
direct purpose of the transaction or relationship." 29 Stated more
thoroughly later in the case, "the liability of an attorney may
extend to third-party beneficiaries of the attorney-client
relationship if it is clear that the contracting parties intended to
benefit the third party."30
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court
focuses on CUCF's involvement in Groffs work in determining
that CUCF was indeed a third party beneficiary to Groffs dealings
with borrowers, and thus entitled CUCF to a legal duty of care.31
The Court states that "we are satisfied that CUCF, if not a client,
was at the very least an intended beneficiary of the contractual
obligations between Mr. Groff and his borrowers, and as such, the
attorney owed CUCF a duty of care."32
Finally, the Court explains how this affects Mortgage
Guarantee's subrogation, and ultimately Ms. Riendeau's claim.
Subrogation "allows the title insurer to 'stand in the shoes' of the
insured creditor when it pays an obligation in satisfaction of the
express terms of their policy."33 Because Mortgage Guarantee
insured CUCF against losses, and because CUCF was owed a duty
of care by Groff, upon Groffs misdeeds, Mortgage Guarantee had
the ability to exercise its subrogation right. 34 In sum, Mortgage
Guarantee was permitted "all rights and remedies which the
insured claimant would have had against any person or property
in respect to the claim had this policy not been issued."35
Thus, Ms. Riendeau's argument fails and the lower court's
grant of the summary judgment motion is affirmed. 36 It should be
noted that this decision sheds no light as to the legal issues
29. Id. at 1271.
30. Id. at 1272.
31. Credit Union Central Falls, 966 A.2d at 1273. This included required
authorization of borrowers to allow CUCF to send the title request to Groff
and CUCF's letterhead being used for this "title examination authorization"
form. Id.
32. Id. at 1274.
33. Id. at 1275.
34. Id. at 1275 (this subrogation right was included, via clause, in
Mortgage Guarantee's contract with CUCF).
35. Id. at 1275.
36. Id. To repeat yet again, Mortgage Guarantee is allowed to recover
any compensation allowed by the summary judgment motion that CUCF
would be entitled to if there were no insurance policy. Id.
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between Groff and Ms. Riendeau, but simply resolves the issue
concerning Mortgage Guarantee.
COMMENTARY
Although a convoluted panoply of events, this case sheds light
on the myriad of legal troubles that could result from
misappropriating client funds. Aside from this caveat, and
although unsuccessful, Riendeau's attorney, through attempting
to stymie this summary judgment, takes a creative route towards
attempting to secure Groff's funds for Riendeau's award.
Nevertheless, all parties involved in this case can take away the
lesson that one must be very careful about who he or she does
business with, even if on the recommendation of another.
CONCLUSION
This case addresses the issue of whether an insurer steps into
the shoes of a mortgage company where a policy is triggered, thus
allowing for the insurance company to file an action on behalf of
the mortgage company. The Court holds that such a process is
legal and legitimate.
Athanasios Petropoulos
Civil Procedure. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150 (R.I. 2009).
The jurisdiction of Rhode Island state courts, as provided in the
Rhode Island Constitution, is solely determined by the state
legislature. Several authorities are granted the power to alter
procedural rules within their respective courts, but none can
extend jurisdiction. The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to
follow one such jurisdictional grant enacted by the Chief
Magistrate of the Traffic Tribunal. The statute extended the
jurisdiction of Rhode Island district courts to hear appeals from
"any party" in addition to "any person."
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The petitioners in this case are six motorists seeking to
reverse a decision of the District Court, Providence County
("District Court").1 Their main claim is that the District Court did
not have jurisdiction over an appeal by the State of Rhode Island
("State").2
One of the six motorists, Christine Cabral, was suspected of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 3 She was brought to
the police station where an officer read her a form describing her
rights. 4 The form, however, did not mention a $200 penalty for
refusing to submit to a chemical test. 5 Rhode Island General
Laws 1956 § 31-27-2.1(c) requires that the person being asked to
undergo a chemical test be informed of the penalties associated
with refusing to submit to such a test.6 Cabral refused the test
and was fined $200 for the violation.7 Cabral appeared in traffic
court to contest the merits of the claim. 8 On October 19, 2006, a
magistrate judge of the Traffic Tribunal dismissed the refusal
1. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 152 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 154.
3. Id. at 153.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Robinson, 972 A.2d at 153.
8. Id.
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charge after finding that she had not been told about the $200
penalty.9 On January 29, 2007 the appeals panel of the Traffic
Tribunal issued a consolidated decision affirming the magistrate's
decision to dismiss the charges against Cabral and the other
motorists. 10
The State further appealed to the District Court.11 Cabral's
answers claimed that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.12
Rhode Island General Laws 1956 § 31-41.1-9(a) (hereafter "§ 31-
41.1-9") only authorizes "a person who is aggrieved" by a decision
of the appeals panel to appeal to the District Court.13 Cabral
argued that the "state" is not a "person" as defined by the
statute. 14 "Person" is defined by Title 31 of the General Laws as
"every individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association." 15
Cabral points out that terms such as "state," "government," or
"public body" are absent from that definition.16 The judge for the
District Court "did not specifically rule on the jurisdictional issue,
but simply cited § 31-41-1.9 as the vehicle for the state's appeal
and the basis for jurisdiction.' 7
The State's counter-argument is that Rhode Island General
Laws 1956 § 8-8.2-1(a) (hereafter "§ 8-8.2-1") grants the Chief
Magistrate of the Traffic Tribunal with "the power to make rules
for regulation practice, procedure and business within the Traffic
Tribunal." 18  Rule 21(b), provided by the Chief Magistrate,
provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by a decision of the appeals
panel may appeal therefrom to the Sixth Division District
Court."19  In this rule the word "party" is the controlling
terminology.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court first determined that jurisdiction in this case "does
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Robinson, 972 A.2d at 154.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 156.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 154.
18. Id. at 156.
19. Robinson, 972 A.2d at 156.
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not spring from the language of § 31-41.1-9."2o If the language of
the statute is "clear and unambiguous," the words must be given
their "plain and ordinary meanings."21 Here, the statute clearly
used the word "person," which does not encompass the State.22
The Court then looked to the State's argument regarding Rule
21 (b).23 There is a clear conflict between the two rules.24 The
Court held that § 31-41.1-9 was controlling because the Chief
Magistrate lacked the authority to enact Rule 21(b).25
The United States Supreme Court has said that the authority
conferred upon courts to make rules and procedure does not give
them the power to enlarge jurisdiction.26 It gives the Court no
authority to modify, abridge or enlarge the substantive rights of
litigants. 27 Here, that is exactly what the Chief Magistrate did. A
rule creating jurisdiction in the District Court to hear an appeal,
in the absence of statutory authorization, is exactly the expansion
of power that this Court has held to be improper. 28 This right to
expand jurisdiction "lies solely within the province of the General
Assembly." 29
The Court held that Rule 21(b) was invalid because it
expanded the jurisdiction of the District Court by entertaining
appeals from "any party" in addition to "any person."30
COMMENTARY
It is clear from the Rhode Island Constitution that Rhode
Island courts are granted jurisdiction solely from the legislature. 31
The Chief Magistrate of the Traffic Tribunal over-stepped his
authority to regulate the "practice, procedure, and business" when
he extended the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear appeals
20. Id. at 157.
21. Id. at 158 (quoting Such v. State, 950 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (R.I.
2008)(citation omitted)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Robinson, 972 A.2d at 159.
26. Id. at 158.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 159.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Robinson, 972 A.2d at 157.
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from "any party" in addition "any person."32 The State's argument
essentially asks the Court to allow an authority, other than the
state legislature, to grant jurisdiction to the courts of this state.
CONCLUSION
An authority conferred upon a court to make rules for
regulating procedure can in no way enlarge jurisdiction.33 This
power rests solely with the state legislature. 34 By extending the
jurisdiction of the District Court to "any party" as opposed to "any
person" the Chief Magistrate of the Traffic Tribunal went beyond
the authority granted to him by the General Assembly.35
Zachary Mandell
32. Id. at 158.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 157.
35. Id. at 159.
Constitutional Law. In re Michael Derderian, 972 A.2d 613
(R.I. 2009). When the Providence Journal Company ("the
Journal") sought a declaration that it was entitled to have access
to the blank questionnaire form used in jury selection for litigation
arising from The Station nightclub fire, as well as the information
contained therein, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined
that the Journal was not in fact entitled to such a declaration as
its action was moot, and not subject to any exception to mootness
doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The issues in this case concern jury questionnaires employed
in a criminal case arising from the February 20, 2003 Station
nightclub fire, in which 100 people lost their lives. 1 Because of the
intensity and enormity of the fire's impact within the Rhode
Island community, the tremendous amount of media coverage, and
the "highly charged nature of this criminal proceeding," selecting
impartial jurors was to be a difficult task.2 As such, the trial court
developed the thirty-two page juror questionnaire with two
express purposes: "(1) to expedite the voir dire process by
eliminating repetitious questioning in a case expected to last
several months and (2) to elicit candid and complete answers."3
When prospective jurors were summoned, the trial court
presented each with a questionnaire, complete with both written
and oral instructions to complete the questionnaire "full and
frankly to the best of each person's ability," and supplemented
these instructions by advising potential jurors that every
reasonable effort would be made to keep answers private.4 As of
1. Michael Derderian, part owner of The Station nightclub, faced 100
counts of involuntary manslaughter under a theory of criminal negligence
and 100 counts of involuntary manslaughter under a theory of misdemeanor
manslaughter. In re Michael Derderian, 972 A.2d 613, 615 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 615.
3. Id.
4. Id. The questionnaires included the following instructions: "You
should be aware that your answers to these questions are NOT
CONFIDENTIAL and may be included in the public record or discussed in
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September 6, 2006, 421 prospective jurors had completed the
questionnaires; counsel had reviewed approximately 200 of these,
and "one or both parties identified a number of prospective jurors
they hoped the court would excuse for cause."5
The Journal filed a miscellaneous petition on September 11,
2006 seeking a declaration that the Journal was entitled to have
access to the blank questionnaire form as well as the information
contained in the completed questionnaires. 6  However, Mr.
Derderian subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere before
the entire jury pool had completed the questionnaires.7 As a
result, jury selection was never completed, nor was any juror ever
dismissed. 8
The Journal continued to seek access to the information
contained in the questionnaires, however, and so the trial court
conducted a hearing on access to these completed questionnaires. 9
On October 12, 2006, the trial court "permitted the release of the
blank form, but denied access to the completed questionnaire" as
it found that, although the Journal's petition was not moot, the
Journal's presumptive right to access under the First Amendment
was not absolute and was in fact rebutted by the specific facts of
the case. 10 The trial judge arrived at this conclusion by balancing
the constitutional interests of the public's right of access to
open court. If in response to ANY of the questions, you do not wish to answer
because the issue is too sensitive, personal, or private, please write the word
'PRIVATE' in the space after the question and circle the entire question. The
Court then may ask you privately about the question if you are called to
return." Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The state objected to disclosure of both the blank and completed
questionnaires, but the Journal argued that restricting the Journal and the
public's right of access to the voir dire proceedings, without making specific
findings justifying this restriction, would violate the Journal's rights under
the United States Constitution, the Rhode Island Constitution, and the
common law. Id.
7. The trial court both accepted his plea and sentenced him on
September 29, 2006. Derderian, 972 A.2d at 616.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 616.
10. Id. Specifically, in considering whether the Journal's petition was
moot because of Mr. Derderian's nolo contendere plea and sentencing, the
trial judge found that the case was justiciable because "access to juror
questionnaires used in future criminal trials is an ongoing issue of great
public interest," capable of repetition and evading review. Id.
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criminal proceedings against future defendants' right to a fair
trial, in addition to considering the statutorily created right to
privacy in Rhode Island.11
Ultimately, these findings were set out in conformity with the
four-part inquiry set forth in State v. Cianci, which is used to
determine whether a limitation on the public's and press's right of
access to criminal trials is lawful.12 Judgment granting access to
a blank copy of the questionnaire and denying the petition "in all
other respects" was entered on October 31, 2006, and the Journal
subsequently appealed.13
On appeal, the Journal contended that it had a "First
Amendment right of access to the jury selection process in
criminal trials, including completed juror questionnaires," and
that right is not outweighed by either the Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial nor the privacy interests of prospective jurors. 14
Alternatively, the Journal argued that even if there were
compelling governmental interests sufficient to outweigh these
First Amendment concerns, the Superior Court's "blanket denial
of all completed questionnaires was overly broad and
impermissible under the four-part inquiry delineated by Cianci."15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Mootness
The Court stated its position on mootness, asserting that it
will 'only consider cases involving issues in dispute; we shall not
address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical situations."' 16
Furthermore, the Court noted that it has "'consistently held that a
case is moot if the original complaint raised a justiciable
controversy, but events occurring after the filing have deprived
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I & VI; R.I. GEN. LAWS.1956 § 9-1-
28.1(a)(3); 972 A.2d at 616.
12. Derderian, 972 A.2d at 616 (citing State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 144
(R.I. 1985)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 617 (quoting State v. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Ass'n, 941 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I. 2008); Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139
(R.I. 1980)).
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the litigant of a continuing stake in the controversy."' 17
Here, the Court determined that the argument to unseal
these documents is technically moot: the claims are unrelated to
an actual controversy as the underlying criminal case had
concluded with Mr. Derderian's entry of a nolo contendere plea,
which precluded the necessity of a jury being empaneled. 18
Exceptions to Mootness
The Court next recognized that 'a determination of mootness
may not end [its] judicial review."' 19 Indeed, the Court reviews an
otherwise moot case when the issues involved implicate matters of
"'extreme public importance,"' and when "the circumstances that
gave rise to the initial controversy are capable of repetition while
evading review."20 The Court elaborated, noting that resolution in
such matters as these is in the public interest, as well as in the
interest of guidance in future cases.21
In this matter, concerns of "extreme public importance" were
undeniably prominent. 22 The Court candidly commented that
"The Station nightclub fire has left an indelible mark on every
citizen in this state," from forcing citizens to consider matters of
personal responsibility to urging reflection on the function of the
criminal justice system. 23 Here, the case concerned not only the
right of the public to access jury information, as well as future
defendants' right to a fair trial, but also the privacy interests of
those who have been or who may be called to serve as a juror and
the judiciary's notable interest fair and efficient administration of
justice. 24
17. Derderian, 972 A.2d at 617 (quoting Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d
1101, 1105 (R.I. 2002); Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 752 (R.I. 1997)).
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting In re Court Order Dated October 22, 2003, 886 A.2d 342,
348 (R.I. 2005); Foster-Gloucester Reg'1 Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854
A.2d 1008, 1013 (R.I. 2004)).
20. Id. (quoting Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I. 2007); Sullivan,
703 A.2d at 752)).
21. Id. (citing Cianci, 496 A.2d at 142).
22. Id. (citing In Re Court Order Dated October 22, 2003, 886 A.2d at
348-39; Providence Journal Co. v. Superior Court, 593 A.2d 446, 448 (R.I.
1991); Cianci, 496 A.2d at 142; Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co. v. Goldberg,
443 A.2d 1252, 1256, n. 6 (R.I. 1982)).
23. Derderian, 972 A.2d at 617.
24. Id. at 618 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,
SURVEY SECTION
Even with these interests in mind, the Court nonetheless
concluded that the circumstances giving rise to the argument are
not capable of repetition while evading review, and thus the
Journal's arguments were, in fact, moot.25 The case was unlike
any other in the State's history and the facts were extraordinarily
unique, and thus, the Court determined that there was "at most a
remote likelihood of another tragic event involving so many lives,
receiving such significant attention, affecting so many people, and
resulting in a criminal trial."26 The Court pointed out that the
massive, unprecedented size of the prospective jury pool and
number of completed questionnaires was overwhelming: the Court
even calculated the volume of information sought-13,472 pages of
questions and answers-and determined, like the trial court
before it, that the release of the information would be overly
burdensome on the Court.27
The Court also made note of the fact that the procedural
posture of the case was unusual in that fewer than half of the
prospective jurors completed the questionnaires, no juror was
dismissed, not one juror was summoned for individual voir dire,
the jury was never empaneled, and the trial judge never had cause
to comment on the matter of juror selection as Mr. Derderian
entered his plea of nolo contendere before the jury could play its
role in his criminal trial.28
COMMENTARY
In reaching its decision, the Court clearly gave great weight
and consideration to the enormity of both public interest and the
uniqueness of the underlying facts that gave rise to this appeal.
As such, the Court was careful to outline its reasoning as a
balancing of Constitutional rights and interests, acknowledging
the weight of The Station fire case in the Rhode Island community
and the competing interests of First and Sixth Amendment
464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984) (determining that "[t]he process of juror selection is
itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the
criminal justice system").
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 618 n.4.
28. Id.
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rights.29 In the end, the Journal's argument was plainly moot
because the case had concluded, and the Court gave greater
weight to the privacy interests of jurors.
Notably absent from the opinion, however, is any
consideration of whether an impartial jury could have ever been
attained in such a sensationalized case as this. The Court chose
not to address whether the opinions of prospective jurors ought to
be public, namely in light of whether they might have driven any
plea discussions. Indeed, as did the trial court, the Court likewise
declined to "engage in rank speculation" or "satisfy idle curiosity
about what jurors, if any, may have been seated in this case or
what role, if any, the jury questionnaires may have had in
[Derderian's] motive[] to change [his] plea."30
The Court's justifiable reliance on the doctrine of mootness to
adjudicate this case certainly resolves the Journal's petition and
concludes the case. In doing so, the decision avoids the more
problematic constitutional rights at play, leaving open to future
interpretation the role of juror questionnaires in criminal trials.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed the
appeal of the Journal as the controversy in this case had ended,
rendering the Journal's arguments moot, and the extreme factual
and procedural posture of this case was unlikely to repeat itself.
Jessica A. Shelton
29. Derderian, 972 A.2d at 617-18.
30. Id. at 618.
Constitutional Law. In re Request for Advisory Opinion from
the House of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management
Council), 961 A.2d 930 (R.I. 2009). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court advised the House of Representatives that, if reenacted,
legislation concerning the organic statute of the Coastal Resources
Management Council would violate the November 2, 2004
separation of powers amendments to the State Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In considering whether the organic statute of the Coastal
Resources Management Council (CRMC) should be reenacted, the
Rhode Island House of Representatives called upon the State
Supreme Court to provide an advisory opinion concerning the
following four issues:1
1) Whether the constitutional amendment to Article 9,
Section 5 is "self-executing?" 2
2) Whether the CRMC, "by its nature, purpose, and
operation," is a legislative body?3
3) Whether the organic statute, which permits members
of the General Assembly to sit as members of the CRMC,
would violate the Article 9, Section 5 constitutional
amendment pertaining to the constitutionality of the
appointing authority?4
4) Whether the organic statute would "permit the
Speaker of the House to appoint public members to the
[CRMC]?"5
Although the Court was reluctant to deliver an advisory
1. In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the H.R. (Coastal Res.
Mgmt. Council), 961 A.2d 930, 932 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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opinion regarding the constitutionality of an organic statute up for
reenactment,6 it agreed to do so in order to address the important
legal questions and public concerns raised by the pending
legislation.7
Historically, the Rhode Island General Assembly has
exercised substantially more executive authority than most other
states, including the power to elect all judicial officers and many
officers of the executive branch. 8  The 1986 constitutional
convention allowed the General Assembly to retain its "continuing
powers," which consisted of any power that was not "expressly
prohibited by the Constitution."9
The constitutional amendments enacted on November 2, 2004
fundamentally changed the separation of powers for the State of
Rhode Island.1o Article 3, Section 6 was amended "to preclude
legislators from serving on state boards, commissions, or other
state or quasi-public entities that exercise executive power."11
Article 5 was amended "to provide that the powers of the Rhode
Island [G]overnment are distributed into 'three separate and
distinct departments"' including the executive, legislative and
judicial.12 Article 6, Section 10 was repealed, which terminated
the "continuing powers" that had been vested in the General
Assembly.13 Finally, Article 9, Section 5 was amended to "give the
Governor appointment power with respect to members of any
state or quasi-public entities exercising executive power, subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate."14
With the separation of powers amendments in mind, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court advised the Rhode Island House of
Representatives on whether the reenactment of the CRMC's
organic statute would violate the State Constitution.
6. Id. (quoting In re Advisory Opinion (C.J.), 507 A.2d 1316, 1319 (R.I.
1986)) (holding that only the Governor can issue advisory opinions pertaining
to the "constitutionality of existing statutes which require implementation by
the Chief Executive").
7. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 932.
8. Id. at 934.
9. Id. at 935.
10. Id. at 933.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 933.
14. Id.
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ANALYSIS
Upon review of the separation of powers amendments, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court first determined that both Article 3,
Section 6 and Article 9, Section 5 are self-executing and thus, do
not require further legislative action in order to be given the force
of law.' 5 These amended sections prohibit legislators from sitting
on administrative units that exercise executive power and vest the
appointment of administrative members in the Governor, with the
advice and consent of the Senate.16
The Court next considered whether the CRMC is legislative in
nature and concluded that the agency is "executive with functions
that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature."17
Examples of the agency's authority, as delegated by Article 1,
Section 17, include the ability to generate policy, approve
regulations, enforce riparian rights, issue written cease and desist
orders and assess administrative penalties of up to $2,500.18
While it is permissible for the CRMC and other agencies to
combine legislative, judicial and executive powers,19 "direct
legislative control of executive powers would be an impermissible
usurpation of the central function of a coordinate branch."20 After
determining that the CRMC is predominantly executive in nature,
the Court opined that no member or appointee of the General
Assembly may sit on the CRMC while occupying a legislative
15. Id. at 937; Thomas M. Cooley, LL.D., TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 100 (The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 1998)
(1868), as reprinted in Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900) ("A constitutional
provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by
means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty
imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-executing when it merely
indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those
principles may be given the force of law.").
16. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 933.
17. Id. at 940.
18. Id. at 937, 941.
19. Id. at 940; see Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 112-
13 (R.I. 1992).
20. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 940; see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
733-34 (1986) ("[Olnce Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its
participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its
enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation.").
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position.21 Additionally, the Governor must make all
appointments to the CRMC with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 22 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court advised the
Rhode Island House of Representatives that the CRMC's organic
statute, as proposed for reenactment, would violate the Article 9,
Section 5 constitutional amendment and would not permit the
Speaker of the House to appoint public members to the agency. 23
The Court emphasized that the constitutional amendments
are not "subordinating the role of the legislative branch to that of
the executive," 24 and that the Senate may continue to approve or
reject gubernatorial appointments. 25  The General Assembly
retains its ability to "enact, revise or repeal laws concerning
coastal management and preservation of natural resources," as
long as the agency acts in compliance with the constitution.26 In
conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court advised the Governor
and the General Assembly to convene in order to reach a mutual
agreement that would allow both the executive and legislative
branches of the State Government to operate in compliance with
the Rhode Island Constitution.27
COMMENTARY
An interesting comment by the Court in reluctantly agreeing
to issue the advisory opinion was that they may decline to answer
requests for future advisory opinions under circumstances similar
to the case at hand.28 When the constitutionality of pending
legislation is in question, the House of Representatives may ask
the Court for an advisory opinion;29 however, when the
constitutionality of existing statutes, "which require
implementation by the Chief Executive," is at issue, the Governor
alone may promulgate an advisory opinion. 30 The organic statute
21. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 940.
22. Id. at 942.
23. See id. at 932, 941.
24. Id. at 934.
25. Id. at 943.
26. Id.
27. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 944.
28. Id. at 932.
29. Id.; see In re Advisory Opinion (C.J.), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318 (R.I. 1986).
30. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 932; see In re Advisory Opinion (C.J.), 507
A.2d at 1319.
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of the CRMC was proposed for reenactment and had practically no
substantive changes, 31 which would seem to liken it to an
"existing" statute rather than to one of "pending legislation."
While the Court proceeded to issue the advisory opinion due to the
important public policy involved, 32 it remains unclear what
conditions must exist for the Court to assent to such an advisory
opinion in the future. Additionally, one is left wondering why the
Governor was not called upon to deliver the advisory opinion after
the Court recognized the unusual circumstances surrounding the
constitutionality of reenacting the CRMC's existing organic
statute.
Regardless of which branch was responsible for answering the
House of Representatives request, the advisory opinion of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court provides important assurance that
the CRMC will be able to fulfill its duties of protecting the natural
environment without political influence from the General
Assembly. The coastline and marine environment are crucial to
the health and economic well being of the Ocean State and its
residents. By forcing the agency to comply with the separation of
powers amendments, the Court will effectuate an important check
on the balance of powers asserted by the legislative and executive
branches of the State Government.
31. In re Request, 961 A.2d at 932.
32. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The November 2, 2004, amendments to the Rhode Island
Constitution separated the State's power into three distinct
branches, including the executive, legislative and judicial. 33
Additionally, these amendments precluded sitting legislators from
serving on the CRMC and required the Governor, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to appoint members to the CRMC.34
Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court advised that if
reenacted as proposed, the organic statute of the Rhode Island
CRMC would violate the separation of powers amendments to the
State Constitution.35
Jacqueline S. Rolleri
33. Id. at 933.
34. Id. at 941-42.
35. Id. at 941.
Constitutional Law. Irons v. The Rhode Island Ethics
Commission, 973 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 2009). In this constitutionally
important case, the Supreme Court grappled with balancing the
protection afforded by one constitutional amendment with the
powers authorized by another amendment.' In the end, the Court
found that a former State senator's constitutional right under the
speech in debate clause 2 affords him immunity from prosecution
under the Ethics Commission provision in the Constitution.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In the first stage of this constitutional case, Robert Arruda
and Beverly Clay 4 filed a complaint in January 2004 with the
Rhode Island Ethics Commission ("Ethics Commission")5 against
William V. IronS6 ("Senator Irons"), who, at the time of the initial
complaint, sat as President of the Rhode Island Senate.7 The
complaint alleged, most importantly, that Senator Irons acted
wrongfully by "'participating in a governmental decision to affect
pharmacy issues, while he was paid significant commissions by
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island'. . . when he voted
1. The Constitution referenced is the Rhode Island Constitution.
2. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 5. The speech in debate clause provides: "For
any speech in debate in either house, no member shall be questioned in any
other place."
3. R.I. CONST. art. III, § § 7, 8.
4. The complainants are the chair and vice chair, respectively, of
Operation Clean Government, an organization "dedicated to promoting
honest, responsible, and responsive state government." Irons v. Rhode Island
Ethics Comm'n, 973 A.2d 1124, 1126 (R.I. 2009).
5. "The Rhode Island Ethics Commission is a constitutionally
established nonpartisan body that was created to adopt, enforce, and
administer the Code of Ethics.... It was 'formed to oversee ethics in State
Government."' In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission),
612 A.2d 1, 3 (R.I. 1992).
6. At all relevant times, Senator Irons was an insurance broker who had
a strong economic ties to the pharmaceutical industry by maintaining CVS,
Inc. (a major pharmacy retailer) and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode
Island (a health insurance company) as his private clients. Irons, 973 A.2d at
1126.
7. Id.
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against the Pharmacy Freedom of Choice legislation8 in 1999 and
2000."9
The second stage of this case unfolded when the Ethics
Commission found that the complaint alleged 'facts sufficient to
constitute a knowing and willful violation' of the Code of Ethics,"
and, after a preliminary investigation, determined the allegations
supported a finding of probable cause.10 At the conclusion of a
probable cause hearing in November 2004, the Ethics Commission
found probable cause on two counts of the complaint:
(1) the allegation that Senator Irons had substantial
conflict of interest when he participated in the Senate
Corporations Committee's consideration of pharmacy
choice legislation in the 1999 and 2000 legislative session;
and
(2) the allegation that Senator Irons used his public office
to obtain financial gain for CVS, his client, during the
same legislative sessions. 11
The next stage occurred several years later, in April 2007,
when Senator Irons demanded a jury trial pursuant to sections 10
and 15 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution. 12  In
November, he filed a motion seeking dismissal of the remaining
two counts of the original complaint, claiming that prosecution
under these counts would violate the speech in debate clause. 13 In
a hearing later that month, the Ethics Commission denied both
the motion to dismiss and the request of a jury trial. 14 Upon this
declaration, Senator Irons filed a complaint in the Superior Court
stating that the Ethics Commission improperly denied his demand
for a jury trial and his motion to dismiss, claiming: "(1) that the
8. The Pharmacy Freedom of Choice legislation, in its essence, would
have given consumers the choice of which pharmacy they could refill their
prescriptions. Id. at 1126, n. 3.
9. Id. at 1126.
10. Id. at 1127.
11. Id. at 1127-28.
12. R.I. CONST. art. I, §§ 10 and 15, respectively, guarantee that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, accused person shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury" and "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate." R.I. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15.
13. See Irons, 973 A.2d at 1128.
14. Id. at 1128-29.
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protection afforded him by the speech in debate clause rendered
him immune from prosecution with respect to the [] counts; and
(2) that, if he was not immune, he had a constitutional right to a
jury trial."15 The Superior Court granted Senator Irons' motion to
dismiss the remaining counts, but denied his demand for a jury
trial.16
This decision prompted the Ethics Commission to petition the
Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the
Superior Court's ruling on the issue of the speech in debate
clause.17 Senator Irons, meanwhile, cross-petitioned for a writ of
certiorari regarding his denial for a jury trial.18 The Supreme
Court granted both petitions. 19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In the final stage of the case, the Court reviewed de novo
issues raised in a writ of certiorari, and only looked at questions of
law raised in the petition.20
An Ancient and Venerable Hallmark21
The root of this case stems from two constitutional provisions,
one that has a long history in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and
the other a more recent addition to the Rhode Island Constitution.
The former provision, the speech in debate clause, contains "plain
and unequivocal language" that protects individual legislators
'from inquiry into their legislative acts or into the motivation for
actual performance of legislative acts that are clearly part of the
legislative process."' 22 The speech in debate clause also shields
legislators from encroachment by the other branches of
government, thereby allowing "'the free flow of debate among
legislators and the maximization of an effective and open
15. Id. at 1129.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1129.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1134.
22. Id. at 1129 (quoting Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 983 (R.I.
1984)).
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exchange of ideas."' 23  The provision intended to confer the
ultimate benefit onto the people. 24
While the Court has construed the speech in debate clause to
provide legislators with "'absolute' immunity" from encroachment
by other branches of government in carrying out their legislative
duties, it by no means opens the door for legislators to abuse the
Code of Ethics. 25 It simply means that the Ethics Commission
may not prosecute "within a narrow class of core legislative
acts."2 6 In the case at hand, both parties agreed that Senator
Irons' actions were "core legislative acts" in that he participated in
debate and consideration on pharmaceutical legislation and voted
in opposition of the Pharmacy Freedom of Choice Act. 27
In Diametrical Opposition28
While both parties agreed that Senator Irons' actions were
within the scope of the speech in debate clause, the Ethics
Commission argued that under the Ethics Amendment 29 they are
allowed to prosecute Senator Irons for violating the Code of
Ethics, thus creating a narrow exception to the speech in debate
clause. 30 The Ethics Amendment was borne out of the times when
"'widespread breaches of trust, cronyism, impropriety, and other
violations of ethical standards' plagued the state, creating a
disjunction in the public's trust in the government. 31 To remedy
this, the Ethics Commission created an ethics committee, which
proposed "an independent nonpartisan ethics commission with
sweeping powers... to adopt a code of ethics and oversee ethics in
state and local government," and finally codifying this proposal in
23. See id. at 1130-31 (quoting Holmes, 475 A.2d at 982, 985).
24. Id. at 1131.
25. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1131.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1132.
28. Id. at 1134.
29. The most pertinent language of this provision provides: "All elected
and appointed officials and employees of state and local government, of
boards, commissions and agencies shall be subject to the code of ethics. The
ethics commission shall have the authority to investigate violations of the
code of ethics and to impose penalties, as provided by law, and the
commission shall have the power to remove from office officials who are not
subject to impeachment." R.I. CONST. art. III, § 8.
30. See Irons, 973 A.2d at 1132.
31. Id.
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the Rhode Island Constitution. 32
The language of both the Ethics Amendment and the speech
in debate clause is "unequivocal and absolute, [and] neither
admits of any exceptions," and the Court refused to "abridge such
a long-standing and widely accepted constitutional provision [like
the speech in debate clause] in the absence of an express and
uncontroverted manifestation of electoral intent."33 Finding that
both provisions are "specific, unequivocal, do not allow for
exceptions, and both were affirmed by the voters on the same
day," the Court rejected any revocation of the immunity afforded
by the speech in debate clause. 34 Thus, the Court held that the
speech in debate clause gives Senator Irons immunity from
prosecution, even when balanced with the weight of the Ethics
Commission's authority granted by the Ethics Amendment. 35
Because Senator Irons was immune from prosecution, the Court
did not reach the issue of whether he had the right to a jury
trial. 36 The Court noted that when an issue is not necessary "for
the disposition of the case at bar," it will not review the issue,
"leav[ing] the analysis of that argument for another day."37
Justice Suttell, in a dissenting opinion, noted that based on
the specific intent of the framers of the Ethics Amendment and "in
view of the history of the times and state of affairs," the provision
"necessarily implies a limitation on the full reach of the speech in
debate clause."38 Thus, the Ethics Amendment creates a narrow
exception to the immunity granted by the speech in debate
clause.39
COMMENTARY
While the Court was correct in refusing to write an exception
to the immunity granted by the speech in debate clause into the
Ethics Amendment, the justification for this decision remains a
fragile levy holding back heavy water. It is understandable that
32. Id. at 1132-33.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1134.
35. Id.
36. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1135.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1141.
39. Id.
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the Supreme Court did not want to create precedent for one
constitutional provision to trump another because that would
simply open the doors for future battles between conflicting
provisions within the Rhode Island Constitution. However, the
excuse that the speech in debate clause "is widely recognized in
this country and most of the English-speaking world"40 cannot
keep the water back forever. Soon enough, an action by a local or
state government official will be so egregious to the Code of Ethics
that the levy will break, forcing the powers granted by the Ethics
Amendment to usurp the immunity granted by the speech in
debate clause.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment
in dismissing the remaining counts against Senator Irons and did
not review the Superior Court's ruling on the jury trial issue; the
Court allowed the record to be remanded to the Superior Court.41
Esther Kapinos
40. Id. at 1134.
41. Id. at 1135.
Constitutional Law. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555 (R.I. 2009).
In this decision, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island conducted a
comprehensive analysis of R.I. Gen. Laws Title 11, Chapter 37.1
(1956), the Sexual Offender Registration and Community
Notification Act. Defendant challenged the Act on four grounds:
(1) his classification pursuant to the sex offender registration
statute was improper because, in his view, the statute (both on its
face and as applied), violates his right to procedural due process,
which right is guaranteed by both the United States and Rhode
Island Constitutions; (2) as applied to the facts of his case, the
statute violates his right to substantive due process; (3) the
statute is not compatible with the principle of separation of
powers that is set forth in article 5 of the Rhode Island
Constitution; (4) that application of the statute to his case
constitutes a violation of the state constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. The Court determined that R.I. Gen.
Laws Title 11, Chapter 37.1 (1956) may be unconstitutional in
some instances; however, it was not in the instant matter.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Notwithstanding the lack of factual detaill preserved or
presented throughout this lengthy case history, the instant matter
before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island arises from the
commission of four sexual assaults in the Spring of 1998 by
defendant Thomas Germane ("Germane").2
1. 'The factual background of this case as reflected in the record must
be characterized as murky at best. On the basis of the rather brief nature of
the colloquy on the record that took place when the criminal charges which
eventually gave rise to the instant case were disposed of through a plea of
nolo contendere, it appears that Mr. Germane did not actually plead to any
specific facts beyond his bare admission of the use of force or coercion in the
commission of four sexual assaults." State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 561
(R.I. 2009).
2. Id. The first sexual assault, consisting of forcible or coerced vaginal
intercourse, was perpetrated against a nineteen-year-old victim on April 7,
1998. Second, forcible or coerced vaginal intercourse on a forty-eight-year-old
cognitively impaired woman on April 15, 1998. Finally, two assaults
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On January 6, 2000, Germane pled nolo contendere; the state
apparently determined that a plea agreement was "preferable" to
proceeding to trial due to complication with background
information and "some of the victims." 3 The state recommended a
sentence of twenty yearS4 at the Adult Correctional Institutions
(six months to serve, nineteen and one-half months suspended,
with probation), the Superior Court imposed this agreed upon
sentence
The Offender Registration and Community Notification Act
("ORCNA"), Rhode Island General Laws 1956 Chapter 37.1 of
Title 11, requires the following individuals to register with a
designated law enforcement agency: (1) anyone convicted of an
enumerated criminal offense against a minor victim; (2) anyone
convicted of a sexually violent offense; (3) anyone determined by a
board of review to be a sexually violent predator.5 The third
category mandated that offenders register indefinitely until such
time as a court might determine that a particular individual was
no longer a sexually violent predator.6 The ORCNA was amended
in 1999 to create a new category of offenses which were subject to
lifetime registration, "'aggravated offenses,' which included most
sexual offenses involving sexual penetration and the use or threat
of force." 7
On February 9, 2000, the Sex Offender Board of Review
("board of review") received Germane's case, and upon a review of
a field investigator, determined that Germane was a "sexually
violent predator" because he "possesses a personality disorder that
make it likely that he will engage in sexually violent offenses in
the future."8 In June 2001, the State sought a determination as to
whether or not Germane was a sexually violent predator; there
was no action taken and Germane remained an unclassified
consisting of one act of forcible or coerced fellatio and one count of forcible or
coerced anal intercourse perpetrated against a twenty-four-year-old self
admitted prostitute on May 19, 1998. Id. at 562.
3. Id. at 563.
4. Six months to serve, nineteen and one-half months suspended, with
probation. Id.
5. Germane, 971 A.2d at 563, (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-3).
6. Id. at 563.
7. Id. (citing Section 11-37.1-2(J), as amended by P.L. 1999, ch. 255, §1).
8. Id. at 564.
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sexual offender.9
In November of 2003,10 Germane was arrested for soliciting
twin twenty-five-year old mentally handicapped sisters from a
motor vehicle for an indecent purpose in violation of Rhode Island
General Laws 1956 §11-34-8.1.11 Germane admitted to having
violated the terms of his probation, and the court continued his
prior sentence and the misdemeanor charge with respect to the
underlying solicitation was dismissed. 12
The Superior Court granted the state's motion to remand1 3
Germane's case to the board of review in order to reconsider his
case in light of the 2003 amendments to the ORCNA.14 In March
2005, the board of review issued a risk assessment of Germane
concluding that, "[Germane] was determined to have two
'individual risk factors' on the STATIC-9915, which translates to a
'moderate-low' risk of reoffense according to that instrument's
scoring key."16 The board of review, upon consideration of several
therapists' professional opinion, determined that Germane was an
overall Risk Level III classification at high risk to recidivate. 17 In
making this determination the board of review relied upon "[the]
criminal record [and] police, institutional, probation/parole,
supervision, and treatment information," "[t]he board of review
also noted a number of 'characteristics' specific to appellant's case
that in its judgment militated in favor of a higher risk assessment
that that indicated by the results of the Static-99." 18 The result of
this classification was as follows:
9. Id. at 565.
10. The State's petition for the Superior Court to determine whether or
not Germane was a sexually violent predator was still pending. Germane,
971 A.2d at 565.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 566.
13. "This remand was authorized by the then newly enacted §11-37.1-20,
as amended by P.L. 2003, ch. 162, §2, which provided for the remand of cases
pending adjudication of sexually violent predator status; the cases were to be
remanded to the Sex Offender Board of Review for risk level determinations
under a revised procedure." Id. at 566 n.16.
14. Id. at 566.
15. "The STATIC-99 is an instrument designed to assist in the prediction
of sexual and violent recidivism for sexual offenders." Id. at 567 n.18.
16. Germane, 971 A.2d at 567.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 569.
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Sexual offender community notification is currently
governed by the guidelines promulgated in 2007 by the
Rhode Island Parole Board pursuant to § 11-37.1-12.
Section 9.0 of the guidelines directs that local law
enforcement shall provide an "offender fact sheet" to any
member of the community likely to encounter appellant.
Local law enforcement is further required to notify the
community of the offender's presence using a variety of
other public information resources-including news
releases, fliers, and advertisements in local newspapers.
As an aggravated offender, appellant will be subject to
community notification for life and will be required to
register quarterly with local law enforcement officials.19
Pursuant to §11-37.1-13, Germane appealed the decision of
the board of review to the Superior Court for judicial review of the
board's determination. The Superior Court accepted the STATIC-
99 over Defendant's objections and in April 2005, the magistrate
affirmed the board of review's classification of appellant as a Risk
Level II offender, holding that Germane "had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the risk level classification and
proposed manner of community notification were not in
compliance with the ORCNA or the relevant guidelines adopted
pursuant to said statute."20
Germane timely filed appeal from the Superior Court
judgment and raised the following issues: (1) his [Germane]
classification pursuant to the sex offender registration statute was
improper because, in his view, the statute (both on its face and as
applied), violates his right to procedural due process, which right
is guaranteed by both the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions; (2) as applied to the facts of his case, the statute
violates his right to substantive due process; (3) the statute is not
compatible with the principle of separation of powers that is set
forth in article 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (4) that
application of the statute to his case constitutes a violation of the
state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. 21
19. Id.
20. Id. at 572.
21. Id. at 560.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Due Process Claims22
A. Procedural Due Process
Germane contends that he was given "no process whatsoever:
no notice and no hearing" of the proceedings before the board of
review and the allocation of the burden of persuasion before the
Superior Court deprived him of due process under the law. 23 The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island applied the three-part test
enunciated in Matthews v. Eldridge to be considered in
determining whether a procedure violates due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 24
A member of the minority, Rhode Island relies on a two-tier
sex offender registration program, whereby facts other than
conviction are used to assess the risk of future dangerousness and
this risk level determination then dictates the scope of community
notification. 25 The ramifications of being categorized as a Risk
Level III offender are widespread dissemination of an offender's
personal information within his or her community and notification
to the community that a sexual offender has been determined to
be currently dangerous and at high risk to reoffend in the
future. 26
In order to determine the private interest affected by the
22. "The guarantee of procedural due process assures that there will be
fair and adequate legal proceedings, while substantive due process acts as a
bar against 'certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' Germane, 971 A.2d at
574, (citing L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202,
210 (R.I. 1997).
23. Id. at 574.
24. Id. at 575 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
25. Id. at 575.
26. Id. at 576.
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government action in the instant matter, the Court separated that
information to be disseminated to the community into two
classifications: (1) information relating to his prior convictions and
his personal information; and (2) information apprising the public
of his assessed level of current dangerousness. 27  Without
hesitation, and relying on a decision by the Supreme Court of
Oregon, the court held that the ORCNA "burdens a protectible
liberty interest and therefore triggers the individual's right to
procedural due process under both the federal and state
constitutions."28 The Court stated that "Germane must adhere to
the registration requirements indefinitely or else face criminal
repercussions; as a result, their legal status is permanently
altered."29
The Court next addressed the nature and scope of the process
due. The answer, the Court proffered, lies within the Supreme
Court's statement that "an essential principle of due process is
that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case."30  The thrust of the argument that Germane was
erroneously deprived of a protected interest lies within the
contention that he was not afforded a hearing prior to his
categorization as a dangerous offender, and that the burden of
persuasion at the Superior Court level was not placed on the
state. 31
Relying on the statutory language of Title 11 Chapter 37.1,
the Court placed significant weight on the fact that even though
Germane was not afforded an opportunity to defend his status to
the board of review, he was afforded the right to appeal for a
judicial determination at the Superior Court level and Germane
did in fact exercise this right.32 As such, this particular case did
not offend the procedural due process afforded to a citizen under
the Rhode Island or United States Constitution. 33
Notwithstanding the determination in the instant case, the
27. Id. at 577.
28. Germane, 971 A.2d at 578.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 579.
32. Id.
33. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
Court took issue and expressly rejected as unconstitutional the
judicial discretion permitted under § 11-37.1-15(a)(2).34
Specifically, the Court held that an offender could be deprived of
his Constitutional right of procedural due process in the event
that the Superior Court does not permit a full evidentiary
hearing.35 Effectively the Court eliminated any discretion the
Superior Court previously had in the determination of the scope of
evidence to be presented. 36
The Court found the burden argument lacking merit as the
burden established by § 11-37.1-16 is initially placed on the state
and the offender then bears the burden to invalidate by a
preponderance of the evidence the method of testing employed. 37
The Court held that the above mentioned review of a
classification, "strikes an appropriate balance between the liberty
interests of those required to register as sex offenders and the
legitimate social, administrative, and financial interests of the
state."38 Without further ado, the Court put this issue to rest.
B. Substantive Due Process
The first argument put forth by Germane was that Title 11
Chapter 37.1 impermissibly burdens certain fundamental rights
that are protected by the due process clauses of the Rhode Island
and United States Constitutions; the Court found the
aforementioned without merit.39 The Court held that persons who
have been convicted of a sex offense do not have a fundamental
right to be free from the notification requirements set forth in the
ORCNA, as such Germane had the near impossible burden of
proving no rational relationship existed between the statute and
some legitimate state interest.40
Germane predominantly challenges the ORCNA as arbitrary
or capricious due to the state's reliance on the STATIC-99,
claiming that by relying on this test the General Assembly
essentially "created an irrational form of mandatory
34. Id. at 580.
35. Germane, 971 A.2d at 580.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 581.
38. Id. at 582.
39. Id. at 584.
40. Germane, 971 A.2d at 584.
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presumption."41 However, the Court held that this argument
lacked merit due to the statutory inclusion of other factors in the
consideration of community notification.42  Additionally,
subsequent to a thorough analysis of the specific factual
circumstances of the instant matter, the Court reiterated the
recommendation to the board of review the importance of
transparency and documentation of considered factors in their
review process. 43
Separation of Powers
Germane argued that the General Assembly may not lawfully
define what constitutes the prima facie case as they have in § 11-
37.1-16(b); specifically, that the General Assembly has intruded by
this definition into the judicial fact-finding process. 44  In
evaluating the sufficiency of this argument, the Court relied on
precedent to direct the analysis to whether there is a "natural and
rational relation between the fact proved presumed and the
inferential process is not 'purely arbitrary or wholly
unreasonable."' 45
The Court states that, contrary to the assertion by Germane,
the legislatively mandated presumption is "rebuttable due to the
judicial determination on the basis of the proof offered by the
sexual offender and/or the state."46  Therefore, the General
Assembly has not impeded on the power of the judiciary by merely
creating a statutory scheme by which the state shall offer its
prima facie case.
The Ex Post Facto Challenge
Lending little deference to the defendant's argument that the
ORCNA is in violation of the state constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws, the Court held that the registration
requirement does not constitute criminal punishment and, as
41. Id. at 585.
42. Id. at 586.
43. Id. at 588.
44. Id. at 590.
45. Id.
46. Germane, 971 A.2d at 591.
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such, is "simply part of a nonpunitive, civil regulatory scheme." 47
COMMENTARY
The Court correctly held that the ORCNA did not violate the
Constitution of Rhode Island or the United States, as the
defendant was afforded considerable hearings taking into account
all the evidence in a fair manner. The heinous crimes committed
by this defendant clearly warranted community notification.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court rejected the claims set forth by
Germane. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Title 11
Chapter 37.1 was not unconstitutional as applied in the instant
matter.
Thomas J. Miller
47. Id. at 593.
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Contract Law. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009).
A computer purchaser bringing an action against a computer
manufacturer for collecting taxes in violation of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act will not be compelled to submit to arbitration
where the "shrinkwrap" terms and conditions agreement, which
specifies arbitration as a mandatory means of settlement, does not
properly inform purchasers of their rights to reject the agreement
by returning the goods. Therefore, the purchasers did not accept
the terms and agreements, including the arbitration provision, by
retaining the goods.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Mary E. DeFontes purchased a computer manufactured by
Dell, Inc. ("Dell"), an international computer manufacturer,
through Dell Catalog Sales LP ("Dell Catalog"), a distributor for
Dell.1 DeFontes supplemented her purchase with an optional
service contract with BancTec, Inc. ("BancTec"), which acts as a
third-party provider, on behalf of Dell, offering service contracts
for on-sight computer repairs. 2 Nicholas Long purchased a Dell
computer through Dell Marketing LP ("Dell Marketing"), a
separate distributor for Dell, along with a an optional service
contract through Dell.3 Julianne Ricci also purchased a computer
through Dell Catalog and opted for a service contract with
BancTec. 4  All three consumers paid taxes on their service
contracts.5
In May 2003, DeFontes initiated a class action suit against
Dell claiming that Dell violated the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act 6 by including a tax on the optional service contract, which
1. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1062-63 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1065 n.8.
5. Id. at 1063, 1065 n.8.
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-16 (2009) (Disclosure of service contract
agreements). Section 6-13.1-16 provides in part:
(a) It shall be a deceptive trade practice in violation of this chapter
288
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DeFontes claimed is not taxable in Rhode Island.7 In July 2003,
Long joined the suit as a plaintiff and the complaint was amended
to include Dell Catalog, Dell Marketing, QualxServ, LLC
("QualxServ") and BancTec as defendants. 8 At a subsequent
hearing, Defendants moved to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration in accordance with an arbitration provision in the
purported contract.9  The defendants argued that Plaintiffs
accepted the "Terms and Conditions Agreement," which included
the arbitration provision, by accepting delivery of the goods.1o
Further, Defendants alleged that they made the agreement
available to Plaintiffs in three separate forums: (1) the website; (2)
the invoice acknowledging receipt of the order; and (3) the terms
included in the box with the product.11
In January 2004, the hearing judge issued an opinion, finding
that the three opportunities the purchasers had to review the
terms and conditions agreement were inadequate, and as a result,
did not establish a contract between the parties.12 First, the
hearing judge found that the terms on the website were too
"inconspicuous" to provide adequate notice. 13 Next, he noted that
"shrinkwrap" agreements are generally acceptable to put
consumers on inquiry notice, but that shrinkwrap agreements
usually provide an express disclaimer that informs consumers
that returning the products acts as a rejection of the terms and
conditions agreement.14 The hearing judge stated the "crucial
for any service contractor to fail to disclose to any person who is a
prospective customer, at the time the person makes initial contact by
any means with the service contractor, that a service call made by
the service contractor to the home or business of the prospective
customer will require the payment by the customer of separate and
distinct fees for the following:
(1) Service charge ....
7. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1062.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1063. The arbitration clause in DeFontes' "Terms and
Conditions Agreement" that was included with her purchase, which is almost
identical to Long's agreement, stated, "Any claim dispute, or controversy ...
against Dell[] [or its subsidiaries] . . . shall be resolved exclusively and finally
by binding arbitration.. . ." Id. at n.2.
10. Id. at 1063.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1063.
14. Id. at 1064. "A 'shrinkwrap agreement' refers to the common
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test" for determining the adequacy of the notice: "whether a
reasonable person would have known that return of the product
would serve as rejection of those terms."15 The hearing judge
found that the language in the terms and conditions agreement
was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable person test, and in the
absence of an express disclaimer, Defendants could not
demonstrate that the purchasers assented to the terms and
conditions agreement.16 Accordingly, the hearing judge found
that Defendants could not compel Plaintiffs to enter arbitration. 17
In March 2004, the Superior Court entered a final judgment
denying Defendants' motions to stay proceedings and to compel
arbitration.18 Defendants subsequently appealed, at which time
the two motions were consolidated.19 In June 2005, "plaintiffs
filed an assented to motion to substitute a proposed class
representative that replaced Ms. DeFontes with Julianne Ricci"
after learning that Plaintiffs' counsel employed DeFontes.20
ANALYSIS & HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that
a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration is a
question of law, and as such, the appropriate standard of review is
commercial practice of including additional terms and conditions either on
the outside of a package or within it when it is shipped to the consumer. " Id.
at n.5.
15. Id. at 1064 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. The terms and conditions agreement read, in part: "By accepting
delivery of the computer systems, related products, and/or services and
support, andlor other products described on that invoice. [sic] You
('Customer') agrees [sic] to be bound by and accepts [sic] these terms and
conditions. . . ." Id. (alterations in original). The hearing judge combined the
terms and conditions agreements sent to DeFontes and Long, which
contained different language. Id. at n.6. In particular, DeFontes' agreement
did contain an express disclaimer. Id. Furthermore, the hearing judge did
not distinguish between the invoice and the shrinkwrap agreement, but this
issue was not addressed on appeal because Defendants failed to properly
preserve it at the hearing.
17. Id. at 1065.
18. Id.
19. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1065.
20. Id. at 1065. While this appeal was pending, the Superior Court
addressed other issues, which were ultimately appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. Id. at n.9; see Long v. Dell, No. 2007-346-M.P., 2009 WL
4791198 (R.I. Dec. 14, 2009).
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de novo.21 In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the
United State Supreme Court's finding that "arbitration is a matter
of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed to submit."22 Further, state
contract law governs whether the parties entered into an
agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the
transaction. 23 Accordingly, the hearing judge's determination is a
question of law subject to de novo review. 24
The Choice-of-Law Provision
After determining the appropriate standard of review, the
Court addressed the applicable law governing the formation of the
purported agreement. 25 Dell manufactured and distributed its
products in Texas, while the plaintiffs lived in Rhode Island.26
The terms and conditions agreement contained a choice-of-law
provision that stipulates that Texas law governs any disputes
arising from the transaction.27 As such, "parties are [generally]
permitted to agree that the law of a particular jurisdiction will
govern their transaction."28  That being said, Rhode Island's
procedural laws govern even if another state's substantive law
governs. 29
Here, Plaintiffs conceded that the choice-of-law is of no
consequence because both Texas and Rhode Island adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), which shifts the burden to
"the proponent of arbitration to prove the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate . . . ."30 Accordingly, the Court "assumes"
21. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1066.
22. Id. (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83
(2002)).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Envtl. Equip. Co.,
697 A.2d 323, 325 (R.I. 1997)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1062.
27. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1066.
28. Id. (quoting Terrace Group v. Vt. Castings, Inc., 753 A.2d 350, 353
(R.I. 2000)).
29. Id. at 1067 (citing McBurney v. The GM Card, 869 A.2d 586, 589 (R.I.
2005)).
30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that Texas law governs the transaction. 31
Formation of a Contract under the U.C.C.
The Court then analyzed the relevant provisions of the U.C.C.
to determine if and when the contract between the parties was
formed. U.C.C. § 2-204 provides that "the sale of goods may be
formed 'in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract."' 32 Moreover, "[t]he U.C.C. creates the assumption that,
unless circumstances unambiguously demonstrate otherwise, the
buyer is the offeror and the seller is the offeree." 33 Further, a
seller accepts a buyer's offer "by a prompt promise to ship or by
the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming
goods . . . ."34
The plaintiffs argued that the contract formed upon the
consumers' payment for the goods and Dell's promise to ship the
goods. 35 If this argument stands, "then any additional terms
would necessarily be treated as '[a]dditional [t]erms in
[a]cceptance or [c]onfirmation' under U.C.C. § 2-207 or offers to
modify the existing contract under U.C.C. § 2-209."36 However,
the prevailing view is that the buyer retains the power of
acceptance after the buyer receives the goods containing the
modified agreement, so long as the buyer retains the power to
either accept or return the goods.37
In reaching its conclusion, the Court discusses the two
prevailing views regarding shrinkwrap agreements. The
defendants urged the Court to adopt the majority view, initially
proposed in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg38 by Judge Frank
Easterbrook.39 In ProCD, the court held that "a buyer of software
was bound by an agreement that was included within the
packaging and later appeared when the buyer first used the
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204 (Vernon 1994)).
33. DeFontes, 984 A2d at 1067.
34. Id. (quoting § 2.206) (omission in original).
35. Id. at 1067-68.
36. Id. at 1068 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
37. Id.
38. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
39. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1068, 1069.
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software."40 The court went even further in Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc.41:
[W]hen a merchant delivers a product that includes
additional terms and conditions, but expressly provides
the consumer the right to either accept those terms of
return the product for a refund within a reasonable time,
a consumer who retains the goods beyond that period
may be bound by the contract.42
Other jurisdictions hearing similar suits against Dell have
accepted the majority view. 43
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, urged the Court to adopt the
minority view, proposed in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology.44 In Step-Saver Data Systems, the court held that the
buyer did not consent to additional or modified terms included
with the product by accepting the product.45 Instead, the buyer
must have expressly assented to the modified terms. 46
After addressing both views, the Court adopted the majority
view and rejected Plaintiffs' argument regarding the formation of
the contract.47 Accordingly, "formation occurs when the consumer
accepts the full terms after receiving a reasonable opportunity to
refuse them."48  However, the burden shifts to the seller to
establish that the buyer has accepted the seller's terms upon
receipt of the product.49
Application to the Facts of DeFontes
The Court addressed two issues. First, whether Dell and its
subsidiaries clearly established in the terms and conditions
40. Id. at 1968 (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53) (footnote omitted).
41. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997).
42. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1068 (citing Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-49)
(emphasis added).
43. Id. at 1069.
44. Id. at 1070; Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939
F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991).
45. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1070 (citing Step-Saver Data Systems, 939 F.2d
at 99).
46. Id. (citing Step-Saver Data Systems, 939 F.2d at 100).
47. Id. at 1071.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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agreement that the buyers could reject the terms and conditions
by returning the computers. 50  Second, whether the sellers
"reasonably invited acceptance" by clearly establishing in the
terms and conditions agreement that the purchasers were
assenting to the terms and conditions contained in the packages,
including the arbitration agreement, by accepting the
computers.51
Regarding the first issue, the terms and conditions agreement
sent to DeFontes contained language that explicitly notified her of
the appropriate means of rejecting the agreement. 52 Despite some
ambiguity in the language, the terms and conditions agreement in
DeFontes' package was probably adequate because it established
that DeFontes could reject the terms by returning the product. 53
However, the Court did not make a determination as to the
adequacy of the language because DeFontes was no longer a party
to the suit.54
The agreements sent to the remaining Plaintiffs, Long and
Ricci, did not contain the provisions contained in DeFontes'
documents, and thus failed to adequately articulate that the
consumers could reject the agreements by returning the
computers.55 Further, the terms and conditions agreements were
very confusing and problematic. The consumer was forced to piece
together two separate provisions, which, when read together, still
did not adequately explain to the reasonable consumer that he or
she may reject the terms by returning the computer.56 The Court
found that the agreement was too obscure and required the
consumer to draw too many inferences. 57 Accordingly, the Court
held that the shrinkwrap terms and conditions agreement did not
adequately inform the consumers of either (1) their right to reject
50. Id.
51. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1071.
52. Id. at 1072. The agreement stated, "[i]f for any reason Customer is
not satisfied with a Dell-branded hardware system, Customer may return the
system under the terms and conditions of Dell's Total Satisfaction Return
Policy . . . ." Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at n.16. The Court addressed DeFontes' agreement for the sole
purpose of illustrating the deficiencies in the agreements sent to the other
plaintiffs.
55. Id. at 1073.
56. Id.
57. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1073.
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the terms and agreements condition by returning the computers
or (2) of the appropriate method of rejection of the agreements. 8
In regard to the second issue, the language in the terms and
conditions agreement put the purchasers on notice of Defendants'
intent to bind them to the agreement, but the agreement did not
dictate to the purchasers the length of time they had to accept the
terms. 59 Defendants argued that a reasonable consumer would be
familiar with the phrase "accepting delivery."60  The Court
disagreed. The phrase "acceptance of goods" has a legal
connotation that a reasonable consumer would not understand.6 1
To address this issue, the Court noted that many jurisdictions
require the seller to explicitly state the length of time a consumer
can retain a product before assenting by silence.62 Here, the
Court found that "a reasonably prudent offeree would [not]
understand that by keeping the Dell computer he or she was
agreeing to be bound by the terms and conditions agreement . . .
."63 Thus, the Court held that the consumers did not agree to the
shrinkwrap terms and conditions agreement, including the
arbitration provision, by accepting the computers. 64
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1071.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1072. As defined by statute, "[a]cceptance of goods occurs
when the buyer":
(1) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to
the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain
them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(2) fails to make an effective rejection.. . , but such acceptance does
not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them; or
(3) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such
act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if
ratified by him.
Id. at n.15 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.606(a) (Vernon 1994)).
62. Id. at 1071. These terms are referred to as "approve-or-return"
agreements. Id.
63. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1073.
64. Id.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the issue of
which party has the power of acceptance in a case involving the
shipment of goods containing an agreement stipulating additional
terms. Courts throughout the country are divided as to these
agreements, commonly referred to as "shrinkwrap" agreements,
and the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code has similarly
failed to take a stand, instead deferring to the courts.65 Here, the
Court found that the buyer possesses the power of acceptance, but
the burden lies with the seller to show that the buyer has accepted
the terms by retaining the product. This burden entails providing
clear and unambiguous terms and conditions that inform the
buyer on his or her ability to accept or reject the terms and
conditions agreement and the proper method by which to reject
the agreement.
However, the Court left two questions unanswered. First, the
Court determined that the buyer accepts the terms after having a
"reasonable opportunity" to refuse them.66 However, the Court
did not address how much time constitutes a "reasonable
opportunity." Instead, the Court referenced other jurisdictions
that provide thirty days after the date of delivery.6 7 Having
adopted these courts' holdings regarding which party possesses
the power of acceptance, the Court should have held that a buyer
assents to the terms contained in a shrinkwrap agreement after
retaining the product for thirty days after delivery. In the absence
of such a holding, the Court will have to resolve this issue in the
future.
Further, the Court found that the seller caries the burden of
proving that the buyer accepts the full terms and conditions of the
agreement. Unfortunately, the Court failed to articulate what the
seller must show to demonstrate acceptance. The Court did,
however, indicate that the seller must provide clear, explicit and
unambiguous terms. Even so, the issues will likely arise again,
and the Court will have to set some standard defining the seller's
burden.
65. Id. at 1071 n. 13; see U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 5 (2003).
66. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071.
67. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a contract is
formed when a buyer accepts the full terms and conditions of a
shrinkwrap agreement after having a "reasonable opportunity" to
refuse them.68 The Court also found that the seller carries the
burden of proving that the buyer has accepted the seller's terms
upon receipt of the product.69 Here, the seller did not enter into
an agreement with the buyers because the terms and conditions
agreement did not provide adequate notice to the buyers that the
buyers could refuse the terms and conditions by returning the
product. 70 Further, the sellers did not enter into a valid contract
because they did not adequately inform the buyers that by
retaining the product, the buyer assents to the terms and
conditions of the agreement. 71 Therefore, the Supreme Court
affirmed the hearing judge's decision denying Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration, and subsequently remanded the case to the
Superior Court. 72
Greg Rosenfeld
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1073.
71. Id.
72. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1073.
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Contract Law. Shappy v. Downcity Partners, Ltd., 973 A.2d 40
(R.I. 2009). The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided that as a
matter of law, Plaintiff was negligent in signing a quitclaim deed
without reading it first. The deed conveyed Plaintiffs property to
his son-in-law, who defaulted on a mortgage loan for that property
resulting in a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff claimed that he was
fraudulently induced into signing the deed. The Court rejected his
claim reasoning that, even if Plaintiff was fraudulently induced
into signing the deed, his negligence bars recovery and protects
the bona fide purchaser.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 9, 2005, plaintiff Shappy sought pre-approval
for a mortgage loan on a property he desired to purchase through
his son-in-law, Cataldo, who was a mortgage broker.1 During
their discussions, Cataldo informed Shappy that he may be
required to relinquish another property that he already owned as
collateral to secure pre-approval for the loan and that this security
measure was simply a fall-back, "only if we need it," measure. 2
Relying on Cataldo's representation, Shappy signed a document
conveying his Johnston property, 87 Benfield Drive, to Cataldo.3
Shappy admits that out of trust in his son-in-law he disregarded
the fact that the document was entitled "Quit-Claim Deed" and
contained a notary clause, deciding not to bother reading it
thoroughly.4
On January 24, 2006, after supposedly taking advantage of
his father-in-law, Cataldo recorded his quitclaim deed for 87
Benfield Drive, and entered into a term mortgage loan with
Downcity, in which he borrowed $110,000, and executed a
promissory note that the property served to secure; the loan was
1. Shappy v. Downcity Capital Partners, Ltd., 973 A.2d 40, 41 (R.I.
2009).
2. See id. at 42.
3. Id. at 41-42.
4. Id. at 42.
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to be satisfied by a single payment on February 1, 2007.5 Cataldo
defaulted on his promissory note with Downcity and decided to
grant a second mortgage on the property to RESOL, LLC to secure
an additional $50,000 loan.6 It is undisputed that both Downcity
and RESOL relied on the validity of Cataldo's recorded quitclaim
deed, and neither of them had knowledge of Shappy's belief that
he did not convey property to Cataldo. 7 Downcity then scheduled
a foreclosure sale for June 20, 2007 as a result of Cataldo's
default. 8
Shappy learned of the foreclosure and commenced an action
against Cataldo and Downcity on June 15, 2007 asserting that
Cataldo fraudulently induced him into signing the quitclaim deed;
as a result, he sought to enjoin Downcity's pending foreclosure
sale, requested that the court vacate and declare the quitclaim
deed and the mortgage deed void, and requested punitive damages
for Cataldo's "malicious conduct."9 With its answer to Shappy's
complaint, Downcity filed a cross-claim against Cataldo for the
amount owed under the mortgage loan. 10 The Superior Court
granted RESOL's motion to intervene, and RESOL filed an
answer and a cross-claim against Cataldo for the amount that he
owed under the second mortgage that the property secured. 11 On
January 15, 2008, Downcity filed a motion for summary judgment
of Shappy's claims against it as well as its cross-claim against
Cataldo, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure.12 Plaintiff filed an objection to Downcity's motion with
supporting documents claiming that he believed that his signature
on the quitclaim deed was a formality of the process to secure a
loan for the property that he had agreed to purchase. 13
On March 3, 2008, the Superior Court held a hearing on
Downcity's motion for summary judgment.14 At the hearing,
Plaintiff relied on Dante State Bank v. Calenda, 183 A. 873 (R.I.
5. Id. at 42 n.2.
6. Id. at 42.
7. See Shappy, 973 A.2d at 42.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Shappy, 973 A.2d at 42.
14. Id. at 43.
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1936), in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that "even a
bona fide purchaser may not enforce its rights under an
instrument if the signer, who was fraudulently induced into
signing the instrument, was free of negligence."15 Plaintiff argued
that Downcity's motion for summary judgment should not have
been granted because whether he was negligent is a question of
fact to be decided by a jury.16 Downcity and RESOL agreed that
Cataldo fraudulently induced Shappy to sign the deed; however,
they believed that Shappy was negligent as a matter of law when
he failed to read17 the deed before signing it.18
The Providence County Superior Court Judge granted
Downcity's motion on its cross-claim against Cataldo for money
owed under the loan.19 Further, the judge ruled that Downcity
and RESOL were bona fide purchasers and that Shappy's actions
of signing the conveyance led to their decision to "extend the
financial accommodations they did to Mr. Cataldo in exchange for
his promissory notes and the security received by them."20 The
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Downcity
and RESOL, with a final judgment entered for Downcity on March
4, 2008, and for RESOL on March 11, 2008.21 Plaintiff timely
appealed. 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On review de novo, the Court emphasized the need to protect
the interest of bona fide purchasers who innocently rely on
recorded deeds; the Court defined bona fide purchaser to mean the
following: a "purchaser for value, in good faith, and without any
knowledge of adverse claims."23 The law will protect the bona fide
purchaser allowing him to enforce the instrument provided that
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. At one point Plaintiff argued that the deed did not contain terms of
conveyance, contradicting his earlier statements that he failed to completely
read the document. See id. at 42-43.
18. Id. at 43.
19. Shappy, 973 A.2d at 43.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 44 (citing Fleckhamer v. Fleckhamer, 147 A. 886, 888 (R.I.
1929)).
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there was negligence on the part of the signing party.24 Plaintiffs
argument that his negligence should be an issue for the jury is
incorrect because where the facts of the case lead to only one
reasonable conclusion, the trial judge may decide the issue as a
matter of law.25 The Court reasoned that unlike the signer in
Dante State Bank, Shappy reads and understands English, and he
admittedly had enough time to read the conveyance but chose not
to before signing,26 and therefore he agreed to the terms set forth
in the document. 27 Failing to read a document before signing it
does not relieve one of its obligations, and no reasonable person
would have signed this document without reading it first;
therefore, Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law and is thus
barred from interrupting bona fide purchasers' (in this case
Downcity and RESOL) enforcement of the deed and decision to
foreclose. 28
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court is making a statement that
parties to agreements cannot hide behind the fraud protection
when they had the means to avoid the fraud. In this case,
Plaintiff was negligent in not fully reading or considering the
terms of which he obligated himself. If the Court had allowed
Plaintiff to hide behind the fraud protection, it could discourage
third parties from entering into contracts for fear that their
agreements would be void should any party by chance be ill-
informed. It is a relief that the Courts will protect bona fide
purchasers by holding parties accountable for actions under their
own control.
CONCLUSION
In Shappy v. Downcity Captial Partners, Ltd., the Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed the Providence County Superior
24. Id. at 45 (citing Dante State Bank, 183 A. at 880).
25. Shappy, 973 A.2d at 45. (quoting Kennedy v. Providence Hockey
Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977)).
26. Plaintiff testified during deposition that he had time to read the
document, '" but [he] didn't see no [sic] reason."' Id. at 46 n.7.
27. Id. (quoting Carter v. Carter, 291 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Va. 1982)).
28. See id. at 46.
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Court's decision to grant defendants Downcity and RESOL's
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff claimed that Downcity
should not be able to collect on the mortgage for, or participate in
a foreclosure sale of, property in which he claimed was
fraudulently conveyed to defendant Cataldo who then secured
mortgages with Downcity and RESOL. The Court held that
Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law when signing a
quitclaim deed for his property, and therefore it was necessary to
protect Downcity and RESOL, the bona fide purchasers of the
deed per Cataldo's default on mortgage payments.
Jennifer L. Aybar
Criminal Law/Procedure. State v. Byrne, 972 A.2d 633 (R.I.
2009). The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a Superior
Court decision suppressing evidence recovered from a suspect's
home due to the failure of the police in their search warrant to
support a reasonable inference that criminal evidence stemming
from an incident at a defendant's place of business would be found
at his home. Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, then-
acting Chief Justice Goldberg vacated and remanded the Superior
Court ruling, holding that the search warrant and the reasonable
inference that a digital camera could easily be transported from a
suspect's business to his home established a sufficient nexus
between the items sought and the location to be searched to
uphold the warrant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 17, 2005, Roxanne and Simon Smith and their
ten-year old daughter, Barbara, visited the Off-Center Coffee
House in Warren.' Defendant Thomas Byrne, the proprietor of
the coffee shop, was an acquaintance of the Smith family, and
Barbara asked to stay at the coffee shop to help out when Mr. and
Mrs. Smith were ready to leave. 2
After Mr. and Mrs. Smith left the coffee shop, Byrne allegedly
asked Barbara if she wanted to see the "museum" he maintained
downstairs. 3  Upon their arrival downstairs, Byrne asked
Barbara, who was wearing a mini-skirt, to kneel down beside his
dog so he could take a picture; he asked that she lift her knees
into a crouching position. 4 After snapping the picture, Barbara
stood up and Byrne dropped down to one knee, and zoomed his
camera in on the area below Barbara's stomach.5
1. State v. Byrne, 972 A.2d 633, 635-36 (R.I. 2009). A footnote to the
Court's opinion notes that fictitious names are used to afford this family a
measure of privacy.
2. Id. at 636.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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After leaving the basement and walking upstairs, Byrne
asked Barbara to clean lamps that were hanging from the ceiling.6
After climbing on top of a table to better reach the lamps, Barbara
saw Byrne's reflection in a mirror on a nearby wall and realized
that he was aiming his camera lens underneath her skirt.7
Barbara's parents became aware of these incidents later that day,
after Barbara became distraught while preparing for a ride to
Boston. 8
Barbara and her mother submitted written statements
detailing these allegations to Detective Joel Camera of the Warren
Police Department, who then included the allegations in an
affidavit in support of a warrant to search the Off-Center Coffee
House as well as Byrne's Barrington residence.9  Detective
Camera asked the District Court for permission to search those
locations "and seize any and all camera(s), computer(s), lap tops
[sic], electronic and digital data storage devices such as disk
drives, floppy disks, CD's, DVD's, etc. as well as contraband or
evidence of criminal activity."10 The search warrant was granted
on September 20, 2005, and upon its execution the Warren and
Barrington Police Departments found two cameras - one of which
was digital - in Byrne's bedroom. 11 These items were seized;
police were able to recover approximately one hundred digital
photographs from Byrne's camera, including photographs of
Barbara kneeling beside Byrne's dog and photographs of
underwear matching the pair Barbara wore on the day she stayed
6. Id.
7. Byrne, 972 A.2d at 636.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. State of Rhode Island v. Byrne, No. P2-05-3432A, P2-05-3433A, 1, 9
n.2 (R.I. Super.Ct. filed Nov. 5, 2007) (Westlaw). Footnote 2. The footnote
includes the final paragraph of Det. Camera's affidavit in its entirety:
"Therefore, I respectfully request that the court issue a warrant to search the
Off Center Coffee House on 30 Child Street, Warren Rhode Island, 02885 and
Thomas P. Byrne's residence located at 93 Walnut Road[,] Barrington[,]
Rhode Island, 02806 and seize any and all camera(s), computer(s), lap tops
[sic], electronic and digital data storage devices such as zip drives, floppy
disks, CD's, DVD's, etc. [sic] [a]s well as contraband or evidence of criminal
activity."
11. Byrne, 972 A.2d at 636. Police also seized a clear plastic bag of
marijuana, $567 in cash, a scale that police concluded was used to weigh
marijuana, and a potted marijuana plant found on the back deck of Byrne's
residence.
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at Byrne's coffee shop. 12 Byrne was subsequently charged with
violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 11-64-2, a felony, by "using an imaging
device to capture images of the intimate area of a ten year-old girl
without her knowledge or consent."13
Byrne moved to suppress the evidence found at his home;
Superior Court Judge Daniel A. Procaccini granted the motion,
holding that the warrant to search Byrne's home lacked any facts
to support a reasonable inference that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found at Byrne's home.14 Judge Procaccini
concluded that Det. Camera's affidavit failed to establish a nexus
between the items to be seized - cameras and photographs - and
the location to be searched.15  The state appealed Judge
Procaccini's decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Det. Camera's affidavit supplied the District Court with enough
information to draw a reasonable inference of probable cause to
search Byrne's home for photographs taken at his business. 16 The
state argued that the warrant did provide probable cause due to
the "fairly probable" inference that Byrne would take the camera
containing the images to his home.17 After noting that probable
cause must be found within the four corners of the affidavit
prepared in support of a search warrant18 and that the affidavit
should be interpreted in a realistic fashion consistent with
common sense1 9, the Court declared "it is our view that a
reasonable inference could be drawn from the facts that the
camera - the instrumentality of the crime and a handheld, easily
transportable item of personal property - could be found" at
Byrne's home.20
12. Id.
13. Id. at 637. Byrne was also charged with unlawfully cultivating and
possessing marijuana.
14. State of Rhode Island v. Byrne, No. P2-05-3432A, P2-05-3433A at 11.
15. Byrne, 972 A.2d at 637.
16. See id. at 639.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 638.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 640.
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To support its holding, the Court first looked to
Massachusetts, and the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Anthony.21 In Anthony, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that the necessary nexus between criminal activity and
the location to be searched need not be based on direct
observation, but can be found "in the type of crime, the nature of
the items sought, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for
concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would
be likely to hide [the items sought]."22
The Rhode Island Supreme Court then reasons that the facts
and circumstances of this case compel an analysis under the
Anthony holding. When seeking to define the type of crime Byrne
is alleged to have committed, the Court "cannot escape" the
similarities between photographing the undergarments of a ten-
year old girl and possessing and viewing child pornography, which
"is, by it's nature, a solitary and secretive crime."23 The Court
also concludes that a camera - usually a "small, easily
transportable item of personal property"24 - by its nature supports
an inference that it might be found Byrne's home. 25 The Court
also notes the lack of evidence to indicate that the camera found at
Byrne's home was work related or in any way connected to his
operation of the coffee house.26
The Court also dismisses Byrne's contention that Det.
Camera's affidavit did not contain any underlying facts from
which an inference that a camera would be found at his home
could be drawn, holding that "because a judicial officer may draw
reasonable inferences from the nature of the crime alleged in the
affidavit and the instrumentality used in it's commission, we are
satisfied that the affidavit in this case provided an adequate basis
for the District Court judge's finding of probable cause." 27 The
Court further supports its holding by stating that a judicial
officer's decision to issue a search warrant "is to be accorded great
21. Byrne, 927 A.2d at 640; Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 59,
883 N.E.2d 918, 926. (2008).
22. Byrne, 972 A.2d at 640.
23. Id. at 640-41.
24. Id. at 641.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 642.
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deference by reviewing courts, and in close cases, the validity of
the warrant should be upheld."28
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision here creates a
significant expansion of police authority and shows clear deference
to police authorities over criminal defendants. Because the Court
upheld the validity of a search where the warrant did not
articulate any reasonable belief that the items sought in
connection with an alleged incident his holding substantially
lowers the "substantial basis" test undertaken by an issuing
judicial officer.
There are other aspects of this opinion that compel comment.
It is noteworthy that the Court could not justify its end here by
looking to existing Rhode Island case law. It found a suitable
precedent by looking to its "learned colleagueS" 29 on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Even after looking to
other states for applicable case law, the Court still has to twist the
facts to fit the law it has chosen. Despite admitting that the
photographic images taken by Byrne "may not rise to the level of
child pornography" 30 the Court still treats them as exactly that to
allow for a neater analysis under Anthony. 31 It does not minimize
or condone Byrne's alleged conduct to acknowledge - as the Court
does - that it is not child pornography. The Court's eagerness to
ignore this distinction when applying the law of its choice is
disturbing.
Judge Procaccini's Superior Court ruling noted that "a search
is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or
bad when it starts and does not change character from its
success." 32 Despite considerable effort to bring the facts before it
28. Byrne, 927 A.2d at 642.
29. Id. at 640.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 641. The Court, quoting United States v. Lamb, 945 F.Supp.
441, 460 (N.D.N.Y.1996), mentions the "imprimatur of severe social stigma"
carried by images of child pornography, as well as the likelihood that
"persons interested in those materials" would hoard them in their homes,
when supporting its holding that the images allegedly taken by Byrne, by
their nature, create the requisite nexus to search a home.
32. State of Rhode Island v. Byrne, No. P2-05-3432A, P2-05-3433A at 5.
2010] 307
308 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:303
in line with its chosen doctrine, the Supreme Court here chose to
"change the character" of this search and put itself in the business
of augmenting deficient affidavits on behalf of the police. If
followed, this decision will make it more difficult for Rhode Island
citizens to assert their Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; instead of simply holding
that reasonable inferences should be articulated in a supporting
affidavit when a search warrant is sought, the Court has
proclaimed itself able to find reasonable inferences - and probable
cause - between the lines of a supporting affidavit where, and
whenever, it wants too.
CONCLUSION
Justice Goldberg concludes the Court's opinion thusly: "Ve
hold that, based on the nature of the alleged offense and the
instrumentality used in its commission, the District Court judge
who issued the warrant had a substantial basis to find that there
was probable cause to believe that the defendant would conceal
the illicit images in his home."33 The Supreme Court vacated the
Superior Court order and remanded the case. 34
David Leveillee
(quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
33. Byrne, 972 A.2d at 641.
34. Id. at 643
Criminal Law/Procedure. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667 (R.I.
2009). According to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence, admission of prior inconsistent statements are allowed
as substantive evidence so long as the party declaring it is
available for cross-examination and testifies at trial. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court determined that a prior inconsistent
statement may be sufficient, and the judge will allow it to go to
the jury, to support a criminal conviction. So long as there is
credible and substantive evidence in addition to the prior
inconsistent statement, the jury will determine if it satisfies the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Appellant Gerardo Cardona was arrested and charged with
two counts of domestic assault against his wife, Catherine
Cardona, and her son Bernard Baton.1 When officers arrived at
the scene, Catherine told them she had witnessed her husband
beat her son, alleged that he had also harassed her as she tried to
call the police, and signed a witness statement confirming those
allegations. 2  Appellant was also issued a no-contact order
prohibiting him from having any contact with Bernard or
Catherine.3 However, at trial Catherine changed her testimony to
say that it appeared as if her husband and son were in an
altercation, refused to look at the witness statement she signed,
and claimed that she only asked about a restraining order because
she had been fighting with Appellant over an old girlfriend.4
Testimony by two patrolmen on the scene, Officer Craig Young
and Officer Sean Clarke, confirmed the initial statements that
Catherine made, as well as the fact that she signed the witness
statement.5
Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal for assault against
1. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 671.
5. Id.
309
310 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:309
Catherine at the close of the state's case, and the motion was
denied. 6 The jury convicted the appellant of domestic assault on
and domestic battery on both Catherine and Bernard.7 Appellant
then moved for a new trial, arguing that Catherine's prior
inconsistent statement was insufficient evidence to support the
criminal conviction, and the trial judge denied his motion.8
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Appellant
claims that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial because the
verdict was only supported by Catherine's prior inconsistent
statement, which he argued was insufficient evidence as a matter
of law.9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In regards to Appellant's three arguments on appeal, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that: (1) trial testimony
supported Catherine's prior inconsistent statement sufficiently to
support Appellant's convictions,10 (2) the jury instructions
adequately explained the standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt,11 and (3) even though the criminal information only
specifically mentioned assault, the Court did not err when it
instructed the jury on both assault and battery.12
When a defendant's motion challenges sufficiency of evidence,
the Court must look at the evidence in light of the jury charge,
"independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence," and then determine if he or she would
have reached a different result than the jury did.13 Furthermore,
6. Id.
7. Cardona, 969 A.2d at 671.
8. Id. at 671-72. The Court sentenced him to five years in the Adult
Correctional Institution, one year to serve on each count to run concurrently,
the balance suspended, with probation, and the petitioner appealed. Id. at
672.
9. Id. The appellant also made two other arguments, claiming that the
trial judge mistakenly failed to include a jury instruction that suspicion alone
is insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that his criminal information only charged him with assault and so the trial
judge erred in instructing the jury on assault and battery. Id.
10. Id. at 674.
11. Id. at 675.
12. Id. at 676.
13. Cardona, 969 A.2d at 672 (citing State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121
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the Court will only overrule a previous ruling if it seems the trial
judge committed a clear error or overlooked a material or critical
piece of evidence.14 Here, the Court determined that the state's
evidence was not limited to Catherine's prior inconsistent
statement, but other relevant evidence included the testimony of
the two police officers on the scene and the facts that Catherine
and Bernard were both noticeably upset and that Bernard had
grass stains on his clothes, lifting his shirt when asked about a
possible assault.' 5 In addition, it is reasonable to assume that
Catherine might have altered her testimony to attempt to protect
Appellant because of their close relationship.' 6 Therefore, the
Court upheld the trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion
for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial. 17 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court on all counts. 18
COMMENTARY
State v. Cardona is a crucial Rhode Island Supreme Court
case because courts are frequently confronted with a victim of
domestic violence changing her testimony to protect the abuser
once they have been arrested and charged.19 Therefore, if courts
(R.I. 2006)).
14. Id. at 672-73 (citing State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 187 (R.I. 2003)).
15. Id. at 673.
16. Id.
17. Before the jury charge, the trial judge had provided a written copy of
the jury instructions to counsel, and defense counsel did not object, but rather
requested additional instructions. Id. at 674. However, the Court
determined that while a defendant is free to request instructions, "there is no
requirement that the trial justice use any particular words or phrases in that
instruction." Id. (citing State v. Palmer, 962 A.2d 758, 769 (R.I. 2009)).
Therefore, the requested language was not necessary, and the jury
instructions adequately explained the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 675.
18. Id. at 676. The Court determined that assault and battery are both
chargeable under Rhode Island General Laws § 11-5-3. Id. at 675. The
Supreme Court reasoned, therefore, that while the two crimes are
independent from each other, they are "closely related and often arise from a
single incident." Id. (citing Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I. 1983)).
Furthermore, the appellant was never convicted of or sentenced to a criminal
battery, so it was not error for the trial judge to instruct the jury on battery,
in addition to assault. Id. at 676.
19. Cardona, 969 A.2d at 669.
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uphold a burden of proof that is too high, abusers may be freed
simply because their victim changes their testimony at the time of
trial. Here, the Court considered all the circumstances, including
testimony by officers, physical evidence, and conduct of the parties
when the police arrived at the scene, which seems to have
produced the right result. Furthermore, the Court also took
Catherine's reliability into account, conceding that a court must
consider the relationship between the abuser and the victim
because that relationship may "influence the victim's memories
and eventual testimony concerning what occurred."20
In cases such as this one, the state must prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.21 The trial judge was correct in rejecting
Defendant's request that the jury also be instructed that "surmise,
suspicion, or hunch alone is not enough to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."22 Instructions to that extent would certainly
influence juries unfairly, emphasizing that they need concrete
evidence, and perhaps even implying that the victims are
fabricating their initial allegations. 23 So long as the trial judge
determines that the state has satisfied a threshold of sufficient
evidence, the case should go to the jury with instructions on
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the factfinder should then be
allowed to make the determination.
By altering jury instructions in the manner defense counsel
suggested, the jury will be implicitly suspicious of victims who
provide any statements that may be inconsistent. However, the
reality of domestic violence shows that victims may change their
testimony out of fear or protection for the abuser. Therefore, it is
ideal to properly instruct juries on the law of reasonable doubt so
that even if these victims change their testimony, if the state is
able to present its case through other means, such as in this case,
the jury can make a sufficient determination of whether that
alleged abuser is guilty. If a judge alters the jury instructions, he
or she effectively takes the decision out of the factfinder's hands,
and has too much influence in the outcome of the trial.
20. Id. at 673.
21. Id. at 674.
22. Id.
23. The trial judge was careful to instruct the jury that the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt "cannot be a fanciful or whimsical doubt," but
must in fact be "a doubt based on reason." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that if prior
inconsistent statements are supported by substantial and credible
evidence, a defendant may be found guilty of domestic abuse
beyond a reasonable doubt.24 Such evidence as the testimony of
the police officers, the fact that Catherine and Bernard were
noticeably upset at the scene, and physical evidence 25 of assault
were sufficient to convict appellant despite Catherine's prior
inconsistent statement.26
Rebecca Aitchison
24. Id. at 673.
25. Id. Bernard had grass stains on his shirt, and when asked about a
possible assault, he lifted up his shirt to show officers. Id.
26. Id.
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Criminal Law/Procedure. State v. Collazo, 967 A.2d 1106 (R.I.
2009). Where the judge, in a jury-waived trial, does not overlook
or misconceive material evidence, the Supreme Court will give
deference to the fact-finder. The trial judge did not commit
reversible error in finding that the defendant failed to prove his
legal insanity in a first degree murder charge by a preponderance
of the evidence. The determination of whether a defendant lacks
criminal responsibility due to a mental illness is a question of fact
to be determined by the fact-finder.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 10, 2002, Defendant Robert Collazo was found by
the Central Falls Police Department and emergency medical
personnel in Jenks Park. 1 Earlier that day, Defendant arrived at
the home of his friend, Brian Araujo in Central Falls, Rhode
Island.2 After a brief conversation with one another, the two
decided to walk to nearby Jenks Park to smoke marijuana. 3
Defendant subsequently pocketed a steak knife from the kitchen.4
Roughly one hour later, Defendant stabbed Araujo twice in the
chest with the knife he had pocketed from the Araujo home. 5 In
front of multiple witnesses, Defendant pushed Araujo down two
sets of stairs, and subsequently "kicked and stomped on Araujo's
head, chest, and throat."6 Defendant walked to Cogswell Tower
within Jenks Park, smoked a cigarette, and subsequently returned
to Araujo's body.7 After a witness identified Defendant as the
injurer, police took Defendant into custody, whereupon Araujo's
ATM card was found in Defendant's front shirt pocket. 8 When
questioned about the blood on his shoes, clothes, and hands,
1. State v. Collazo, 967 A.2d 1106, 1107 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1107.
8. Id. at 1107-08.
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Defendant responded that he was trying to save his friend.9 It
was around this time that Araujo was pronounced dead. 10
At the police station, Defendant denied having injured
Araujo.11 Defendant's alibi was that Araujo and he went to the
park to smoke marijuana; however, they realized they needed a
lighter.12 According to Defendant, before exiting the park to find
a lighter, he heard Araujo scream for help, and saw Araujo "lying
on the ground stabbed [. . .] and gasping for air."13 Defendant
claimed that he thought this was the product of a robbery, which
was why he took the ATM card for safekeeping.14 After stating
that he suffered from schizophrenia, Defendant hastily changed
his story.15 Among other things,16 Defendant referred to Araujo
as "Satan's incarnate" and declared that he wanted Araujo to
"suffer as much as possible before he died."17 He stated that he
committed the murder on a Sunday because "[i]t's the day that
God rested."18
On August 30, 2002, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury
for the murder of Araujo; Defendant moved to rely on the insanity
defense, and waived his right to a jury trial.19 After undergoing
six pretrial competency evaluations, 20 Defendant was found
competent to stand trial.21 During the trial, which commenced on
9. Id. at 1107.
10. Id. at 1108.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1108.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Defendant also boasted of stabbing and beating Araujo, and
referred to the victim as "evil" because "he existed" and "he alleged, without
elaboration, that Araujo had raped at least one of defendant's girlfriends,
though he acknowledged that it had been a while since he had had a
girlfriend. He asserted that he wanted to watch Araujo die and [...] also
expressed regret that the murder was not televised and that more people,
including his own family, were not present to witness the murder. Finally,
defendant claimed that he had planned the murder years in advance." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1108.
20. Id. "Three of these evaluations determined defendant to be
incompetent. The other three evaluations, including the last, concluded that
defendant was competent to stand trial." Id. at 1108 n.2.
21. Id. at 1108.
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March 23, 2006, Defendant primarily relied upon the testimony of
his expert-witneSS22 Ronald Stewart, M.D., a board-certified
psychiatrist. 23
Dr. Stewart evaluated Defendant several times after the
murder and testified to the prior documentation of Defendant's
numerous hospitalizations for psychotic and suicidal behavior. 24
Based upon Defendant's symptoms and behavior, Dr. Stewart
stated that Defendant suffered from schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic
disorder, and antisocial personality disorder.25 Furthermore, Dr.
Stewart believed that Defendant, at the time of the murder,
suffered from a paranoid delusion; therefore Defendant was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. 26
To rebut the expert testimony of Dr. Stewart, the State
introduced the expert testimony of board-certified psychiatrist,
Robert Cserr, M.D.27 Dr. Cserr disagreed with Dr. Stewart's
interpretation of the role that these illnesses played in the
murder.28 Dr. Cserr believed that Defendant had not suffered
from a paranoid delusion at the time of the murder, but rather
"the murder was the product of anger due to his personality
disorder."29 This conclusion was evidenced by "the calmness and
deliberateness with which Defendant had planned and executed
the murder and the degree to which he clearly recollected the
details of the crime."30 Although Defendant suffered from these
illnesses, Dr. Cserr believed Defendant could appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions and could conform his conduct to the
22. Id. Defendant did not challenge the state's evidence at trial that he
had in fact murdered the victim. The defendant also did not produce any of
his own evidence contradicting this contention. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1108-09.
25. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1109.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. "Dr. Cserr maintained that the murder was the product of anger
that defendant had failed to control due to his personality disorder. He
hypothesized that the anger derived from a sexual relationship between
defendant and Araujo, which the latter had initiated, and which defendant
had revealed to Dr. Cserr as having troubled him." Id.
30. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
requirements of law. 31
In his November 1, 2006 opinion, the trial judge found Dr.
Cserr's testimony to be more reliable and credible than that of Dr.
Stewart. 32 The trial judge agreed with Dr. Cserr that the mental
illnesses did not substantially impair Defendant's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, nor did they impair his
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 33 The
trial judge consequently sentenced Defendant to the statutorily
defined term of life imprisonment 34 and Defendant appealed. 35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in
believing the testimony of Dr. Cserr over the testimony of Dr.
Stewart. 36 Defendant questions only the trial judge's conclusion
that Defendant was legally sane at the time of the murder.3 7
Defendant does not challenge the evidence that shows that his
appreciation for the criminality of his conduct, but that the
evidence shows he lacked the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act or conform it to law. 38
Standard of Review
The Supreme Court will give substantial deference to the fact-
finder regarding its determination of whether "a defendant lacks
criminal responsibility due to a mental illness."39  "[T]he
reviewing court will not disturb a trial justice's findings of fact in
a jury-waived trial unless [. ... ] the trial justice misconceived or
31. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1109.
32. Id. at 1109-10.
33. Id. at 1110.
34. R.I.G.L. 1956 § 11-23-2. "Every person guilty of murder in the first
degree shall be imprisoned for life."
35. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1110.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. "[T]he insanity defense, place[s] great burdens on the trier of fact.
[] As an appellate court with only the cold, lifeless record to guide us, we
naturally defer to the trier of fact who heard the witness' tone of voice, saw
their facial expressions and presumably caught the trial's subtleties - all of
which may be lost in the written word." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cain,
503 A.2d 959, 971 (P.A. 1986)).
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overlooked material evidence on a controlling issue." 40 Thus, the
reviewing court may decide to uphold a trial judge's conclusion
"even if [the reviewing court] would have found differently had
[they] been in the trial justice's position."41
Defendant's Criminal Responsibility for the Murder of Brian
Araujo
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code test for legal insanity in State v.
Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476.42
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
defect, his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he
cannot justly be held responsible. 43
The Rhode Island Supreme Court made a conscious decision to use
the word "wrongfulness" over "criminality" in its definition
because "a person who, knowing an act to be criminal, committed
it because of a delusion that the act was morally justified, should
not be automatically foreclosed from raising the defense of lack of
criminal responsibility."44 Although a defendant may engage in
bizarre behavior or made unusual statements, this, in and of
itself, does not compel a finding of insanity; a defendant may have
a mental illness without being declared legally insane.45
While the State bears the burden of proving all the elements
of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant who raises the
insanity defense bears the burden of proving his or her insanity by
a preponderance of the evidence. 46 "A defendant not only must
prove that he suffered from this defect at the time of the offense,
but also that he suffered from this defect to such a degree that he
40. State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I. 2006).
41. LaCroix, 911 A.2d at 679.
42. See Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1111.
43. Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979)).
44. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Johnson, 399 A.2d at 477).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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cannot justly be held responsible for the crime."47
In assessing a defendant's claim of legal insanity, the trial
judge (in a jury-waived trial) takes into account expert testimony
in addition to the defendant's actions surrounding the crime.48 In
a legal insanity determination, it is the expert psychiatrist who
informs the fact-finder as to the defendant's mental state.49 The
psychiatrist testifies as to the defendant's characteristics,
potentialities and capabilities, from which the fact-finder decides
whether the defendant should or should not be held accountable
for his acts.50
Here, there is no suggestion that the trial judge misconceived
or overlooked material evidence in finding the defendant
accountable for the murder.51 The trial transcript indicates that
the trial judge considered and understood both expert witnesses'
testimony, and found that of Dr. Cserr to be more reliable and
credible. 52 The trial judge conveyed his concern that Dr. Stewart
chose to believe some of Defendant's statements regarding the
incident, while doubting other statements made by Defendant. 53
The trial judge agreed with Dr. Cserr that Defendant
understood the wrongfulness of his conduct, evidenced by the fact
that Defendant created an alibi, repeatedly denied wrongdoing,
concocted a story to make the incident seem like a robbery, and
attempted to save Araujo's life. 54  Additionally, the physical
evidence, eyewitness testimony, and videotaped confession
admitted at trial were consistent with Dr. Cserr's testimony.55 In
light of the reviewing court's deference to the fact-finder, and
because the trial judge did not overlook or misconceive material
evidence, the trial judge "did not commit reversible error in
finding that the defendant failed to prove his legal insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence."56
47. Id. (quoting Johnson, 399 A.2d at 478).
48. See id.; see also State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929, 936-37 (R.I. 2001).
49. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1111.
50. Id. at 1111-12.
51. Id. at 1112.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1112 n.10.
54. Id.
55. Collazo, 967 A.2d 1112.
56. Id.
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COMMENTARY
The question before the Rhode Island Supreme Court was a
clarification of the deference, and the reasons thereof, that are
given to the fact-finder in a determination of a defendant's legal
insanity. At first glance, it may seem that the Court's holding in
Collazo defeats the purpose of having a reviewing court if
substantial deference will nevertheless be given to the fact-finder.
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court accurately reasoned
that it is the fact-finder that watches and hears the witnesses,
while the reviewing court merely reads the trial transcript. 57
It is difficult to see how a fact-finder is able to distinguish
between two board-certified expert psychiatrists, especially when
these expert witnesses are testifying to an area of science that is
generally beyond the comprehension of society as a whole. It is
equally as difficult then, to determine which expert testimony
should be afforded more weight based upon reliability and
credibility. However, this determination can be done accurately
and without much difficulty if the fact-finder applies the expert
testimony to the case at hand. For example, in Collazo, the trial
transcript indicated that "Dr. Stewart chose to believe some of the
things that defendant had told him, while disbelieving other
things that he had said."58 Additionally, Dr. Cserr was able to
provide reasons for each action and statement of Collazo, 59 a
complex task given Defendant's abrupt changes in behavior.
Thus, given Dr. Stewart's inability to explain all of Defendant's
intricate behavior, and Dr. Cserr's ability to enlighten the Court
as to Defendant's behavior, the fact-finder here relied more
heavily on Dr. Cserr's testimony. 60
This decision will likely provide some guidance in determining
future legal insanity cases in which a defendant's ability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct is disputed by two
board-certified expert psychiatrists. Regardless of the open-ended
57. Id. at 1110 (quoting Cain, 503 A.2d at 971).
58. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1112 n.10.
59. Id. at 1112.
60. Id.
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test the Court uses regarding the deference that will be given to
the fact-finder, it seems that the Supreme Court made a rational
and legally-sound decision in assessing the defendant's claim of
legal insanity on appeal.
CONCLUSION
This case has uncluttered and clarified the scope of the
deference that will be given to a trial judge's determination of a
defendant's claim of legal insanity. Here, there was no indication
that the trial judge misconceived or overlooked material evidence
in finding Defendant to be criminally responsible for the
murder. 61 As the trial transcript demonstrated, the trial judge
considered each expert witness's testimony.62 However, the trial
judge found the State's board-certified psychiatrist's testimony as
an expert witness to be more reliable and credible than that of
Defendant's psychiatrist, and accordingly afforded it more
weight. 63 The Rhode Island Supreme Court thus stated that
considerable deference will be given to the fact-finder, as "it is the
trier of fact who hear[s] the witness' tone of voice, [sees] their
facial expression and presumably [catches] the trial's subtleties,
all of which may be lost in the written word."64
Rachael Schupp-Star
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1110 (quoting Cain, 503 A.2d at 971).
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Education Law. School Committee of City of Cranston v. Bergin-
Andrews, 984 A.2d 629 (R.I. 2009). The issue in this case was
whether a school committee met the statutory prerequisites in
bringing a Caruolo actionl when it was aware of a budget deficit
many months prior to the initiation of the suit. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed, inter alia, that a Caruolo action,
properly considered in light of other education-related statutes,
requires that a school committee make a good-faith effort to
operate within its initial budget appropriation and to make
necessary budgetary adjustments and future requests, in a timely
manner, if it discovers an actual or potential budget problem.
Additionally, the Court held that the doctrine of laches applies in
a Caruolo action where the school committee knowingly incurred
an end of the year deficit and waited to initiate the action until a
time where no corrective measures can be taken. Because a school
committee has a statutory obligation to file a corrective action
plan to cure the projected budget shortfall, there is no judicial
error when the court requires this report.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In the event that a school committee finds that its
appropriated budget is insufficient to meet the state imposed
educational mandates, the school committee may file a special
complaint-commonly referred to as a Caruolo action-seeking
from its respective towns or cities additional appropriations
necessary to meet the its expenditures. 2 In 1995, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held in Beil v. Chariho School Committee
that before a school committee may file a Caruolo action, it must
first: (1) adhere to the original budget the city appropriated; (2)
petition the state commissioner of education, seeking alternatives
and/or waivers to the state regulations that would enable the
school department to balance their budget; and (3) if rejected by
1. R.I. GEN. LAws §16-2-21.4 (1956).
2. Sch. Comm. of the City of Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629,
634 (R.I. 2009).
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the state commissioner, then the school committee must petition
the city council for additional appropriations.3 Only after these
three required steps have been undertaken may a school properly
file a Caruolo action. 4
This case is the consolidation of two separate cases arising
from budgetary woes in the City of Cranston. The School
Committee of the City of Cranston ("school committee") filed the
initial action against the City of Cranston pursuant to the Caruolo
Act in hopes of obtaining additional monetary appropriations to
help cover a $4.9 million shortfall for fiscal year ("FY") 2007-
2008.5 The City of Cranston subsequently filed a separate action,
asking the Superior Court to order the school committee to file
corrective action plans and to refrain from certain expenditures. 6
Finding that both cases involved common issues of fact and law,7
both the Superior Court and later the Supreme Court consolidated
the instant cases into one.8
While the Court goes into great detail summarizing
approximately a year and a half of budgetary wrangling between
the city council and the school committee, the most salient facts
are as follows: as early as April of 2007, the school committee was
already projecting a deficit for the FY 2007-2008.9 After the
school committee amended its budget to match the city's original
May 2007 appropriation, the city reduced the school department's
budget by an additional $106,743.00 in July 2007 due to a lower
amount of state aid.10 By September 2007, the school's consultant
was estimating a projected deficit of $3.5 million. 11 Rather than
amending its budget to reflect this reduced appropriation, the
school committee included a "budget reconciliation" item in its
November 2007 revised budget. 12 By December 6, 2007, the
projected budget deficit had increased to $3,888,190.00.13
3. Beil v. Chariho Sch. Comm., 667 A.2d 1259, 1259 (R.I. 1995).
4. Id.
5. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 634.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 647.
8. Id. at 633.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 633.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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In December 2007, the school committee was already
contemplating a Caruolo action against the city.14 On December
26, 2007 the school superintendent requested additional funding
for special and vocational education programs from the
commissioner of the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education, as well as permission to eliminate certain
student transportation and to increase some class sizes. 15 All
requests were denied on January 15, 2008.16
While the city council did not respond to a January 22, 2008
request from the school committee for a supplemental
appropriation of $3,839,190.00, it met with the school committee
on several occasions over the next few months in an effort to
resolve the budget problems.17
Finally, in an April 2008 presentation to the city council, the
school committee reported that the budget deficit had increased to
approximately $4.9 million for FY 2007-2008.18 The city council
asked the mayor to seek a writ of mandamus requiring the school
department to operate within its appropriated budget in
accordance with state law.19  On May 13, 2008, the school
committee filed the Caruolo action against the city.20 The city
subsequently filed the aforementioned separate actions against
the school committee. 21
After extensive trial testimony from employees of both the
school department and the city, the Superior Court granted the
city's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissed the
school committee's Caruolo action for having failed to comply with
the prerequisites established in Beil v. Chariho School
Committee.22 The Superior Court also issued a writ of mandamus
ordering the school committee to file a corrective action plan to
address the budget deficit for FY 2007-2008, as was petitioned by
city.23
14. Id. at 634.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 634.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 638.
23. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 639.
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On appeal, the school committee alleged the trial judge
committed numerous errors, including: (1) considering other
education-related statutes in concert with the Caruolo Act rather
than considering the act in isolation; (2) determining that the
school did not comply with the statutory prerequisites to filing a
Caruolo action; and (3) failing to make proper findings to grant
injunctive relief. 24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Caruolo Actions Should Not Be Considered In A Vacuum
In its appeal, the school committee argued that the General
Assembly intended for the Caruolo Act to be applied without any
reference to any other statutes. 25  Directly contradicting the
school committee's argument, the Court ultimately held that any
relevant sections of the General Laws should be considered in any
Caruolo action. 26 The Court came to this conclusion by first
referring to the text of the Caruolo Act itself.27 While the school
committee focused on the introductory language
"[n]otwithstanding any provision of the general or public laws to
the contrary" to support its argument that the Caruolo Act should
be read in complete isolation,28 the Court noted that the Act itself
referred to other statutes within the same title.29 Furthermore,
the Court had previously interpreted the statutory meaning of the
word "notwithstanding" to mean "regardless of hinderance by."30
The Court next noted that "[u]pon careful examination of the
Caruolo Act, as well as the other pertinent sections" no part of the
Caruolo Act was "hindered by" including these other education-
related statutes. 31 The Court justified this by citing Providence
24. Id. at 640.
25. Id. at 642.
26. Id. at 643.
27. Id. at 642 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws §16-2-21.4 (1956)). While the
opinion found it noteworthy to quote the majority of this section, it is not
necessary here.
28. Id. at 642.
29. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 642. Specifically, the other sections
referred to are Chapters 2 and 7 of Title XVI.
30. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 634 (quoting Defenders of Animals, Inc.
v. Dept. of Envtl. Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I. 1989)).
31. Id. at 643. Specifically, the Court was referring to the other sections
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Teachers' Union, Local 958 v. School Committee of Providence,
which held that "if two statutes are found not to be inconsistent
with one another and relate to the same subject matter, [they]
should be considered together."32 Finding that because these
other relevant statutes were also education-related and they were
not inconsistent with the Caruolo Act itself, the Court concluded
that they should be considered in any Caruolo action. 33
Timeliness: An Essential Element For A Successful Caruolo Action
The school committee also argued that the trial judge erred in
determining that the school did not comply with the statutory
prerequisites to filing a Caruolo action.34 The Court further
developed the prerequisites set forth in Beil v. Chariho School
Committee by articulating that in order to satisfy each
prerequisite, timely action is required. 35 The Court pointed out
that the intention of the General Assembly in drafting the Caruolo
Act was to have "school committees [] amend their budgets,
request waivers, and request additional appropriations from their
host municipalities at the first indication of a possible or actual
deficit."36 The Court further elaborated that the intent of the
Caruolo Act was "to encourage expeditious action in instances of
potential school deficit spending is both practical as a matter of
public policy and indisputable as a matter of statutory
construction." 37 Additionally, the Court bolstered this conclusion
by citing several sections of Title XVI that regulated school
districts in managing their budgets by including deadlines and
other elements to encourage expeditious action. 38
While the school committee argues that its attempts to satisfy
these three prerequisites were sufficient, the Court concluded that
the record provided sufficient evidence to conclude that the school
of Chapter 2 and 7 of Title XVI.
32. Id. (quoting Providence Teachers' Union, Local 958 v. School
Committee of Providence, 276 A.2d 762 (1971)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 641-42.
35. Id. at 645.
36. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 643. Specifically, the Court cited R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 16-2-21(b),
16-2-9(d), and 16-2-9(e).
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committee failed to satisfy the first and second prerequisites in
the required timely manner.39 First, the school committee failed
to make a timely or good-faith effort to operate within the city
council's school budget appropriation by not adhering to the final
budget it received in July 2007.40 The November 2007 "budget
reconciliation" was viewed by the court as neither timely nor a
good faith effort to conform to the actual appropriation. 41 Second,
the Court again held that school committee failed to make a good-
faith effort to analyze potential savings. 42 Furthermore, waiting
until December 2007 to seek waivers and alternatives from the
commissioner was not timely enough to satisfy this second
requirement. 43
Doctrine of Laches Applied
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial judge's
decision was at least partially based on the equitable defense of
laches.44 After noting that the "defense of laches is not as limited
in scope as it once was,"45 the Court again reemphasized how the
"overarching intention" of the Caruolo Act requires school
committees "to act quickly when they discover actual or potential
budget problems." 46 With this principal in mind, the Court
concurred with the trial judge that it is "contrary to the intent of
the Legislature to allow a school committee to knowingly incur an
end of year deficit where corrective action can no longer be taken,
only to be appropriated additional funds under the Caruolo Act."47
Due to this delay on the part of the school committee that caused a
disadvantage to the city, the Court concluded that applying the
39. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 646.
40. Id. at 645.
41. Beil, 667 A.2d at 1259.
42. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 646.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 644. The doctrine of laches is defined by the Court as: "an
equitable defense that precludes a lawsuit by a plaintiff who has negligently
sat on his or her rights to the detriment of a defendant .... [L]aches, in legal
significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to
another." Chase v. Chase, A. 804, 805 (1897).
45. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 644.
46. Id. at 644; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §§16-2-9(f) & 16-2-21.
47. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 645.
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doctrine of laches in this case "was eminently justified."48
Corrective Action Plan Required By Writ of Mandamus
On appeal, the school committee improperly framed the trial
judge's order for it to file a corrective action plan as injunctive
relief granted to the city. 49 The Court clarified that the corrective
action plan was properly ordered by the trial judge by writ of
mandamus. 50 Section 16-2-9(f) of Title XVI required the school
committee to file a corrective action plan with the city council
within five days of discovering an actual or potential budget
deficit. 51 When the trial judge issued the writ, a definite budget
deficit existed, the school committee had been aware of the actual
deficit since November 2007, and the school committee had never
satisfied the statutory requirement by filing a corrective action
plan with the city. Because the trial judge was "merely
compell[ing] the school committee to its preexisting statutory
obligations," there was no error in the trial judge requiring this
action by writ of mandamus. 52
COMMENTARY
This case adds the essential element of timeliness to earlier
precedent regarding what is required for a successful Caruolo
action. This case presented a good example of a school committee
not only unduly postponing its eventual (and ultimately
unsuccessful) Caruolo action, but also presented a good example of
how the necessary steps that occur prior to a Caruolo action can
be delayed. The Court emphasized how the intent of the Caruolo
Act inherently requires school committees to act promptly and in
good faith in their efforts to adjust their financial situations to
meet the ever-increasing challenge of realizing the state-
mandated educational goals while not exceeding their
48. Id.
49. See id. at 640, 648.
50. Id. at 648. The Court explains that a writ of mandamus may be
issued when "(1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought, (2)
the respondent has a ministerial duty to perform the requested act without
discretion to refuse, and (3) the petitioner has no adequate remedy at
law"(quoting New England Dev. LLC v. Berg, 913 A.2d 363, 368 (R.I. 2007)).
51. R.I. GEN. LAws §16-2-9(f) (1956).
52. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 648.
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appropriated budgets. While this is no easy task, it cannot be
approached in an indecisive manner that only invites delay.
While the intent of requiring a school committee to first
adhere to whatever budget the city has appropriated is to
encourage a school committee to live within the means they are
given, this requirement may only mask the financial problem it is
trying to prevent. In order for a school committee to satisfy this
prerequisite, the school must say, at least on paper, that there is-
and will be-no budget shortfall. While on paper a school may
force its overall budget to match the initial appropriation, in
reality it may not be able, or particularly concerned, about
keeping its spending within those prescribed constraints. Perhaps
a fourth prerequisite would be in order: requiring school
committees to provide concrete evidence that they have done all in
their power to comply with the appropriated budget. Such
evidence may come in the form of records indicating a school
instituting salary or hiring freezes, confirmed layoffs, protracted
maintenance of facilities, etc. While none of these difficult actions
are wanted, much less helpful to educating the next generation,
the production of these records may help courts determine
whether a school committee put forth the required good-faith
effort to stay within its budget.
Finally, the courts may not be the right place to start to
resolve these types of disputes. State education professionals with
extensive training and expertise are the ones who are
commissioned to establish the state-mandated educational
requirements for each school district. Likewise, local school
committees who strive to put methodologies and procedures in
place that will meet these state-mandated requirements are made
up of education professionals with similar training and
backgrounds. This being the case, perhaps judges who lack the
specified knowledge and skills are not the proper people to
initially resolve the disputes that will inevitably arise from
whether or not proper funding has been provided to allow school
departments to educate our youth. While the Caruolo Act
essentially provides a cause of action for school committees to take
advantage of in order to get an audience before the Court, Caruolo
actions require extensive fact-finding of complicated educational
practices and methodologies. Perhaps it is more proper for these
disputes to begin in a series of administrative hearings, where
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education professionals with the requisite background and
knowledge can analyze the school committees' attempts at
reducing their budget without unduly compromising the quality of
education. Then, if a party is not satisfied with the state's
administrative procedures, the issue may get appealed to the
courts. In that case, the judge's role in this extensive and
complicated matter will less complicated, as the judge in this
scenario can rely on the then-established administrative record.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that a
Caruolo action, properly considered in light of other education-
related statutes, requires a school committee to first make a good-
faith effort to operate within its initial budget appropriation and if
it discovers a potential or actual budget problem, to make the
necessary budgetary adjustments and/or requests in a timely
manner. 53 Additionally, when a school committee waits until the
end of the fiscal year to file a Caruolo action, the doctrine of laches
may preclude the school from successfully obtaining additional
funds.54
Peter F. Spencer
53. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 645-46.
54. Id. at 645
Evidence. State v. Nelson, 982 A.2d 602 (R.I. 2009). A
prospective juror's prejudicial comment made during voir dire
does not warrant a mistrial unless the statement inflames the
passions of the jurors, precluding an objective evaluation of the
evidence. A proper instruction to the jury by the trial judge to
disregard inappropriate remarks may dispel any prejudicial
effects to the defendant, removing the need to conduct an
individual voir dire of each juror. Additionally, where the
defendant does not produce evidence of tampering with blood
alcohol level analysis, and the imperfection in the chain of custody
is the unknown identity of the technician performing the analysis,
such imperfection goes to the weight of the evidence rather than
its admissibility. Lastly, judicial interrogation of a witness is
limited to clarifying an issue that the trial judge believed to cause
confusion to the jury; otherwise, the judge commits irreversible
error where the inquiry simply serves as an extension of direct or
cross-examination.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Transported to South County Hospital after a serious car
collision on Route 1, Nicki Nelson's blood alcohol analysis revealed
a level more than double the legal limit.1 Almost a year after the
accident, 2 Nelson's charges included: (1) operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and causing
serious bodily injury to another;3 (2) operating a motor vehicle in
reckless disregard for others' safety, which proximately caused
serious bodily injury to another; 4 (3) operating a motor vehicle
while knowingly possessing an illegal substance; 5 and (4)
1. State v. Nelson, 982 A.2d 602, 606-07, (R.I. 2009). Nicki Nelson's
blood alcohol level ranged between 0.192 and 0.208 percent. Id. at 607. The
legal limit is 0.08 percent. Id.
2. The collision occurred on July 24, 2004, while charges were brought
on May 25, 2005. Id. at 606-07.
3. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.6 (1956).
4. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-1.1 (1956).
5. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.4. (1956). The illegal
substance was marijuana. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 607.
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unlawfully possessing marijuana with knowledge and intent.6
Nelson's 2007 trial resulted in an acquittal of operating a motor
vehicle while possessing a controlled substance; however, she was
convicted of the drunk driving charges in Counts One and Two,
infra.7 A timely appeal followed highlighting three issues.8
First, a prospective juror indicated during voir dire that past
experiences affected her ability to be fair and impartial.9 Rather
than being heard at sidebar, Juror 29 blurted out, "Well, I'm a
college professor. I have had three students killed by drunk
drivers."10  Although the potential juror was immediately
dismissed, and a cautionary instruction given to the remaining
jurors to ignore Juror 29's statements, Defendant moved for a
mistrial.11
Defendant claimed that the prejudicial statement infected the
jury pool by encouraging jurors "to do something about these
drunk drivers driving around, and here is your opportunity [to do
so]."12 Further, granting the motion to pass would be ideal given
the early stage of trial. 13 The judge denied the motion, holding
that the number of available jurors did not enable such a restart,
and, in any event, the prospective jurors proclaimed their ability
to remain dispassionate and impartial.14
Second, during Nicki Nelson's treatment at South County
Hospital, a nurse sent a blood sample directly to the laboratory for
6. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(ii) (1956); Nelson, 982
A.2d at 607. Count Three merged with Count Four. Id.
7. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 607.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 608.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 608-09. Defense counsel originally believed Juror 29 to be a
University of Rhode Island professor, and that her students had been killed
in the same geographic area as the one in this trial. Id. at 608. The professor
actually taught at Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island. Id. at
609 n.4.
13. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 609.
14. Id. At sentencing, Nelson received ten years imprisonment, alcohol
treatment while in prison, a $1,000 fine, a two-year suspended license upon
release, and restitution for Bates's incurred and continuing expenses and lost
wages on count one. Id. at 607. Count Two sentencing included a five-year
suspended sentence, five years probation, and substance abuse counseling
upon release. Id.
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alcohol level testing.15 A clinical scientist testified that the vial
arrived the same morning of the accident but could not remember
which scientist conducted the analysis.16 While a standard report
recorded the clinician handling the blood sample, Nelson's medical
record did not contain the document.17 Thus, Defendant argued
on appeal that because the state failed to satisfactorily prove the
chain of custody for Nelson's blood alcohol-level testing, the
evidence should not have been admitted since the results were
"highly questionable."18
Finally, after Nelson's treating physician, Dr. Kettle, testified
on direct and cross-examination, the trial judge interrogated Dr.
Kettle' 9 about the doctor's inability to order a cervical spine
assessment. 20 Dr. Kettle clarified that he ordered the x-rays but
could not conduct a complete physical examination of Nicki Nelson
because of her intoxication. 21 The next day, the justice gave
defense counsel an opportunity to object to the judge "hammering
in" the state's argument, reasoning that the jury might infer
Nelson's guilt based upon the detail and nature of the judge's
questions. 22
The judge also interrogated Mr. Hillard, the director of the
Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory. 23 Rephrasing a question
the state previously asked, the judge inquired whether Nelson's
blood alcohol level at the time of the accident could have been the
same when Nelson arrived at the hospital an hour later.24 Hillard
testified, over Defendant's objection, that he could not formulate
an opinion because he did not know when Nelson consumed her
15. Id. at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 612.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 613-14. Nelson's intoxication prevented her from being a
cooperative and reliable patient. Id. Conducting the physical exam in her
intoxicated state could possibly result in a spinal cord injury. Id. The patient
must be able to follow commands explicitly during directions to move one's
head ever so carefully to the left, right, and tilting the chin upwards in an
effort to determine pain. Id. The trial judge's questioning revealed all this
information. Id.
22. Id. at 614. The trial judge overruled the objection. Id.
23. Id. at 613.
24. Id. at 615 n.8.
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last drink.25
The questions presented for review include: (1) whether the
trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion to pass and
declaration of a mistrial after a prospective juror made an
improper statement during voir dire; (2) whether the trial judge
erred in admitting evidence of a blood alcohol analysis due to an
incomplete chain of custody; and (3) whether the trial judge
committed irreversible error by interrogating two of the
prosecution's witnesses. 26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to
the trial judge's determination of whether to pass a case and
declare a mistrial.27 The trial judge is in the best position to
determine whether a juror's inappropriate comment has a
negative effect upon the jury in making an impartial
determination of the evidence.28
Juror's Prejudicial Comment
The Supreme Court held that no abuse of discretion occurred
when the trial judge refused to grant the motion to pass and
declare a mistrial. 29 On appeal, Defendant argued that Juror 29's
comment proposed Nelson's guilt, and, therefore, it prevented the
jurors from brushing aside the suggestion. 30  A prejudicial
statement by a potential juror does not render every case subject
to a new trial. 31 Instead, the probable effect such prejudicial
statements would have on a reasonable juror requires
assessment. 32 The statement must "be of a nature to 'inflame the
jurors' passions' to preclude 'their calm and dispassionate
25. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 615.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 607-08 (citing State v. LaPlante, 962 A.2d 63, 70 (R.I. 2009)).
28. Id. at 607 (quoting State v. Figueroa, 673 A.2d 1084, 1091 (R.I.
1996)).
29. Id. at 610.
30. Id.
31. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 610 (citing State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254,
1267-68 (R.I. 2007)).
32. Id. (citing State v. Harley, 656 A.2d 954, 962 (R.I. 1995)).
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evaluation of the evidence."' 33  The trial judge's finding of
prejudicial evidence requires a proper warning or cautionary
instruction. 34
In the case at bar, the probable effect of Juror 29's prejudicial
remark remained relatively minimal on the average juror since
the prospective jurors already possessed knowledge of Defendant's
drunk driving charges. 35 The Supreme Court also held that Juror
29's statement (that three of her students were killed by drunk
drivers) would not inflame the passions of the average juror so as
to color one's views of Nicki Nelson. 36 The statement did not
imply Nelson's guilt nor refer to the defendant in any manner.3 7
Rather, Juror 29's emotional response simply reflected her own
perceived inability to objectively view the evidence. 38
By contrasting the Nelson curative instruction with the one
enunciated in State v. Massey,39 the Supreme Court further
justified its holding. 40 A prospective Massey juror opined that the
Massey family committed crimes in the past, and that the
defendant likely committed the crime in question.41 The corrective
instruction failed to clearly inform the potential jurors to
disregard the comment. 42 Additionally, the instruction given in
Nelson mirrored State v. Coleman,43 wherein a witness testified
that he knew the defendant since they were juveniles because
they served time in jail together.44 The judge directed the jury to
disregard the witness's statement, purging any "harmful effect" by
clearly explaining the statement's immateriality to the case and
ensuring that the jury could overlook the prejudicial statement.45
In both cases, the instruction "erased consideration of the
33. Id. (citing State v. Luciano, 739 A.2d 222, 228 (R.I. 1999)).
34. Id. (citing State v. Carmody, 471 A.2d 1363, 1366 (R.I. 1984)).
35. Id. (citing State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 937 (R.I. 2006)).
36. Id. But cf. Carmody, 471 A.2d at 1367 (holding that a juror's opinion
as to the defendant's guilt was highly prejudicial).
37. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 610.
38. Id. at 611.
39. State v. Massey, 382 A.2d 801, 803 (R.I. 1978).
40. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 611.
41. Id. (citing Massey, 382 A.2d at 803).
42. Id.
43. State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929 (R.I. 2006).
44. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 611 (citing Coleman, 909 A.2d at 935).
45. Id. (quoting Coleman, 909 A.2d at 936-37).
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statement from the jury's mind."46
As a general rule, individual voir dire is only necessary when
uncertainty exists as to whether the jurors read or heard
prejudicial statements affecting the case, and the force of
circumstances require insulating those jurors who did not learn of
the damaging information.47 In Nelson, the Court does not clarify
whether all of the potential jurors were present when Juror 29
mentioned her experiences. 48 Rather, the Court determined that
no abuse of discretion occurred when the trial judge refused to
conduct an individual voir dire.49
Chain of Custody
The Supreme Court held that the results of the blood alcohol
test were properly admitted since the prosecution showed that "in
all reasonable probability the evidence had not been tampered
with."5 0 Proof of a continuous chain of custody may provide
assurance of reliability, but it is not necessary to introduce
physical evidence. 5 1 Eliminating all possibility of tampering is not
required by the state.52 As a result, the relevancy of a continuous
chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence. 53
The defendant did not offer any proof that the blood sample or
test results were subject to foul play.54 Moreover, no evidence
existed that showed a delay between the blood specimen's arrival
in the laboratory and the testing of Nelson's blood.5 5 The unknown
46. Id. (quoting State v. Manfredi, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (R.I. 1977)).
47. Id. at 611-12.
48. See id. at 608. The opinion only states that Juror 29's statement
occurred on the first day of jury selection, after questioning several jurors on
their ability to be fair and impartial. Id.
49. Id. at 612.
50. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 612-13 (citing State v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 151, 154
(R.I. 1988)).
51. Id. at 612 (citing State v. Infantolino, 355 A.2d 722, 727 (R.I. 1976)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id. The Court discussed two cases that had a greater probability of
evidence tampering than Nelson but were still properly admitted. Id. State
v. Bracero, 434 A.2d 286, 290 (R.I. 1981), held no error in admitting a bag of
cocaine that arrived in the lab for testing on June 9th and subsequently
tested on July 19th. Cohen, 538 A.2d at 154, held a sufficient chain of
custody existed to render admissible evidence seized from a vehicle the day
after the arrest, and testimony regarding the location of the key's vehicles did
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identity of the clinician retrieving and conducting the analysis
encompassed the problem with the chain of custody.56 The Court
held that in all reasonable probability no tampering of Nelson's
blood sample occurred, and the state's inability to declare with
certainty who determined the illegal levels of alcohol in
defendant's blood was relevant as to the weight of the evidence,
not admissibility.57
Trial Judge's Interrogation of the State's Witnesses
The Court held that Defendant's objection to the judge's
questioning of Dr. Kettelle was properly preserved for appeal. 58
The raise or waive rule requires evidentiary objections to be raised
at the trial level, and be "sufficiently focused so as to call the trial
justice's attention to the basis for [the] objection."59 Rhode Island
Rule of Evidence 614(C) allows objections to interrogations by the
court to occur immediately, or at the next available opportunity
when the jury is not present.60 The rule avoids counsel choosing
between interrupting the judge in front of the jury (and losing its
favor), or forsaking an objection to preserve for appeal. 61
Counsel's specific sidebar objection, which occurred at the
conclusion of the judge's interrogation, was appropriate. 62
Counsel also had the opportunity to formally state the reasons for
objecting the following day.63
After finding the issue properly preserved, the Supreme Court
held that the trial judge committed irreversible error when he
interrogated Dr. Kettelle, necessitating a remand for a new trial. 64
Although a judge is allowed to make a limited interrogation of the
not occur until the seizure.
56. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 613.
57. Id. (citing Cohen, 538 A.2d at 154).
58. Id. at 616.
59. Id. (quoting State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 407 (R.I. 2008)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 616. The court cautioned that a general objection
would not suffice as proper preservation. Id.
63. Id. The jury was not present when defense counsel noted the judge's
interrogation negatively affected the defendant by suggesting that the
defendant was guilty. Id. at 616-17. A jury instruction was not requested by
defendant for fear that it would have been ineffective. Id. at 617.
64. Id. at 617, 619.
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witness, 65 in the instant case, the judge exceeded the scope of
authority by going beyond mere clarification of matters that
confused the jury.66 The trial judge stated that the interrogation
was premised on the witness's lengthy medical log, 67 but the
Court held that the length of the medical record's volume did not
result in a determination that the jury was confused.6 8 The
prejudicial questions were comparable to a cross-examination, and
resulted in Dr. Kettlle twice stating that he could not perform a
full evaluation of Nelson because of her intoxicated state.69 The
witness's testimony had devastating consequences in Nelson's
drunk-driving trial because it reinforced the fact sought to be
proved, namely Defendant's intoxication.70  Bolstering the
prosecution's case goes well beyond the acceptable scope of judicial
interrogation. 71
Likewise, the judge's interrogation of Mr. Hillard was found
to be irreversible error since it also failed to clarify a point that
confused the jury.72 Defendant argued that when the judge asked
the witness whether Nelson's blood alcohol level was the same at
the time of the accident and the subsequent analysis, it revealed
the judge's bias and belief that Nelson had a higher blood alcohol
level at the time of the accident.73 Given the fact that the judge
rephrased a question that the prosecution already asked and the
witness answered, the jury twice heard Mr. Hillard's inability to
opine about Nelson's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident
without knowing more.74 Thus, the judge's questioning failed to
clarify a point of confusion for the jury when the judge already
knew how the witness would answer.75  The interrogation
65. Id. at 617 (citing State v. McVeigh, 660 A.2d 269, 273-74 (R.I. 1995)).
66. Id.; see also State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1994).
67. Id. at 613.
68. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 617. In fact, the Court points out that the trial
judge was attempting to prevent the jurors from becoming confused (not that
they were actually confused). Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 618. The prosecution and defense already inquired about
Nelson's state of intoxication and how it affected Dr. Kettlle's medical
assessment. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see supra note 1.
74. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 618.
75. Id.
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prejudiced the defendant, requiring the trial decision to be
vacated.76
COMMENTARY
Although the Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not
err in its refusal to grant a mistrial when Juror 29 divulged the
professor's inability to act impartially,77 it seems unlikely that the
prospective jurors could actually discount the prejudicial
statement. It is possible that the jurors would act precisely as
Defendant feared - the jury taking the opportunity to put away a
drunk driver. 78 A cautionary instruction may not necessarily
undo the damage. However, given the fact that all the jurors were
directed in a straightforward manner, it is also probable that the
jurors would police each other during deliberations to ensure that
a decision would not be based upon the forbidden statement.
The trial judge's interrogation of the state's witnesses was not
treated as lightly as the aforementioned juror's comment. By
emphasizing that trial judges should not extend direct and cross-
examinations or reinforce counsel's points, the Court provided no
leeway for justices to elicit testimony beyond that which is needed
for clarification. The bright line rule follows the idea that the
judge acts merely as a gatekeeper whose biases should not
unfairly prejudice either party.
CONCLUSION
Prejudicial juror comments require the trial judge to assess
the probable effect the information would have on a reasonable
juror. If the statement inflames the passions of the jury,
rendering them unable to maintain an impartial stance, a new
trial is proper. The Court held that Juror 29's comment did not
inflame the passions of the jurors, and the trial judge's corrective
instruction was proper since it advised the jurors to disregard the
prejudicial statement. An individual voir dire was not necessary
in this case since no abuse of discretion occurred. 79 A perfect chain
76. Id. at 617.
77. See supra note 10.
78. See supra note 11.
79. The Court's holding suggests that all the prospective jurors heard the
prejudicial comment which eliminated the need to insulate ignorant jurors
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of custody is not required to admit physical evidence. Rather,
"physical evidence is admissible upon a showing that in all
reasonable probability the evidence has not been subjected to
tampering."80 The state sufficiently met the standard with regard
to Nelson's blood sample and the defendant did not provide any
proof to the contrary. The blood alcohol test was, therefore,
admissible since the unknown identity of the technician
performing the test went to the weight of the evidence.
Judicial interrogation of a witness is limited to clarifying an
issue that causes confusion for the jury.81 The Supreme Court
held that the trial judge's interrogation of the prosecution's two
witnesses did not conform to the law. The trial judge could not
have been clarifying a confusing matter when the witnesses
already answered the question posed by counsel.
Christy DiOrio
from the damaging information. See supra note 48; see also supra note 49.
80. Nelson, 982 A.2d at 612 (citing State v. Bracero, 434 A.2d 286, 290
(R.I. 1981)).
81. See id. at 617; Figueras, 644 A.2d at 293.
Family Law. Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619 (R.I. 2009).
Mother's allegations were sufficient under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act for Family Court to assert emergency
jurisdiction, enter interim custody order, and schedule a hearing.
However, the continuance of emergency jurisdiction was improper
and impermissibly broad once the Family Court had received a
copy of North Carolina's custody decree, which was entitled to full
faith and credit under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 16, 2000, Jessica Beauregard ("Beauregard") filed a
complaint for divorce in North Carolina, part of which sought
custody of her two children, Colby (born August 10, 1997) and
Nicholas (born August 28, 1999).1 In addition to establishing
jurisdiction by alleging she and her husband, Grady Samuel
White ("White"), had lived for a period longer than six months in
North Carolina, her complaint also alleged that her husband did
not spend time with the children, and spent excessive time on the
Internet, where he downloaded pornographic images of men.2
Once the complaint was filed, Beauregard moved with her
children to Rhode Island, where she had family. 3 In June of 2000,
the North Carolina General Court of Justice, District Court
Division, held a hearing, determining temporary custody of the
children as well as establishing jurisdiction and North Carolina as
the home state of the children.4 This temporary order granted
custody to Beauregard, and gave White visitation in Rhode Island,
and required the children to visit White in North Carolina for one
1. Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 622 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (referring to Section 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4), part of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act which determines "home state" as "the State in
which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which
the child lived from birth with any such persons."). Id. at 622 n.1.
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week per month. 5 Due to an allegation of substantial change in
the situation after Colby told his grandmother that his father had
shaken Nicholas, Beauregard filed a motion seeking to terminate
White's visitation in August of 2000.6 The matter was referred to
the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families
("DCYF") for an investigation into White's alleged "excessive and
inappropriate discipline."7 In December of 2000, following an
altercation outside of the child psychologist's office in Rhode
Island, a magistrate in the Family Court granted Beauregard's
protection from abuse order by consent of the parties, continued
the visitation as previously ordered in North Carolina, and spoke
with the North Carolina judge regarding the matter.8
On November 26, 2002, almost a year after the parties were
granted a divorce, the North Carolina court held hearings
regarding the child custody issues, and the Court entered an order
with its findings of the child custody dispute.9 In September 2002,
prior to the decision on the record, the North Carolina judge sent
both parties a written memorandum stating what the terms would
be in the order.10 Hoping to avoid those unfavorable terms, such
5. Id. at 622.
6. Id. at 623. In addition, Colby saw a child psychologist, with whom he
shared that his father shook his brother when he cried and was mean.
Nicholas was taken to Hasbro Children's Hospital for a CT scan. Id.
7. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 623. DCYF initially indicated that White's
discipline of Nicholas was excessive and inappropriate, but declined to take
legal action because the incident took place in North Carolina. Id. 622-23. In
September of 2000, North Carolina issued an order for supervised visits for
two months, and later vacated the order. Id. at 622. After White filed an
administrative appeal in Rhode Island, the claim was determined
"unfounded." Id. at 622.
8. Id. at 623. Following the conversation, the North Carolina judge
noted that Beauregard and her parents had behaved in an "unreasonable"
manner. Id.
9. Id. The judge found that Beauregard moved to Rhode Island in an
attempt to remove White from their children's lives, and that Beauregard
would continue to make trouble for White's visitation if she remained in
Rhode Island. Id. at 623. Also, the visitation schedule could not remain in
effect as the children got older, and Beauregard was hindering White's ability
to have a relationship with his children. Id. It was in the best interests of
the children for them to return to North Carolina, where the couple would
have joint legal custody; Beauregard would have primary physical custody,
unless she refused to move in which case, physical custody would be given to
White. Id.
10. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
as returning to North Carolina with the children, Beauregard filed
a complaint in the Rhode Island Family Court seeking emergency
relief from the visitation and relocation provisions of the North
Carolina order.11
The Family Court of Rhode Island issued an ex parte order
asserting jurisdiction, prohibiting the parties from removing the
children from Rhode Island without permission from the court,
and scheduling a hearing for November.12 Beauregard supported
her complaint with an assessment from Dr. Parsons, a
psychologist, that returning the children to North Carolina would
be detrimental, as well as her own fears for the safety of herself
and the children because of White's threats of physical violence. 13
During the November ex parte hearing, the Family Court found
that there was jurisdiction and justification for an "emergency"
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA") and the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"), but continued
the hearing because service on White had not been effectuated.14
Even though White had still not been served by February 12,
2003, the Family Court found it in the children's best interest to
continue the orders. Then, White sent a certified copy of the
North Carolina custody order seeking to register the order, in
addition to contemporaneous motions in Rhode Island (contesting
jurisdiction) and in North Carolina (contempt proceeding against
Beauregard for non-compliance).15
Arguing that North Carolina had exclusive jurisdiction over
the matter and modification of the custody order, White moved to
dismiss the modification complaint in Rhode Island on September
17, 2003.16 A hearing was held November 5, 2003, and January
11. Id.
12. Id. at 624.
13. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 623-24. Doctor Parsons found that while the
children were in the home White was involved excessively with male
pornography, and both the children and Beauregard reported physical abuse
by White. Id.
14. Id. at 624.
15. Id. The North Carolina court found that Beauregard failed to return
to North Carolina with the children by the prescribed date, that North
Carolina has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and parties, and
ordered the children to be placed with White. Id. North Carolina also found
Beauregard in criminal contempt and issued an order for her arrest. Id.
16. Id. at 625.
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29, 2004, the general magistrate denied White's motion to dismiss
because of the emergency situation created by the "alleged abuse
of the child," and the "apparent pedophilia of the defendant
(White) as to the safety of the children."17 White petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that emergency jurisdiction
was improperly exercised under the UCCJEA, and the North
Carolina custody order was improperly modified by the magistrate
failing to account for the decision already made by North
Carolina.18 Beauregard counters that the Family Court properly
exercised jurisdiction because the order was limited in duration,
and also challenges the appropriateness of North Carolina
continuing jurisdiction because she and the children had lawfully
moved to Rhode Island, and had been living there for two and a
half years before North Carolina addressed the custody issues. 19
ANALYSIS
In an opinion written by Justice Flaherty, the Court
addressed the issue of whether the Family Court had properly
exercised jurisdiction and issued orders regarding a child custody
dispute when there was an ongoing proceeding in North Carolina
and after an ultimate determination had been made in North
Carolina. 20 The Court held that the Family Court erred in two
respects: first, the allegations were sufficient for emergency
jurisdiction initially, but improper to continue as the
circumstances changed, and second, the Family Court exceeded its
authority when it exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Beauregard's complaint. 21
17. Id. During the November hearing, Beauregard testified that her
children became upset before and after visiting with their father, that the
North Carolina Court found White had viewed child pornography, and Doctor
Parsons belief that transitioning the children back to North Carolina would
cause irreparable harm since the children were afraid of their father and his
"apparent pedophilias" and "pornography issues." Id. Later, in July of 2004,
both parties were ordered to psychological assessments, toxicology screens,
and supervised visits between father and children. Id. The order did not
have an end date or any future hearing scheduled. Id.
18. Id. at 625-26. (cert. granted).
19. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 626.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Jurisdiction
For the Family Court to have authority over custody
proceedings, it must have subject matter jurisdiction, which is
reviewed de novo.22 Although subject matter jurisdiction of child-
custody disputes is currently governed by the UCCJEA (adopted
by the General Assembly in 2003)23 which supplies the rules for
custody disputes involving jurisdictional conflict, when this
proceeding started the matter was governed by UCCJA.24
Emergency jurisdiction, existing for a limited period, lasts "only as
long as the emergency exists or until a court that has jurisdiction
to enter or modify a permanent custody order is apprised of the
situation and accepts responsibility."25 The Court distinguishes
between having jurisdiction and whether it should be exercised. 26
22. Id. (citing State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 916 (R.I. 2007); Jordan v.
Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1083 (R.I. 1991)).
23. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-14.1-16(a) (2003): The court has "temporary
emergency jurisdiction" if "the child is present in this state and the child has
been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse." Also Section 15-14.1-16(c): "If there is a previous
child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this chapter,
or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state
having jurisdiction, any order issued by a court of this state under this
section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to
allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having
jurisdiction. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is
obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period
expires." And, Section 15-14.1-16(d): "If the Rhode Island Court learns that
a child-custody proceeding has been commenced or a child-custody
determination has been made by a court of another state having jurisdiction,
the Rhode Island court shall immediately communicate with the court of that
state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child,
and determine a period of the duration of the temporary order." (Emphasis
added).
24. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 626 (citing Glynn v. Meslin, 532 A.2d 554,
555 (R.I. 1987)). The UCCJA is less stringent and specific with respect to the
limits of emergency jurisdiction, however under either statute the same
result would be achieved. Id. at 627. Under the Court's prior holdings,
emergency jurisdiction is temporary in nature and orders. Id. See Ogden v.
Rath, 755 A.2d 795, 798 (R.I. 2000).
25. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 626 (quoting Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d
717, 725 (R.I. 1998)).
26. Id. at 627-28. See Jordan, 586 A.2d at 1084 (reasoning that the
Family Court could properly have emergency jurisdiction when the children
were physically in Rhode Island and their father alleged physical and
emotional abuse by their mother in Florida, but exercising jurisdiction was
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Establishing Emergency Jurisdiction
Emergency jurisdiction is based on extraordinary
circumstances where the petitioning parent has established the
"existence of a bona fide emergency that constitutes the likelihood
of substantial harm to the child," proven by more than mere
allegations and self-serving statements from the petitioning
parent.27 Based on precedent, the Family Court had to find that
the children were physically in Rhode Island and that there was
an allegation of "actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse."28
Here, Beauregard alleged threats of harm by White, an
outstanding order of protection from abuse, and a report by Dr.
Parsons, which made the concerns more than "simply parental
allegations," and these were sufficient for the Family Court to
properly assert emergency jurisdiction and schedule a hearing.29
The initial order was properly limited in time and scope when it
ordered that a hearing was to be held within twenty days and
temporarily enjoined the parents removing the children from
Rhode Island. Additionally the second order was proper because it
simply granted Beauregard more time to serve White.30 The
subsequent orders in this case were errors by the Family Court.31
The Allegations were Insufficient to Continue Emergency
Jurisdiction
The Family Court should have been aware that continuation
of emergency jurisdiction was improper after it received the
certified copy of the North Carolina decree in February 2003, and
again after the hearing in November 2003 because Beauregard's
testimony and Dr. Parson's report were insufficient because they
did not create a new emergency. 32 This case is analogous to
Woods v. Winsor, where the Family Court did not admit evidence
improper because the Florida court had properly exercised jurisdiction by
granting the divorce and reserving jurisdiction over the child-custody dispute,
and this was the type of conflict UCCJA was enacted to prevent.) Id.
27. Id. at 628 (based on the decision in Glynn, 532 A.2d at 555-56).
28. Id. at 629. See generally Duffy v. Reeves, 619 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1993);
Silva v. Tucker, 500 A.2d 947, 949-50 (R.I. 1985).
29. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 629.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 630.
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about abuse that had occurred prior to the decision issued by the
Kentucky court because the judge in Kentucky had found these
allegations were "simply another ploy" by the mother to deny the
father's visitation, and the Supreme Court held Kentucky had
jurisdiction and its custody order was entitled to full faith and
credit.33  Here, the Family Court magistrate admitted into
evidence allegations of abuse, pedophilia, child pornography, the
order for protection from abuse, and the shaking incident to
continue jurisdiction even though these were taken into account
by the North Carolina judge before he issued his decision.34 Thus,
if the Family Court continued exercising emergency jurisdiction
properly, there needed to be new allegations, which if proven,
created a real emergency because of mistreatment. 35 Dr. Parson's
report does not rise to the level of real emergency, and Beauregard
had plenty of time to bring her concerns to the North Carolina
Court. 36 Moreover, the orders issued by the Family Court could
only be temporary in nature and could not modify the North
Carolina custody decree, so the Family Court erred because there
was no language in the order indicating they were temporary, nor
any termination date.3 7 Since there was a proceeding taking place
in North Carolina and there were no circumstances for emergency
jurisdiction when Beauregard filed her complaint, the Family
Court should have declined jurisdiction.3 8 The Family Court
33. Woods v. Winsor, 637 A.2d 373, 374 (R.I. 1994) (quoted in
Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 630).
34. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 630. Significantly the allegations of child
pornography and pedophilia were unsubstantiated by anything other than
Beauregard's testimony and the hearsay of Dr. Parsons; the North Carolina
judge took into account the incident between the parents outside the child
psychologist's office, the alleged shaking, and the father's viewing of
pornography; DCYF concluded the allegations of excessive discipline
unfounded. Id.
35. Id. at 630.
36. Id. at 631.
37. Id. For an order to be temporary in nature it is not enough that the
order terminates when complied with. Id.
38. Id. (relying on Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 637 (Del. 1993), which
holds that "the continuing jurisdiction of a sister state is not affected by the
child's residence in another state for six months or more.") See also 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1738A(a), (c), (d), (f); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 175-76 (1988)
("imposes a duty on the States to enforce child custody determinations
entered by a court of a sister State if the determination is consistent with the
provisions of the Act.).
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should have been aware that jurisdiction was improper because
North Carolina was the "home state" of the children at the time
the complaint for divorce and child-custody was filed, no other
state had jurisdiction, and North Carolina had not stayed or
terminated its jurisdiction.39 Further, the Family Court should
have complied with the UCCJA by staying its proceeding, and
contacting the North Carolina court so the matter could be
"litigated in a more appropriate forum."40
Appropriateness of North Carolina's Continuing Jurisdiction
under the PKPA
Under the PKPA, North Carolina's child-custody decree is
entitled to full faith and credit because it was the home state of
the children at the time the complaint for divorce was filed, the
decree is consistent with the PKPA, White continues to be a
resident of the state, and the North Carolina has not declined
jurisdiction.41 Due to the length of time that had elapsed because
of the drawn-out court proceedings, the Court recognized the
children may have little connection to North Carolina. 42 However,
this does not relieve the Court from enforcing the North Carolina
custody decree. 43
COMMENTARY
Although in this factual situation the outcome is unsatisfying,
the Court properly applies the UCCJA and the PKPA to afford full
faith and credit to the North Carolina decree. At the time of the
decision, Colby and Nicholas, aged almost twelve and almost ten
respectively, had been living in Rhode Island for nearly a decade,
and the Court ordered their return to North Carolina unless
Beauregard can obtain relief from the provision from the North
Carolina court. It does not appear to be in the children's best
interest to uproot their home and school lives because the Family
39. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 631-32.
40. Id. at 632 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-14-7(c)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 633. The Court was distressed by the length of time that
elapsed between hearings and the numerous continuances in a matter that
was cast as an emergency and involved two young lives. Id. In the Court's
opinion, "the lapse of nearly two years.. .is simply inexcusable." Id.
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Court erred in exercising jurisdiction and their parents' actions
merit no praise.
However, the Court's analysis of the child-custody issue under
the statutory guidelines of UCCJA (in effect when the complaint
was filed) and the UCCJEA (in effect now), as well as precedent
make it clear that Rhode Island Family court did err, and the
Court was under a duty to afford full faith and credit to the North
Carolina decree. 44
Hopefully, the clear language presented in the UCCJEA will
prevent a situation like this from happening to other children.
Under section 15-14.1.-16(a), temporary emergency jurisdiction is
appropriate only when "the child is present in the state, and it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child is
subject to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." Also,
emergency jurisdiction should be limited in time until an order is
received from a sister state or the order expires. This case
presents clear guidelines for the Family Court to use when
determining if jurisdiction is proper, and also what factors to
consider in determining an emergency, i.e. not using factors
already satisfactorily dealt with by the sister court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the inappropriateness of exercising jurisdiction over
this child-custody dispute, the Court quashed the orders of the
Family Court. 45 The case was remanded to order Beauregard to
comply with North Carolina's order or to obtain relief from North
Carolina within thirty days.46
MaryKate Geary
44. Id. at 632.
45. Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 632.
46. Id.
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Family Law. In re Peter S. et al., 973 A.2d 46 (R.I. 2009). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that Rhode Island General
Laws § 15-7-7(a) dictates the termination of all legal rights of a
parent to the child when the parent engages in actions rendered
seriously detrimental to the child, including cruel or abusive
treatment. The Court held that the Family Court properly
terminated the parental rights of a father who had been convicted
of felony assault for inflicting injuries upon his three month old
son. The Court held that: (1) criminal conviction evidencing an
abusive act may be considered as one of the factors in determining
whether a parent is unfit, despite remorse on the part of the
parent; (2) conduct toward one child is a proper factor to be
considered when determining parental fitness as to the other
children in the family unit; and (3) the protection offered to
children from a divorce decree terminating custody is insufficient
as compared to the protection offered under a termination of
parental rights. Moreover, the Court found that the Department
of Children, Youth and Families ("DCYF') has no obligation to
engage in reunification efforts to preserve a family when abuse is
present under Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 1, 2006, Joshua, the youngest of Peter S.'s three
children, was taken to Hasbro Children's Hospital for critical
injuries, including seizures and lifelessness.1 The injuries to three
month old Joshua were a result of abusive head trauma, inflicted
by Joshua's father, Peter, after Peter shook Joshua because
Joshua would not stop crying.2
In May 2006, the DCYF instituted proceedings for
involuntary termination of Peter's parental rights with respect to
his three children.3 At trial, a DCYF investigator, Mr. Dante
1. In re Peter S. et al., 973 A.2d 46, 48 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 49-50.
3. Id. at 48. The Family Court trial, concerning the termination of
Peter's parental rights, began on May 3, 2007. Id.
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D'Alessio, testified that he interviewed both of Joshua's parents at
Hasbro Children's Hospital on January 1, 2006.4 Mr. D'Alessio
testified that Peter explained that Joshua woke up in the early
morning so Peter decided to prepare a bottle for him.5 Peter told
Mr. D'Alessio that when he returned to give Joshua the bottle,
Joshua was lifeless and limp, so Peter called 9-1-1.6 Mr. D'Alessio
testified that Peter told him he was unaware of any trauma to
Joshua.7 However, the day after the interview a doctor told Mr.
D'Alessio that the injury to Joshua's head had been caused by a
third party.8 After again interviewing Joshua's parents, Peter
continued to deny any knowledge of the cause of Joshua's injury
and insisted that he did not hurt Joshua.9 Mr. D'Alessio testified
that Joshua's mother, Nicole, then called Peter in his presence
and the investigator was able to hear their conversation in which
Peter admitted to have shaken Joshua three to four times because
Joshua would not stop crying.10
Dr. Christine Barron, the clinical director of the Hasbro
Children's Hospital Protection Program, also testified at the
parental rights trial.11 She testified that Joshua suffered from
brain tissue injury and a skull fracture, which were irreparable
injuries.12 She opined that Joshua would be unable to develop
normally as a result of his injuries.13 Dr. Barron further testified
that the extensive examination of Joshua at the hospital on
January 1, 2006 revealed that he had previously suffered a similar
injury to his brain between seven and thirty days before the
current injury. 14
The trial judge held that Peter's abusive conduct toward
Joshua affected not only Joshua, but Peter's two other children as
4. Id. at 48-49.
5. Id. at 49.
6. Id.
7. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 49.
8. Id. Mr. D'Alessio thereafter conveyed this information that Josh's
injuries had been inflicted by a third party to the police. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 50.
13. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 50.
14. Id.
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well.15 The trial judge found that Peter was an unfit parent as to
all three of his children, and entered a decree terminating Peter's
parental rights under Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7(a).16
Peter filed a notice of appeal. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Peter
contended that the trial judge erred in terminating his parental
rights because: (1) there existed merely one isolated incident of
abusive behavior and Peter had expressed remorse for that
incident; (2) the divorce decree, providing for termination of
custodial rights, was sufficient to ensure that he would be unable
to see his children or receive custody until determined fit by the
Court; (3) the fact of incarceration alone was insufficient to meet
the requisite grounds for termination of parental rights; (4) the
DCYF should have made reasonable efforts to reunite him with
his children; and (5) there existed no evidence tending to show he
presented a danger to his children.18
The Court held that the fact that Peter expressed remorse
concerning his conduct toward Joshua fell significantly short of an
assurance that his other children would not be exposed to such
conduct in the future.19 In coming to this conclusion, the Court
acknowledged that Peter's behavior did not occur in the distant
15. Id. at 51.
16. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a):
The court shall, upon petition duly filed by a governmental child
placement agency... .after notice to the parent and a hearing on the
petition, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the
child... if the court finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(2) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions
seriously detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited to,
the following:
(ii) Conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature.
17. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 51. In addition to the parental rights
action, criminal charges were instituted against Peter for felony assault.
Peter pled nolo contendere and was convicted for inflicting injuries upon
Joshua. He was ordered to have no contact with Joshua, and was sentenced
to twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 48.
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 53.
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past.20 The Court reasoned that Peter must have demonstrated
that his past conduct no longer endangers the safety of any of his
children, and remorse alone is insufficient to meet this burden.21
Further, the Court found that no judicial or statutory
authority was cited to suggest that a divorce decree is equivalent
to a state's termination of parental rights in terms of the
protection afforded to children.22  The Court reasoned that
protecting children through a termination of parental rights
proceeding provides a more effective means of protecting children
than does a divorce decree, and the appellant had cited no
authority to suggest otherwise. 23
Moreover, the Court reasoned that nothing in the record
suggested that the fact of incarceration alone was determinative
in the trial court's decision to terminate Peter's parental rights.24
The Court found that the trial court considered Peter's
incarceration as one factor, amongst other factors, which is
appropriate in deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights.25
The Court held that, pursuant to the statutory language of
Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1), DCYF had no
obligation to exert reasonable effort in preserving and reunifying
Peter's family.26 The Court reasoned that the requirement of
reasonable reunification efforts does not apply to situations where
abuse is present under Rhode Island General Laws §15-7-
7(a)(2)(ii), and because abuse existed in the present case, DCYF
was not required to reunify. 27
Finally, the Court held that the children's interests in
freedom from abuse and cruelty are of paramount concern when
the parent is found to be demonstrably unfit, and it was in these
interests that Peter's parental rights as to his three children were
20. Id. at 52.
21. See id. at 53.
22. Id.
23. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 54.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 15-7-7(b)(1): "in the event that a petition is
filed pursuant to subdivision( ... (a)(2)(ii) of this section, the department has
no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a
family."
27. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 54-55.
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terminated.28 The Court thus affirmed Family Court's decree
which terminated Peter's parental rights.29
COMMENTARY
Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7 seems to encompass the
Rhode Island General Assembly's judgment that cruel and abusive
conduct toward a child is impermissible under any circumstance. 30
This judgment is evidenced by the statute's command that "the
court shall. . .terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to
the child" when an abusive situation exists.3 1 The legislature's
belief that this behavior is intolerable is also supported by the
absence of the statutory requirement on the part of DCYF to exert
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.32 It seems that the
legislature wanted to eliminate all risk that a child might be
exposed further abuse, and thus, the reasonable efforts to
facilitate reunification, though normally required, are not
obligatory when circumstances of a "cruel or abusive nature" in a
parent-child relationship are present.33
This decision evidences the harsh consequences which Rhode
Island General Laws § 15-7-7(a) imposes upon a parent who
decides to engage in as egregious behavior as abusing their
child.34 Though, because of his seemingly genuine remorse,
termination of Peter's parental rights may seem, to some,
unsympathetic, the case sets forth the reality of Rhode Island
General Laws § 15-7-7(a) mandate: if you engage in conduct
seriously detrimental to your child, your legal parental right will
be terminated, and you will not be afforded a reunification effort
by DCYF.35 Peter's remorse, in this situation, was proven
insufficient to overcome his burden of showing that he no longer
presented a danger to his children. 36 The Court, through plain
meaning statutory interpretation of Rhode Island General Laws §
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 51, 54.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 54-55.
33. See In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 54-55.
34. See id. at 51, 55.
35. Id. at 51, 54-55.
36. Id. at 53.
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15-7-7(a), sets forth the proposition that legal consequences will
proceed from unacceptable behavior, and possible participants in
such behavior should take due care to consider what is expected in
a cultured society before engaging in said action. 37
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, under Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7,
DCYF need not engage in reasonable efforts to reunify and
preserve a family when a termination of parental rights petition is
filed pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) situations where abusive
circumstances exist. 38 Additionally, a divorce decree does not
serve as an adequate measure of child protection, when compared
with a termination of parental rights. 39 A criminal conviction
may be considered as a factor in determining whether parental
rights should be terminated, and signs of remorse are insufficient
to demonstrate that a parent no longer presents a danger to his or
her children. 40
Marisa Ruthven
37. See id. at 55.
38. Id. at 54-55.
39. In re Peter S., 973 A.2d at 54.
40. Id. at 53.
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Government Liability. Adams v. Rhode Island Dept. of
Corrections, 973 A.2d 542 (R.I. 2009). The public duty doctrine is
a narrow exception to the general rule of state liability and is not
met solely because the state performed an activity "for the public
good."' The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that where the
state provided an allegedly defective box of raisins to the plaintiff
at a "food giveaway for low-income persons" the public duty
doctrine did not shield the state from liability because the storing
and providing of food is not an exclusive governmental function
and could be performed by private parties.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The United States Department of Agriculture operates the
Emergency Food Assistance Program ("TEFAP"), a federal
program that purchases and ships food to state agencies, which
then distributes it to public organizations that in turn distribute it
to the public. 3 TEFAP does not allow private parties, either
individuals or corporations, to distribute the food to the public. 4
The Rhode Island Department of Corrections ("DOC") is Rhode
Island's state agency that receives and redistributes the food from
TEFAP.5 In late March of 2004, DOC received six cases of raisins
and stored them in its temperature-controlled center in Cranston. 6
In early October of 2004, DOC sent six cases of raisins to the
Rhode Island Community Food Bank in Providence, which in turn
distributed them to St. Raymond's Church in Providence where
they were given to the public.7 Plaintiff Thomas Adams ("Adams")
attended a food giveaway at St. Raymond's Church on October 16,
2004 where he received a box of raisins that he recalls "was
1. Adams v. Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, 973 A.2d 542, 545, 547
(R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 544, 547.
3. Id. at 544.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Adams, 973 A.2d at 544.
356
SURVEY SECTION
factory-sealed and bore a label reading 'USDA Inspected."' 8
Adams ate the raisins later that day, noticing that the last raisin
in the box had a strange taste and texture.9 He then discovered
insect dung and larvae inside the empty raisin box.10 He alleges
that the discovery provoked "nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of
sleep, and mental anguish for several days."11
Adams filed a complaint against the DOC in mid April of
2006.12 In late June of 2007 the DOC filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that the public duty doctrine shielded them
from liability, that no exceptions to the doctrine applied, and
alternately, that they had no notice of any problems with the
raisins as provided to them.13 The trial judge granted summary
judgment to the DOC, finding that the public duty doctrine
shielded them from liability because the distribution process
undertaken was far more complex than that performed by private
parties, private parties were not permitted to distribute the
federally provided food, the distribution was undertaken "for the
public good as a whole", and no recognized exception to the
doctrine was applicable.14 The trial judge entered final judgment
in early November of 2007 and Adams timely filed his notice to
appeal. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court uses a de novo standard to
review a trial judge's grant of summary judgment.16 A grant of
summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence
presents "no genuine issue of material fact" and the moving party
is entitled to the judgment.17
Rhode Island is liable in tort actions "subject to. . .monetary
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Adams, 973 A.2d at 544-45.
14. Id. at 545.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 545 (citing Planned Env'ts Mgmt Corp. v. Robert, 966 A.2d 117,
121 (R.I. 2009)).
17. Id. (citing Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006)).
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limitations" in the manner of private individuals or corporations
pursuant to R.I. General Laws 1956 § 9-31-1, which overruled the
prior doctrine of sovereign immunity under the common law.18
The Court created a narrow exception to this statutory liability,
now known as the public duty doctrine, for the purpose of
encouraging government administration particularly when an
activity requires "a high degree of discretion such as governmental
planning or political decision making."19 The public duty doctrine
applies when the government is performing an activity that
private individuals or corporations could not reasonably be
expected to perform, such as "licensing of drivers, management.. .of
incarcerated prisoners, and the exercise of police power."20 When
the state is performing an activity identical or parallel to that
which a private party may perform, such as ownership of land or
vehicles, the public duty doctrine does not apply. 21 In short, if a
private party could perform the governmental function at issue
then the state has a duty to perform the task with reasonable
care. 22
The "administration of a federally funded program could,
potentially, be considered a governmental function" and had
Adams alleged that "the discretionary decisions of government
agents in administering the TEFAP program" caused his injuries
the public duty doctrine might apply.23 However, in this case the
government action at issue is food storage and distribution.24
Because these are activities that private parties perform often, the
public duty doctrine cannot be invoked to preclude state
liability.25
In finding that the public duty doctrine applied because DOC
was performing an activity for the public good, the trial judge
misinterpreted the opinion in Haworth v. Lannon.26 Unless a
18. Id.
19. Adams, 973 A.2d at 545-46 (quoting Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d
328, 333 (R.I. 1989)).
20. Id. at 546 (quoting O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 336-37 (R.I. 1989)).
21. Id. (quoting O'Brien, 555 A.2d at 336-37).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Adams, 973 A.2d at 546.
26. Id. at 546-47 (quoting Haworth v. Lannon, 813 A.2d 62 (R.I.2003)).
In Haworth v. Lannon the Court explained the policy behind the public duty
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government activity or something very similar "cannot be
performed by a private party" the public duty doctrine does not
apply solely because the activity is performed "for the public
good." 27  For these reasons, the Court vacated the grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 28
COMMENTARY
The public duty doctrine is a court created exception to a
legislatively created liability and is intended to be narrowly
construed. While it seems unjust for the beneficiary of a
government charity to turn around and bite the hand that feeds
him, the alternative would be a shielding of the state from liability
in all of its public benefit programs. This absence of liability
would likely result in the careless governmental management and
performance of operations resulting in more injuries and possibly
counterbalancing any good the programs accomplished, thus
wasting efforts and funds. The Court made a good decision in this
case by keeping the exception narrow while not eliminating it, and
in emphasizing the simple rule that an activity must be one that
private parties cannot perform for the doctrine to apply, thus
greatly aiding adjudications in the future. The Court does give
due respect to the trial judge and also notes in Footnote 3 that this
ruling does not preclude another grant of summary judgment for
other reasons. 29 It is probable that the DOC shall prevail in this
case, and though Adams has been dealt back into the game, it
seems as if both the Court and the trial judge have seen the
writing on the wall.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that the public duty doctrine did not apply to
shield the DOC from liability in this case because the function at
issue was storage and distribution of food, an activity that private
parties can and do perform regularly. The trial judge originally
doctrine, it did not intend to create a new test for its application.
27. Id. at 547.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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found that the doctrine did apply because TEFAP, when viewed as
a whole, was more complex than the distribution operations of
private parties; had the complaint alleged that some action of a
government official in the administration of this large, complex
program had caused the injury the Court might have affirmed
rather than reversed and remanded. The question of whether or
not the public duty doctrine applies requires a determination of
whether the specific government activity that allegedly caused the
injury could be performed by private parties; if the answer is in
the negative, the doctrine applies. Implied in the opinion is the
finding that even where private parties are forbidden to perform a
function for a specific government program, the doctrine still does
not apply if private parties can perform parallel functions in their
own capacity. The Court also vacated the trial judge's finding that
the doctrine should apply because the function was for the public
good. The public duty doctrine is merely a narrow exception to
G.L. 1956 § 9-31-1 and thus it is necessary to leave the state
susceptible to most liability even when actions are undertaken for
the public good.
Alastair C. Deans
Indian Law. In re Tamika R., 973 A.2d 547 (R.I. 2009). A state
agency must comply with the provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, §102(e), 25 U.S.C. §1912(e) (ICWA) when
revoking a parent's custody of a dependant who is a member of an
Indian tribe. First, the state agency must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that continued custody is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Second, the
ICWA requires that any foster care placement order be supported,
at least in part, by testimony from qualified expert witnesses. If
the state agency fails to adhere to these requirements, a court
may not order the child into foster care, taking away the parent's
custody over the child without committing an error that will not
be considered harmless.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Mr. Robinson, a member of the Narragansett Indian Tribe, is
the father of Tameka, who was born on October 4, 2007.1 Mr.
Robinson lived with Eleanor Wilson for over eight years, raising
their four children together.2 Tameka's mother was not Ms.
Wilson, but rather was a woman with whom Mr. Robinson had an
affair. 3 Feeling as though she could not adequately care for
Tameka, the biological mother agreed to place the child with a
social-service agency for adoption. 4 Mr. Robinson objected to the
adoption, and on October 19, 2007, he advised DCYF that he
wanted custody of the child shortly after the baby's birth.5 After
learning of the affair, Ms. Wilson demanded that Mr. Robinson
vacate their home.6 Mr. Robinson also informed one of the
caseworkers that he used marijuana.7  DCYF required Mr.
Robinson to attend a drug treatment facility and refused to place
1. In re Tamika R., 973 A.2d 547, 548-49 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 549.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 549.
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Tameka in his custody, pointing to his lack of stable housing and
his admitted use of marijuana.8 On October 19, 2007, DCYF filed
a petition against both biological parents alleging dependency on
drugs and neglect.9
Based on Tameka's and Mr. Robinson's membership within an
Indian Tribe, when DCYF stepped into this situation, it was
obligated to comply with the provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).1o The ICWA is a statement of
Congressional policy concerning "the special relationship between
the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and
the Federal responsibility to Indian people." 11
The ICWA imposes two constraints on a state agency
attempting to revoke the custody of an Indian child from the
parents.12  First, a state agency must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that continued custody "is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child."13
Furthermore, testimony from a qualified expert witness14 must
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 551 ("No foster care placement may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and
convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that
the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." (quoting 25
U.S.C. §1912(e))).
11. Id. at 550 (recognizing that "there is no resource [. . .] more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."
(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)) (explaining that Congress established minimum
Federal standards to reflect the unique values of the Indian culture when
removing Indian children from their families and placing such children in
foster or adoptive homes. Congress found "that an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private
agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed
in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and [. . .] that the
States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 1901(4) and (5))).
12. Id. at 551.
13. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 551 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)).
14. Id. (defining "qualified expert witness" as "(i) [a] member of the
Indian child's tribe who is recognized by the tribal community as
knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family organization and
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support the foster care placement.15  The two interrelated
requirements ensure that "Indian child welfare determinations
are not based on 'a white, middle-class standard, which in many
cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family."' 16
The trial was held on March 20, 2008, where the trial judge
found that (1) Mr. Robinson's family was already being supported
by the state rather than a working family member, and (2) that
DCYF had provided clear and convincing evidence of Mr.
Robinson's dependency on marijuana. 17  The judge then
committed Tameka to the care, custody, and control of DCYF.18
Mr. Robinson's attorney objected that DCYF had failed to
establish dependency by clear and convincing evidence, and the
agency's failure to adhere to ICWA's provisions requiring the
testimony of a qualified expert witness to support the removal of
the child.19
Although the trial judge initially considered reopening for the
submission of expert testimony, after hearing further argument
from the state, he concluded that Mr. Robinson's admission
regarding his marijuana use of, "I can't stop, it's part of my life,"
superseded the necessity of expert testimony.20 The trial judge
concluded that DCYF's case plan should include "generous"
visitation to facilitate reunification, DCYF should ensure that Mr.
Robinson rather than Ms. Wilson would be the primary caretaker
of Tameka during these visitations, and that Mr. Robinson submit
to random drug screening tests.21 An initial decree was entered
on April 9, 2008, and a second decree was entered on April 23,
childrearing practices[;] (ii) [a] lay expert witness having substantial
experience in the delivery of child and family services to Indians, and
extensive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and
childrearing practices within the Indian child's tribe[; or] (iii) [a] professional
person having substantial education and experience in the area of his or her
specialty." (quoting GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURTS; INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584-95 (Nov. 26, 1979))).
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Miss. Bank of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
37, 109 (1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7350, 7546)).
17. Id. at 549-50.
18. Id.
19. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 549.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 550.
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2008, where the trial judge added that DCYF had "made
reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification as to father."22 Mr.
Robinson appealed.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal Mr. Robinson argued: (1) that DCYF failed to
submit clear and convincing evidence of his dependency on
marijuana; and (2) that DCYF's failure to comply with the ICWA
in not presenting expert testimony had required the trial judge to
dismiss the agency's dependency petition. 24  Justice Suttell,
writing for the majority, explains the standard of review to be
used,25 discusses the ICWA requirements, and points out that
DCYF has conceded noncompliance to the mandatory
requirements. 26 DCYF argues that this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, and goes on to explain that because
the trial judge's reasoning for his findings were "culturally
neutral," allowing an expert to offer his opinion, even though
required by the ICWA, would not have outweighed the evidence of
dependency presented.27
The Court holds that the failure to comply with the
requirements of the ICWA was not a harmless error.28 DCYF
failed to present any evidence that serious emotional or physical
harm was likely to be sustained by Tameka if Mr. Robinson was
granted custody.29 The Court also points to DCYF's knowledge
that its claim of a lack of stable housing was not relevant since
Mr. Robinson never left the home, and, in addition, Ms. Wilson
had been visiting Tameka and was willing to make the child part
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 550 (explaining that the trial judge's
decision will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the decision is
clearly wrong or that material evidence was overlooked or misconceived. The
record must be examined to determine whether the trial judge's decision is
based on legally competent evidence, and because this case presents a
question of statutory construction, the Court will review the record de novo).
26. Id. at 551.
27. Id. (relying on Mr. Robinson's admission that he "can't stop").
28. Id. at 552.
29. Id.
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of her family.30  The Court also holds that Mr. Robinson's
admission of his use of marijuana was not sufficiently "culturally
neutral" to allow the trial judge to ignore the requirement of a
qualified expert witness because the testimony could have been
helpful in assessing the seriousness and cultural relevance of Mr.
Robinson's marijuana use. 31 The cases DCYF cites exemplify an
expansive definition of a qualified witness, but do not relate to Mr.
Robinson's case because in both, expert witnesses testified that
continued custody would likely result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the children if remaining in the parent's
custody. 32
Although the lower court suggests that Mr. Robinson's
marijuana use was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage, the Supreme Court correctly found it significant that the
trial judge merely ordered drug screening, and that DCYF did not
attempt to take away Mr. Robinson's other four children that were
living with him.33 Because the trial judge declared that Mr.
Robinson's testimony "supersedes [the necessity of] an expert," the
Court is satisfied that the ICWA regulations were disregarded in
30. Id.
31. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 552 (suggesting that evidence that only
shows the existence of "family poverty, crowded or inadequate housing,
alcohol abuse, or non-conforming social behavior does not constitute clear and
convincing evidence that continued custody is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child." (quoting GUIDELINES FOR STATE
COuRTs; INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584-95 (Nov.
26, 1979)); ("Legislative history indicates that the primary reason for
requiring qualified expert testimony in ICWA termination proceedings was to
prevent courts from basing their decisions solely upon the testimony of social
workers who possessed neither the specialized professional education nor the
familiarity with Native culture necessary to distinguish between cultural
variations in child-rearing practices and actual abuse or neglect." (quoting
L.G. v. State Dep't. of Health and Social Services, 14 P.3d 946, 952-53
(Alaska 2000))).
32. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 551-52 (People ex rel. K.D., 155 P.3d 634
(Colo.App. 2007) ("qualified expert need not possess special knowledge of
Indian life where she is testifying about culturally neutral reasons for
termination and where she has substantial education and experience in her
field); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't. of Lane County v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793
(Or. C. App. 1985) ("when cultural bias is clearly not implicated, the
necessary proof may be provided by expert witnesses who do not possess
special knowledge of Indian life").
33. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 552.
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the lower proceedings. 34
The particular circumstances of this case left uncertainty as
to whether Mr. Robinson still would have been prevented from
obtaining custody of Tameka had DCYF complied with the ICWA
regulations. 35  Tameka was committed to DCYF for foster
placement by the trial judge without any testimony from a
qualified expert witness supporting that decision.36 The trial
judge also failed to make the required finding that placing the
child with Mr. Robinson would likely result in serious emotional
or physical damage to the child.37 With the blatant disregard for
the prerequisites of the ICWA, the Court could not find that the
trial judge's error was harmless. 38 The case was remanded to be
retried or resolved no later than ninety days from the date of the
Court's opinion.39
COMMENTARY
This case exemplifies the prejudice Indian families tend to
face when dealing with public and private agencies. The inability
to relate to the Indian culture directly conflicts with the typical
autonomy normally granted to biological parents wishing to obtain
custody of their children. Congress enacted the ICWA in an
attempt to counteract these biases. DCYF and the trial judge
seemingly display a preconception in this case that Mr. Robinson
is unfit to parent Tameka based on the decision to disregard
mandatory regulations that have been statutorily created for
these exact situations. Congress discovered that an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian tribe children have been removed from
their families and placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions.40 The highly disparate result leads to one of the
following conclusions: (1) a greater majority of Indian parents are
not able to adequately care for and protect their children: or (2)
the prominently "white, middle-class standard"41 holds a
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 553.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 553.
40. Id. at 550.
41. Id. at 551 (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37).
SURVEY SECTION
predisposed assumption that Indian families are different, and
because they are different, they are generally incapable of taking
care of their own children because they do not adhere to white,
middle class actions and beliefs.
After disclosing the affair, Mr. Robinson found himself in
what would normally be a typical reaction by any person in a long
term relationship; he was told to get out. DCYF did not seem to
take into consideration that Mr. Robinson was willing to come
clean with this information for the purpose of claiming and taking
responsibility for his child. His action not only illustrates the
recognition by Congress in creating the ICWA that "there is no
resource [. . .] more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children,"42 and it is also an action that
in many other cases would be held as exemplary. Mr. Robinson
likely knew he would face repercussions at home for the discovery
of his fathering another woman's child; some men would likely let
that child slip out of their life without breathing a word about it to
avoid creating trouble at home. Neither DCYF nor the trial judge
seems to think that risking his relationship to gain custody of his
child was an act that should garnish much consideration.
Instead, DCYF and the trial judge focus on Mr. Robinson's
admission of marijuana use. Justice Suttell points to an illusion
of danger and unfitness that both DCYF and the trial judge cling
to while preventing Mr. Robinson from recognizing his rights
under the ICWA.43 Had there been any true concern regarding
Mr. Robinson's ability to parent and the potential safety of the
child placed under his care and supervision, both the trial judge
and DCYF would have taken drastically different steps while
producing the same result. The trial court likely would have
ordered Mr. Robinson into a drug rehabilitation program rather
than mere testing, and the living situation with his four other
children would have been more closely observed. Without finding
that the four children presently in Mr. Robinson's custody are or
could be in danger, it is hard to understand how the decision could
be made that only Tameka would be in danger if placed within the
same household.
However, the argument could be made that both the trial
42. Id. at 550 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)).
43. Id. at 552.
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court and DCYF were in fact aware of a present danger for the
children already residing in the home, but chose to rely on the fact
that they were also Ms. Wilson's biological children to prevent
them from further consideration. The trial judge, after ordering
visitation for the father, makes it clear that it is Mr. Robinson
that should perform as Tameka's primary caretaker during his
visits rather than Ms. Wilson.44 This statement seems to suggest
that the Court felt as though Ms. Wilson was capable of taking
care of her children, but it was not Ms. Wilson's child here that
was at issue. Ms. Wilson was not the biological mother, and there
is no evidence that she intended to adopt Tameka as her own.
Therefore, she could kick Mr. Robinson and Tameka out of the
house, leaving them with nowhere to go, and with no ability to
provide any support for him and his child. At issue was whether
custody granted to Mr. Robinson, as the biological father, was
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
Tameka. Rhode Island courts adhere to the best interest of the
child standard in determining custody.45 A court could reasonably
decide that placing an infant in the custody of a person who had
no way to care and protect the child on his own satisfied the clear
and convincing evidence needed to show that custody held by that
parent was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child, and was not in the best interest of the child.
However the facts of the case, the actions taken by DCYF, and
the decision of the trial judge do not relate any of these concerns.
These arguments would also ignore that the ICWA does not
adhere to a best interest of the child standard. There are
statutory requirements that DCYF and the trial judge in this case
directly chose to ignore. 46 Therefore, the Court was correct in its
holding that the error made in this case was not harmless. 47 If
anything, one could say this error was a direct harm, not only to
the Indian tribes, but to all individuals because it reinforced the
idea that certain categories of people do not necessarily have to
adhere to the rules and regulations set before them. The Supreme
Court ensured justice where it had not been granted.
44. Id. at 550.
45. Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I. 1990) (citing Petition of
Loudin, 101 R.I. 35, 39 (1966)).
46. In re Tamika, 973 A.2d at 552.
47. Id. at 553.
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CONCLUSION
In judicial procedures under 28 U.S.C. §1912(e) of the ICWA,
a judge must adhere to the mandatory requirements and not order
foster care placement unless there is clear and convincing
evidence, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, to
determine that the continued custody of the child with the parent
is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.48 If a judge does not adhere to these statutory directives, it
is to be considered a harmful error. 49
Heather O'Connor
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Labor and Employment Law. City of East Providence v. Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2009). The
City of East Providence appealed after their motion to vacate an
arbitration award granting Chief James Moniz injured on-duty
benefits was denied. The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
award pursuant to § 45-19-1, the injured on-duty statute, and §
45-19.1, the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In August 2002, James Moniz, the East Providence Fire
Department Battalion Chief, was diagnosed with prostate cancer. 1
Consequently, Chief Moniz underwent treatment for his illness
and was out on sick leave from August 22, 2002 until November
18, 2002.2 Fortunately, the treatment was successful and Chief
Moniz was able to return to active duty immediately after.3 Upon
his return, Chief Moniz requested that his forty-four day sick
leave be converted to "injured on-duty" time in order to have those
days credited back to his sick leave reserve.4 Although Chief
Moniz cited two other firefighters who were diagnosed with cancer
and who had their sick leave converted to injured on-duty time,
the chief of the department denied his request.5
Subsequently, International Association of Firefighters Local
850 ("Local 850") filed a grievance pursuant to the collective-
bargaining agreement, but the human resources director
nevertheless denied the grievance. 6  The director denied the
grievance partially because the two firefighters Chief Moniz
referenced did not return to active duty following their diagnoses,
but retired on sick leave.7 The director stated that each request is
1. City of East Providence v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982
A.2d 1281, 1283 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1283-84.
6. Id. at 1284.
7. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1283-84.
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considered on a case-by-case basis with two factors taken into
consideration: (1) the type of cancer, and (2) whether the cancer
led directly to disability retirement.8 Since Chief Moniz was able
to, and in fact did, return to active duty, the human resources
director denied the grievance.9
The collective-bargaining agreement between the City of East
Providence ("the City") and Local 850 provides that an "in-line-of-
duty illness" must conform with the injured on-duty statute, § 45-
19-1.10 Following the City's denial, Local 850 submitted the
grievance to arbitration 11 arguing that § 45-19.1 (the "Cancer
Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute)12 was incorporated into the
parties' collective-bargaining agreement through the agreement's
adoption of § 45-19-1.13 Moreover, Local 850 argued that
8. Id. at 1284. "It is the City's policy to evaluate each request that
cancer be presumed to be work related on a case-by-case basis. In the past,
the City has ruled in two cases, based on the type of cancer and the fact that
the cancer led directly to disability retirements, that the sick leave taken
immediately prior to the disability pension should be converted to injury on
duty leave. In your case, based on the type of cancer and the fact that you
have recovered sufficiently to return to active duty, it is the City's position
that your sick leave not be converted to injured on duty status." (letter from
the human resources director denying Chief Moniz's request) Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1283. Section 45-19-1(a) provides:
Whenever any [... .] fire fighter [. . .] of any city, town, fire district, or
the state of Rhode Island is wholly or partially incapacitated by
reason of injuries received or sickness contracted in the performance
of his or her duties [. .] the respective city, town, fire district, state
of Rhode Island or Rhode Island Airport Corporation by which the [. .
.] fire fighter [. . .] is employed, shall, during the period of the
incapacity, pay the [. . .] fire fighter [. . .1 the salary or wage and
benefits to which the [. . .] fire fighter [. . .] be entitled had he or she
not been incapacitated [. . .]
R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-19-1(a) (1956). Article X, Section 10.03(A) of the
collective-bargaining agreement reads:
Members of the fire department, covered by this contract who are
injured in the line of duty including non-civic details to which they
are assigned, shall receive full salary while their incapacity exists or
until they are placed on a disability retirement (This section is in
conformance with . . . , as amended, §45-19-1).
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1283.
11. Article XVI of the collective-bargaining agreement made arbitration
obligatory. Id. at 1284.
12. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-19.1 (1956).
13. Intl Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1284.
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previously granting firefighters cancer benefits constituted a past
practice, which entitled Chief Moniz to benefits under the
statute. 14 In response, the City asserted that its firefighters were
not entitled to the benefits under the "Cancer Benefits for Fire
Fighters" statute because the applicability of the statute is limited
to those municipalities participating in the option retirement plan
under § 45-21.15
The arbitrator awarded Chief Moniz forty-four days of sick
leave back to his reserve, concluding that §45-19-1 was
incorporated into the collective-bargaining agreement.16
Moreover, the arbitrator concluded that the General Assembly
amended §45-19-1 to include cancer as a potential on-duty
injury.17 Further, in the alternative, the arbitrator determined
that any ambiguity in whether the "Cancer Benefits for Fire
Fighters" statute was applicable to the agreement could be
explained by the parties' past practices.18 The arbitrator found
that the City had previously provided cancer benefits for its
firefights; therefore, the parties intended for the "Cancer Benefits
for Fire Fighters" statute to be incorporated into the agreement.19
The City filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in
Superior Court, but the hearing judge denied the motion.20 The
City appealed arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by finding the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute
applicable to its firefighters. 21 The City contends that the
arbitration award was irrational because: (1) the "Cancer Benefits
for Fire Fighters" statute is limited to municipalities that
participate in the option retirement plan pursuant to § 45-21-2,
and that its firefighters are not entitled to the benefits because
the City does not participate in such a program; (2) implementing
the arbitrator's award would cause irreparable, unforeseen fiscal
harm; and (3) the application of the "Cancer Benefits for Fire
Fighters" statute to its firefighters created new injured on-duty
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Int'l Assn of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1284-85.
20. Id. at 1285.
21. Id.
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and pension benefits that were not a product of collective-
bargaining. 22  Local 850 maintains that § 45-19-1 was
incorporated into the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
that the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute amended § 45-
19-1, and that the plain language of the statute applies to all
Rhode Island firefighters. 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court stated that arbitration awards enjoy a
presumption of validity, 24 and therefore, the award may only be
overturned where it is irrational or where the arbitrator has
manifestly disregarded the law. 25 A manifest disregard of the law
is present when an arbitrator correctly understands and
articulates the law, but nevertheless ignores it.26
The Court first addressed, and quickly rejected, the City's
argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by construing
the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute to be an
amendment to § 45-19-1.27 Commenting that an arbitrator can,
and should, decide questions of state law in resolving a grievance
among parties to a collective-bargaining agreement, the Court
found the arbitrator to be well within his authority.28
Next, the Court rejected the City's argument that conferring
injury on-duty benefits to firefighters with cancer would cause
irreparable economic harm. 29 The City is statutorily obligated
under the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute, as it
amended §45-19-1, to provide benefits for cancer-stricken
firefighters. 30 Given that the parties collectively bargained for the
benefits of § 45-19-1, the City was also contractually obligated to
provide such benefits. 31 Finally, the Court noted that cancer was
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id (citing N. Providence Sch. Comm. v. N. Providence Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 920, 945 A.2d 339, 344 (R.I. 2008)).
25. Int'lAss'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1285-86.
26. Id. at 1286.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers v. State of R.I., 643 A.2d 817, 821
(R.I. 1994)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Int'lAss'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1286.
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just one type of injury a firefighter may have that would qualify
him for injury on-duty benefits.32
The Court also rejected the City's argument that the "Cancer
Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute is limited to municipalities that
participate in the option retirement plan. 33 In agreement with
Local 850, the Court found the plain language of the statute to
indicate a general application to all Rhode Island firefighters. 34
After looking at the legislative findings, 35 the Court found that
the "statute acknowledges the unfortunate fact that in the
performance of their duties, firefighters develop cancer at a
disproportionate rate."36  In order to determine whether the
"Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute applied in the present
case, the Court examined § 45-19.1-3.37 Section 45-19.1-3
provides:
Any fire fighter, including one employed by the state, or a
municipal fire fighter employed by a municipality that
participates in the optional retirement for police officers
and fire fighters, as provided in chapter 21.2 of this title,
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1288.
34. Id.
35. Section 45-19.1-1 provides:
(a) The general assembly finds and declares that by reason of their
employment: (1) Fire fighters are required to work in the midst of,
and are subject to, smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or
chemical substances; (2) Fire fighters are continually exposed to a
vast and expanding field of hazardous substances through hazardous
waste sites and the transportation of those substances; (3) Fire
fighters are constantly entering uncontrolled environments to save
lives and reduce property damage and are frequently not aware of
the potential toxic and carcinogenic substances that they may be
exposed to; (4) Fire fighters, unlike other workers, are often exposed
simultaneously to multiple carcinogens, and the rise in occupational
cancer among fire fighters can be related to the rapid proliferation of
thousands of toxic substances in our every day environment; and (5)
the onset of cancers in fire fighters can develop very slowly usually
manifesting themselves from five (5) to forty (40) years after
exposure to the cancer-causing agent.
(b) The general assembly further finds and declares that all of the
previously stated conditions exist and arise out of or in the course of
that employment.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-19.1-1 (1956).
36. Int'lAss'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1288.
37. Id. at 1287.
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who is unable to perform his or her duties in the fire
department by reason of a disabling occupational cancer 38
which develops or manifests itself during a period while
the fire fighter is in the service of the department, and
any retired member of the fire department of any city or
town who develops occupational cancer, is entitled to
receive an occupational cancer disability, and he or she is
entitled to all the benefits provided for in chapters 19, 21,
and 21.2 of this title and chapter 10 of title 36 if the fire
fighter is employed by the state. 39
The City argued that the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters"
statute was limited to those municipalities participating in the
option retirement plan.40 However, the Court concluded that the
statute was clear and unambiguous. 41 Therefore, the statute is
construed by using the plain and ordinary meaning of the
language. 42 Section 45-19.1 declares cancer as an on-duty illness
among firefighters. 43 The plain language of the statute indicates
that any cancer-stricken firefighter is entitled to receive injured
on-duty benefits, regardless of whether the municipality
participates in the option retirement program. 44
Therefore, the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute
confers injured on-duty benefits to cancer-stricken firefighters as
governed by § 45-19-1.45 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding Chief
Moniz injured on-duty benefits.46
COMMENTARY
Unfortunately, cancer has become a prevalent and
38. "Occupational cancer means a cancer arising out of his or her
employment as a fire fighter, due to injury from exposures to smoke, fumes,
or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic or chemical substances while in the
performance of active duty in the fire department." R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-19.1-
2 (1956).
39. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19.1-3(a) (1956).
40. Int'l Assn of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1286.
41. Id. at 1288.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1288-89.
46. Int'l Assn of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1289.
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devastating illness in modern society. Most Americans know
someone who has been affected by the disease.47 As a result, it is
natural to empathize with those adversely affected by cancer. In
addition, firefighters perform an indispensable and invaluable
service to their community that many people would be reluctant to
do. Thus, it is easy to see why the Rhode Island Supreme Court
was sympathetic to Chief Moniz's situation. The Court
commended Chief Moniz for returning to active duty after battling
cancer. 48 Not only was the Court showing compassion, but it also
seems as if they were wagging their finger at the City of East
Providence for not doing the same. Moreover, the Court went to
great lengths to explain the legislative intent of the "Cancer
Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute, detailing the dangers of being
a firefighter. 49
Although the Court's underlying sentiment was clear
throughout the opinion, the Court seems to have conscientiously
and rationally decided the case. The Court was careful to explain
the logical reasoning behind its decision. Primarily, the Court
thoroughly described its reasons for finding the City's arguments
to be unpersuasive,o even though the case seemed to be fairly
straightforward. Moreover, the Court went to great lengths to
make it clear why the "Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute
was applicable in this situation.51 Even though the Court
ultimately found for Chief Moniz, the Court does not seem to have
been entirely influenced by his sympathetic situation. Thus, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court prudently remained levelheaded in
order to properly and meticulously apply the law, despite their
compassion.
47. "There is an epidemic of cancer today. One in three Americans will
be diagnosed with cancer, often before the age of 65." David Servan-
Schreiber, We Can Stop the Cancer Epidemic (2008), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/opinion/19iht-edservan.1.16308287.html.
48. Int' Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1284 n.2.
49. Id. at 1287-88.
50. Id. at 1285-89.
51. Id. at 1286-89.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the "Cancer
Benefits for Fire Fighters" statute provides injured on-duty
benefits to firefighters diagnosed with cancer and, therefore, Chief
Moniz is entitled to have his sick leave converted to injured on-
duty time.52 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's
judgment.53
Kate Early
52. Id. at 1289.
53. Id.
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Labor and Employment Law. New England Stone, LLC v.
Donald C. Conte, et al., 962 A.2d 30 (R.I. 2009). In this decision,
Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg, writing for the unanimous
Rhode Island Supreme Court, affirmed that where an employment
contract specifies that an employee may only be terminated for
"cause" demonstrated by a showing of "good faith," that the
measure of "good faith" is to be determined through a case-by-case
consideration. The Court declined the opportunity to adopt
objective measurable standards for determining good-faith,
favoring (1) the legislature's role in determining the elements of
protection to be conferred on a class and (2) the parties' rights of
protection from courts supplying additional protections not
included in the original contract. Further, the Court held that a
termination for cause is made in good-faith where the employee's
conduct is in direct defiance of a superior's repeated instructions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Plaintiff, New England Stone, LLC (hereinafter "NES") is
a provider of granite products to clientele across the United
States.1 Prior to 2005, NES was owned by the father-in-law of the
defendant, Donald C. Conte (hereinafter Conte), who served as its
general manager. In 2005, when NES was sold, Conte remained
with the new management as chief operating officer. 2
The Contract
Prior to undertaking his duties as chief operating officer,
Conte entered into an employment agreement specifying that he is
to report "exclusively" to Craig Reynolds (hereinafter "Reynolds"),
the president of NES.3 Additionally, the agreement specified
grounds for termination, allowing NES to terminate Conte's
employment only for cause, defined as "Conte's failure to follow
1. New England Stone, LLC v. Donald C. Conte, et al. 962 A.2d 30, 31
(R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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any directive of the (p)resident with regard to the conduct of the
(c)ompany's business," providing also that cause shall be
determined in "good faith."4
Under the contract, if Conte was terminated for cause, he was
prohibited from competing with NES in the New England area for
two years, could not solicit NES customers for two years, and
could not disseminate confidential information for five years. 5 He
would also only be entitled to his accrued salary.6
The Stone Creek Quarry Incident
Sometime prior to the current suit, NES had obtained a
$50,000 judgment against a client, Stony Creek Quarry
Corporation (hereinafter "Stony Creek") for nonpayment. 7 Despite
the ongoing litigation, the two companies continued to do business
under Reynold's instructions that Stony Creek was to pay cash
upon delivery until payment of the judgment was complete. 8
When Reynolds learned that Stony Creek was being allowed to
purchase materials from NES for only 50 percent down payment
with the balance due thirty days later, he reiterated his
instructions in an email sent to Conte and other employees.9 In
this same email, Reynolds also cancelled all orders from Stony
Creek because of their outstanding invoices, which totaled
$7,809.10 However, this directive was shortly repudiated, leaving
the cash-on-delivery requirement in effect. 11
On Friday, May 18, 2007, an associate of Stony Creek
traveled to NES to pay for and retrieve a portion of an order of
stone tiles.12 The first truck not being sufficient to retrieve the
entire order, Stony Creek dispatched a second truck to pick up the
remainder of the tiles, but because of some confusion, the second
truck did not have a payment to give to NES in exchange for the
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 31.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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tiles.13 By this time, it was too late in the day for the driver to go
back to Connecticut and return to Rhode Island with the
payment. 14 Sandy Meyer, NES's logistics officer, adhering to
Reynold's instructions, refused to release the order without first
receiving payment.15 Reynolds was out of reach, so the associate
contacted Conte and assured him that the payment would be sent
the following Monday.16 In agreement, Conte instructed Meyer to
release the tiles without payment, however, she refused.17 Conte
then simply overruled Meyer, and ordered the plant foreman to
release the tiles to Stony Creek, which he did.18 Stony Creek paid
NES for the tiles at a later date.19
The following week, Reynolds met with Conte and another
NES officer to discuss the incident. Reynolds testified at trial that
he had not made up his mind whether to terminate Conte at the
outset of the meeting.20 Reynolds further testified that when he
questioned Conte about countering his directive regarding Stony
Creek, Conte became agitated and displayed an "attitude" and
"negative body language."21 Conte was terminated following the
meeting.22
After the Stony Creek Incident
Following his termination, Conte acquired partial ownership
of AC Stone, LLC, a competitor of NES, prompting NES to
institute this action, contending that Conte was in violation of the
employment agreement. 23 NES sought a preliminary injunction
to enforce the contract.24 Conte filed a counterclaim, asserting
that because he was not terminated for cause, he was entitled his
salary for the duration of his contract with NES in addition to
13. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 31.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 31-33.
19. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 32.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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payment for eleven weeks of accrued vacation time.25
The hearing judge held that Conte was terminated for cause
in accordance with the employment agreement, noting that "good
faith" was limited to a finding that cause for termination existed
because of Conte's "blatant disregard of the literal language of the
memo precluding what actually subsequently transpired."26
The hearing judge granted NES's preliminary injunction, and
denied Conte's counterclaim. 27 A temporary stay was issued,
during which Conte appealed. 28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first resolved that because
the defendant is challenging the decision in the Plaintiffs favor on
the grounds that the hearing justice made an error of law by not
employing a measurable good-faith standard, its review would be
de novo.29
Objective Standards for Good-Faith Termination Contracts
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that Rhode Island
is an employment-at-will state, and that absent an employment
agreement, there is no right to continued employment, and the
employee may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or for no
reason at all. 30
The defendant urged that the Court create additional, implied
terms to govern situations where a contractual agreement exists
between employer and employee that would require would give
"due-process mandates" before ensuring a finding of good faith.31
Such standards would be an objective good-faith standard that is
used in other jurisdictions. To illustrate one of these standards,
the Court looked to the California requirements for termination
for cause, which must be based on "fair and honest reasons,
25. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 32.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 33 (citing Galloway v. Roger Williams Univ., 777 A.2d 148, 150
(R.I. 2001)).
31. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 33.
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regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not
trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs or
goals, or pretextual."32 The Court held that such a standard
would require the employer to support its decision to terminate an
employee with "substantial evidence gathered through an
adequate investigation that includes notice of the claimed
misconduct and a chance for the employee to respond."33
Conte argued that NES breached the employment agreement
by failing to terminate him in good faith for two reasons. First,
that NES failed to conduct a full and thorough investigation,
including the interviewing of key witnesses, notifying him of the
alleged misconduct, and affording him an opportunity to be
heard.34 Second, that Reynolds terminated him solely because of
his alleged negative attitude during the meeting following the
Stony Creek incident. 35
The Court declined to impose such requirements into good-
faith termination contracts, citing to case law holding that it is not
within the province of the courts to create rights for persons where
the Legislature has not chosen to confer such protection.36
Alternatively, the Court pointed out in a footnote that the
California cases adoption of the objective good-faith standard
involved cases where the trier of fact was in the position of
deciding whether the employee actually committed the act
justifying the dismissal, or if the employer could have honestly
concluded that the employee committed the act. 37 Here, the issue
of whether Conte committed the act was not in dispute, but the
question was whether dismissal for such action was a good-faith
cause.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Pacheco v. Raytheon Co,. 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993)).
37. New England Stone, 962 A.2d at 33 n.3.
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Conte's Agreement with NES
After declining to adopt objective, measurable standards for a
"good faith" finding of cause for termination, the Court set out to
determine whether NES did have a good faith cause to terminate
Conte. Agreeing with the lower court, Justice Goldberg wrote that
"(i)n our view, Conte's admission to Reynolds that he permitted a
representative from Stony Creek to pick up materials without
paying for them, in direct defiance of Reynold's order, satisfied the
good-faith provision of the employment agreement. 38
Justice Goldberg also pointed out that the objective standards
that Conte had proposed would not have provided him any
relief.39 Because the employment agreement here "clearly and
unambiguously" asserted that Conte's failure to follow a direct
order from NES's president would constitute cause for
termination, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that
the requisite cause for termination was provided. 40
COMMENTARY
The state Supreme Court here rejects the opportunity to do as
other states have done by refusing to give teeth to the terms "good
faith" as contained in employment agreements. Inherently, the
decision not to adopt these requirements serves two ends: it
spares employers the resources and time required to fulfill
concrete, objective judicial standards to satisfy newly established
"elements" of a good faith finding. Second, it represents a decision
by the court to not define a term that is often used in employment
and other agreements, instead leaving such protections for
employees to the bargaining process.
Justice Goldberg specifically addresses California's policies
regarding a showing of good faith for termination for cause, which
specifically requires that the employer conduct an investigation in
order to gather the "substantial evidence" it needs to show that
the employee actually committed the alleged misconduct. In such
a case as the one at hand, this would probably be an unnecessary
step, which would produce a judicial quagmire: must the employer
38. Id. at 34.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 33-34.
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in a situation where employee's conduct is clear and not denied
still investigate and prove the conduct in order to terminate the
employee? The policy of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in this
case, is not to require such actions.
This indicates that this case is likely to be read narrowly in
the future. While employees across the state may have cause to
feel that the Court may have a pro-employer agenda, the real
agenda here is to prevent business from being forced to undergo a
judicially-imposed resource-devouring investigation of employee
conduct when that employee's misconduct is unquestioned and
clearly violative. Conte had been instructed by the superior not to
deliver tiles to Stony Creek without payment first. He directly
and knowingly violated this order. It would appear that Reynolds
had a good and valid reason for instituting the requirement that
Stony Creek specifically pay first, as they had been to court with
them over the issue of nonpayment, but continued to do business
with each other. The payment prior to the transfer of the tiles
was a means to avoid a repeat of the problem, and Conte clearly
undermined that determination. To hold that Reynolds was then
required to undergo an investigation into Conte's actions would be
purely duplicitous and unnecessary, as the action itself was so
clear-cut.
To the unanimous Rhode Island Supreme Court, there could
be no other cause for termination following this incident than one
that was made in good faith. To hold that an employer must
undergo an investigation after an incident where the employee, a
management level officer, is in clear violation of a directive from
the company's principal could have the inevitable effect of
ultimately undermining management authority. Thus, this case
was easy. For a panoply of fact-specific reasons, future cases may
not have the same outcome. The Court indeed leaves open the
question of what "good faith" constitutes by declining to adopt
objective rules to define and measure it. Instead, employees with
this term in their contract are indeed left protected, as this case
indeed further ensures that "good faith" must at least be clear-cut
and unambiguous.
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CONCLUSION
The Court held that Conte was terminated for cause, and that
cause was found in good faith because he was in clear violation of
his superior's direct order. The Court declined to adopt specific
measurable bounds for the contractual language "good faith," but
indeed implies that a "good faith" finding of cause for termination
will only exist where the issue of the employee's misconduct is
clear, unambiguous and undisputed.
Jared B. Arader
Law of Debtors and Creditors. Holden v. Salvadore, 964 A.2d
508 (R.I. 2009). For a transaction to constitute a loan, the parties
to the transaction must intend to enter into a creditor-debtor
relationship. Under R.I. General Laws § 5-79-1(a), a party who
enters into an agreement and assumes the right of the highest
bidder at a foreclosure sale to purchase such foreclosure property
does not meet the definition of mortgage foreclosure consultant
and thus is not subject to the prohibitions outlined in the
Mortgage Foreclosure Consultant Regulation Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Deborah Holden, was in danger of losing her
home from foreclosure by a lending institution, but was able to
enter the highest bid of $265,000 for the property at the
foreclosure sale.1 Holden put down a $5,000 deposit and was
required to pay the balance within thirty days of the sale date in
order to complete the transaction.2 With two weeks left before the
deadline, and having been unable to obtain financing elsewhere,
Holden contacted the defendant, Guido Salvadore, for assistance.3
Holden informed Salvadore that she believed her property had a
value of $379,000 and that a realtor had already listed the
property on her behalf.4  After reviewing the foreclosure
documents, Salvadore offered to enter into an agreement with
Holden, by which Holden would assign Salvadore her rights to
purchase the property under the agreement she had entered into
with the mortgagee in exchange for the option to repurchase the
property later.5
At this point, Holden retained an attorney and the parties
negotiated and executed a written agreement.6 Under the terms
1. Holden v. Salvadore, 964 A.2d 508, 509-10 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. at 510.
3. Id. Salvadore, an attorney, had assisted Holden with another matter
three years earlier. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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of the agreement, Holden assigned Salvadore all of her rights
under the memorandum of terms and conditions of sale that she
had entered into with the mortgagee, and Salvadore granted
Holden a ninety-day option to repurchase the property for
$310,000.7 Alternatively, if Holden were able to secure a third-
party buyer for the property, she would be entitled to any profits
from the sale that exceeded $310,000.8 The agreement did not
provide for any payment between the parties in exchange for the
assignment of the right to purchase the property.9
After executing the agreement with Holden, Salvadore
obtained a loan, paid the mortgagee the $260,000 balance due and
obtained title to the property.10 Holden continued to market the
property for sale and eventually her realtor found a buyer willing
to purchase the property for $350,000.11 However, Holden was
intent on repurchasing the property herself and refused this
offer.12 She told Salvadore that she was exercising the option to
purchase the property under the agreement and requested that
Salvadore extend the closing date by a few days and reduce the
purchase price by $10,000.13 Salvadore subsequently agreed to
these modifications.14  However, there was no further
communication between Salvadore and Holden from this point
until the time this litigation was initiated by Holden.15
Holden filed a complaint against Salvadore alleging usury
and fraud and misrepresentation, seeking to recover monetary
damages and obtain both a preliminary and permanent
injunction.16 Later, Holden amended the complaint to include
counts alleging that Salvadore violated the Mortgage Foreclosure
7. Holden, 964 A.2d at 510.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. During this time, Salvadore allowed Holden to continue to live in
the property rent-free. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Holden, 964 A.2d at 510.
14. Id. Holden and Salvadore gave contrary testimony as to whether
Salvadore agreed to reduce the price of the property but the trial judge
accepted Salvadore's assertion that he did in fact agree to the price reduction.
Id. n.2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 510-11.
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Consultant Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.17
Before the trial judge, Holden testified that her original
purpose in contacting Salvadore was strictly to obtain financing in
order to purchase her property at the foreclosure sale, but
Salvadore would only agree to be involved if he obtained title to
the property.18 In her testimony, Holden conceded that she had
filed for bankruptcy in September 2006 and that her bankruptcy
petition failed to list Salvadore as a creditor or claim any
ownership interest in the property.19 Salvadore testified that he
believed the transaction presented a business opportunity from
which both parties had the chance to profit, and this was what
motivated him to enter into the agreement.20
The trial judge found that Holden had not presented a prima
facie case and failed to meet the burden necessary for a grant of
equitable relief.21 First, the trial judge held that the transaction
between Holden and Salvadore was not a loan but merely
represented a business agreement from which both parties
reasonably anticipated to profit.22 Second, the trial judge found
that because the agreement between Salvadore and Holden "was
an arms-length transaction and not a consultation," Salvadore
was not a mortgage foreclosure consultant and the Mortgage
Foreclosure Consultant Regulation Act did not apply. 23 The
Superior Court denied Holden's request for a preliminary and
permanent injunction and for other equitable relief and entered
partial final judgment in favor of Salvadore. 24 Holden appealed
this judgment, maintaining the trial judge erred in finding that
the transaction was not a loan and in finding that Salvadore was
not a mortgage foreclosure consultant. 25
17. Id. at 511; see also R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-79-1, 6-13.1-1 (1956).
18. Holden, 964 A.2d at 511. Holden further testified that she refused to
accept the $350,000 offer obtained by her real estate agent because she
intended to exercise the option to purchase the property herself, as she
needed a roof over her head and this property was her home. Id.
19. Id. Significantly, Holden never provided the Supreme Court with a
copy the transcript of her testimony before the trial judge and thus the
Supreme Court was unable to review these facts. Id. at 511 n.4.
20. Id. at 511.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 511-12.
23. Id.
24. Holden, 964 A.2d at 511-12.
25. Id. The parties were ordered to appear before the Supreme Court to
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Was this transaction a loan?
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the
transaction between Holden and Salvadore was a "loan in
disguise."26  Holden maintained that her agreement with
Salvadore did constitute a loan agreement and, therefore, was
subject to and in violation of the Rhode Island usury laws.27
Addressing Holden's argument the Supreme Court established
that, in determining whether a transaction such as the one at
issue here constitutes a loan, it is necessary to "focus on the
substance over the form of the transaction" and to consider the
totality of the circumstances in order to determine the "true
nature of the transaction."28 Thus, the Court held that the
existence of a loan is a question of fact 29 that turns on "'whether
the parties intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship."'30
Here, the trial judge found that Holden and Salvadore merely
intended to enter into a business agreement, and the transaction
between the parties was not intended to be a loan. 31 After
reviewing the record provided, the Supreme Court found that the
trial judge was not clearly wrong in finding that the transaction
show cause why the issues raised by Holden should not be summarily
decided. Id. at 509. After oral arguments, the court was confident that cause
had not been shown and decided the appeal at that time. Id.
26. Id. at 513. Generally, review of this case would be precluded by
Holden's failure to provide the Court with a transcript of her testimony. See
id. at 513 n.7. However, because Holden maintained that the Superior Court
judgment was in error despite the findings of fact, the Supreme Court
inferred that she accepted the trial judge's findings and thus review can be
granted to determine whether the trial judge "misconceived the law that
applies to these facts." Id. 513-14 n.7.
27. Id. at 513; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-26-2.
28. See Holden, 964 A.2d at 513 (citing Lancia v. Grossman's of R.I., Inc.,
216 A.2d 517, 520 (R.I. 1966); Nazarian v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 78 A.2d 7, 9
(R.I. 1951); Daniels v. Mowry, 1 R.I. 151, 164 (1842)).
29. Id. (citing West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Pacific Fin.
Loans, 469 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1970)).
30. Id. (quoting Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah 1972)). In
applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court noted that it would
overturn the trial judge's finding of fact "only when they are clearly wrong or
when the trial judge overlooked or misconceived material evidence." Id.
(citing Bd. of Governors for Higher Ed. v. Infinity Constr. Servs., Inc., 795
A.2d 1127, 1129 (R.I. 2002)).
31. See id.
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was not a loan, and the decision was clearly supported by the
judge's reasoning. 32 The Supreme Court differentiated this case
from a number of cases relied on by Holden, where a sale subject
to an option to repurchase had been deemed a usurious loan.33
The Court found that "[t]he common thread in [those] cases, the
absence of which distinguishes them from the case at bar, is the
existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between the holder of
title and the holder of the option."3 4  The Court further
established that such a debtor-creditor relationship could "be in
the form of personal liability of the debtor to pay a sum of money
to the creditor"35 or "in the form of 'a large margin between the
debt or sum advanced and the value of the land conveyed."' 3 6
Here, the Supreme Court found it to be "clear that the parties
did not intend to enter into a debtor and creditor relationship."3 7
Holden was not personally indebted to Salvadore nor did
Salvadore retain the right to collect any money from Holden. 3 8
The Supreme Court gave particular significance to the fact that
Holden "did not relinquish her title to her property in exchange for
the use of a sum of money that was significantly less than the
32. Id. at 514. The trial judge reasoned that a loan did not exist because
Salvadore did not lend Holden any money, Holden did not owe any debt to
Salvadore, and Salvadore considered the arrangement to be a business deal.
See id. The trial judge further noted that Holden was represented by
independent counsel, and the written agreement was a "joint effort" executed
by both parties, under which Holden had the potential to realize a profit of
$50,000 to $60,000. See id. The trial judge found it particularly significant
that Holden filed for bankruptcy and her bankruptcy petition did not list this
transaction as a loan, nor did it claim any interest in the property at issue.
Id.
33. See id.; see also Kawauchi v. Tabata, 413 P.2d 221, 227-28 (Haw.
1966); Robinson v. Durston, 432 P.2d 75, 76 (Nev. 1967); Canon v. Seattle
Title Trust Co., 252 P. 699, 701 (Wash. 1927).
34. Holden, 964 A.2d at 514 (citing Robinson, 432 P.2d at 83-84; Canon,
252 P. at 701).
35. Id. at 515 (citing Kawauchi, 413 P.2d at 228-29).
36. Id. (quoting Kawauchi, 413 P.2d at 230 (citation omitted)). In
Kawauchi, the plaintiff deeded property worth $160,000 to the defendant in
order to avoid a foreclosure sale in exchange for an option to repurchase the
property and $90,000 to pay off the mortgage. Kawauchi, 413 P.2d at 224,
225-26. There, the transaction was deemed to be a loan because "'the sum
that the defendant paid for the property was inadequate in relation to the
value of the property."' Id. at 230-31.
37. Holden, 964 A.2d at 515.
38. Id.
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property's value."39 Instead, Holden only relinquished her right to
purchase the property and take title in her own name in exchange
for "the option to buy the property from Salvadore, or in the
alternative, an opportunity to make a profit from a third-party
sale."40 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no
evidence of an actual debt or a transfer of property for inadequate
consideration that would have served as security for a debt," and
therefore the trial judge was not clearly wrong in finding that the
transaction between Holden and Salvadore was not a loan.41
Was Salvadore a mortgage foreclosure consultant?
The second issue that the Supreme Court addressed was
whether the trial judge erred in concluding that Salvadore was not
a mortgage foreclosure consultant and thus not subject to the
prohibitions set forth under Rhode Island General Laws § 5-79-
4(a)(5). 42  The Rhode Island statute "defines a mortgage
foreclosure consultant as a person who, for compensation, renders
services to carry out one or more of eight delineated functions."43
On appeal, Holden alleged that Salvadore fell under this
definition because "he performed a service that would either
'[s]top or postpone the foreclosure sale' or '[s]ave the owner's
residence from foreclosure."' 44
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Holden, 964 A.2d at 515; specifically, the statute states that a
mortgage foreclosure consultant is "any person who, directly or indirectly,
makes any solicitation, representation, or offer to any owner to perform for
compensation or who, for compensation, performs any service which the
person in any manner represents will in any manner do any of the following:
(1) Stop or postpone the foreclosure sale; (2) Obtain any forbearance from any
beneficiary or mortgagee; (3) Assist the owner to exercise the right of
redemption provided in § 34-23-2; (4) Obtain any extension of the period
within which the owner may reinstate the owner's obligation; (5) Obtain any
waiver of an acceleration clause contained in any promissory notes or
contract secured by a mortgage on a residence in foreclosure or contained in
the mortgage; (6) Assist the owner in foreclosure or loan default to obtain a
loan or advance of funds; (7) Avoid or ameliorate the impairment of the
owner's credit resulting from the recording of a notice of default or the
conduct of a foreclosure sale; or (8) Save the owner's residence from
foreclosure." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-79-1(a).
44. Holden, 964 A.2d at 515-16 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-79-1(a)(1),
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The Supreme Court rejected Holden's argument and found
that "Salvadore never made a solicitation, representation, or offer
to help Holden stop or postpone the foreclosure sale," emphasizing
that the sale and foreclosure had already taken place when Holden
contacted Salvadore for assistance. 45 Holden had been the highest
bidder at this foreclosure sale and her subsequent agreement with
Salvadore merely represented that he would "step into the shoes
of the purchaser and become the grantee/purchaser at the
closing."46 The Supreme Court concluded that "Salvadore did not
make any representation to Holden that he would stop or postpone
the foreclosure sale or save her residence from foreclosure" and
thus there was nothing in the record to justify a finding that
Salvadore was a mortgage foreclosure consultant under the Rhode
Island statute.47
COMMENTARY
Justice Flaherty opens this opinion by acknowledging that,
given the nationwide foreclosure crisis, the Court is "not surprised
that [it] must consider an appeal presented by a homeowner faced
with very difficult financial circumstances whose home was
threatened by foreclosure proceedings" and emphasizes that the
Court addresses such a case "with empathy for those who have
found themselves in that unhappy position."48  However
sympathetic such an introduction may have been towards down-
on-their-luck plaintiffs, these comments failed to preface an
opinion in which Holden, the unhappy "homeowner," comes out
victorious. While the Court sympathizes with Holden's financial
plight, it cannot give credit to her legal arguments.
Here, the Supreme Court held that, as with all contractual
relationships, it is the parties' intentions in entering into an
agreement that is of primary importance in determining the
existence of a creditor-debtor relationship. 49 In practice, this
principle of contract law makes perfect sense. It prevents parties
to a contract from attempting to change the meaning of that
(8)).
45. See id. at 516.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 509.
49. See id. at 513.
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agreement with the benefit of hindsight. Here, neither Holden nor
Salvadore intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship in
entering into the agreement. This is evident from the both terms
of the agreement itself and from the surrounding circumstances.
At no point did Holden owe any amount of money to Salvadore. In
fact, under the agreement, Holden was not obligated to do
anything at all, other than relinquish her rights as the highest
bidder at the foreclosure sale. She merely had the option to
repurchase the property for a specified sum within a specified
period of time. Such agreement does not place Holden in the role
of debtor and is merely a business relationship in which each
party bears his own risks and reaps her own rewards.
Unfortunately, this business arrangement between Holden and
Salvadore went sour. The Supreme Court held that Holden
cannot attempt to rectify this failed business arrangement by
trying to redefine the transaction for her own benefit. While the
Court may have felt "empathy" for those who find themselves in
financial situations similar to that of Holden, such empathy could
not persuade the Court to create a loan agreement where, in fact,
none existed.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the determination
of whether a transaction constitutes a loan requires an inquiry
into whether the parties intended to enter into a creditor-debtor
relationship. The Court concluded that a loan agreement does not
exist when there is no evidence that the transaction resulted in an
actual debt or a transfer of property for inadequate consideration
that would have served as security for a debt. The Court further
held that a party to an agreement who assumes the right of
highest bidder at a foreclosure sale to purchase foreclosure
property does not fall under the definition of a mortgage
foreclosure consultant under § 5-79-1(a).
Kathryn A. Primiano
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Municipal Law. Felkner v. Chariho Regional School Committee,
968 A.2d 865 (R.I. 2009). In Felkner v. Chariho Regional School
Committee the issue presented is whether an elected official may
simultaneously hold a position on the Chariho Regional School
Committee and the Hopkinton Town Council. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that both the Hopkinton Charter and the
common law rule of incompatibility forbid an elected official from
holding the two positions simultaneously.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 7, 2006, Plaintiff William Felkner was elected
to the Chariho Regional School Committee to serve a four year
term. 1 Two years later, Plaintiff was elected to the Hopkinton
Town Council. 2 The School Committee determined that Plaintiff
had effectively resigned his position on the School Committee by
taking the oath of office for the Town Council.3 After having his
Superior Court complaint dismissed due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Plaintiff appropriately filed a petition in the
nature of quo warrantO4 with the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
challenging his removal from the School Committee. 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court uses jurisprudence on
statutory interpretation to construe competing and contradictory
provisions in the Hopkinton Town Charter to determine whether
the Plaintiff is prohibited from serving both on the School
Committee and Town Council simultaneously.6  When
1. Felkner v. Chariho Reg'1 Sch. Comm., 968 A.2d 865, 868 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Plaintiffs petition in quo warranto is an action asserting Plaintiffs
title to the office at issue. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his title
to the position. The authority to hear such a petition is vested in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 869.
5. Id. at 868.
6. One provision of the Hopkinton Town Charter provides that no
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interpreting contradictory statutory provisions that cannot be
construed consistently, "'the specific governs the general."' 7 Thus,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court holds that the specific language
in the Hopkinton Town Charter prohibiting holding more than one
elected office at a time and specifically including School
Committee members in the definition of elected official governs,
despite an alternative provision creating an exception for those
serving on boards representing the town regarding the school
district.8 The Court reasons that if the drafters had intended to
include School Committee members in the exclusion to the
prohibition against holding multiple offices, they would have
referred to the School Committee with the same level of specificity
as they had in other portions of the Charter.9
The Court goes on to apply the common law doctrine of
incompatibility which prohibits an elected official from holding
multiple public offices with "potentially overlapping duties."10
Elected offices will be incompatible if there is the potential for a
conflict of duties such that the duties of both offices cannot be
performed simultaneously.11 Under the doctrine of
incompatibility, when an elected official accepts a second
incompatible public office he impliedly resigns the first.12 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court holds that the position of Chariho
School Committee Member and Hopkinton Town Councilor are
incompatible because the Town of Hopkinton leases property to
the School Committee, contracts for water distribution to local
schools, fills vacancies on the School Committee, and provides
funds for the school's budget.13 A potential conflict would arise
"member of the Town government" may hold more than one elected office at a
time. The Town Charter also specifies that a School Committee member is
an elected official. However, another provision provides that "membership on
boards or commissions that act as representatives of the Town of Hopkinton
in regards to the School District " does not preclude serving on another board
or commission. Id. at 869-70.
7. Felkner, 968 A.2d.at 870 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51
(1974)).
8. Id. at 870.
9. Id. at 871.
10. Id. at 872 (citing State v. Brown, 5 R.I. 1, 9-11 (1857)).
11. Id. at 872 (citing State v. Lee, 50 N.W.2d 124, 126 (1951)).
12. Id. (citing State ex rel. Metcalf v. Goff, 9 A. 226, 226 (1887)).
13. Felkner, 968 A.2d at 873.
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should the Town Council and School Committee disagree over the
aforementioned issues. 14 In addition, there is a more fundamental
conflict between the positions because a School Committee
Member must place the educational interests of students first
while a Town Councilor must put first the interests of the
residents of the Town of Hopkinton.15
Because the holding of multiple elected offices is prohibited by
the Hopkinton Town Charter as well as the common law doctrine
of incompatibility, the Rhode Island Supreme Court holds that the
Plaintiff effectively resigned his position on the School Committee
by taking the oath of office for the Town Council. 16
COMMENTARY
The doctrine of incompatibility prevents an elected official
from serving in more than one elected position at a time if the
duties of the two positions are incompatible.17 Although there are
obvious public concerns that are remedied by the doctrine of
incompatibility such as conflicts of interest and homogeneity in
local public office, the fact that Felkner was elected by his
constituents to hold two elected offices seems to reflect their belief
that Felkner is capable of holding both offices at once or at least
that Felkner's abilities as an elected official outweigh the
potential for a conflict of interest. 18  The accuracy of this
characterization depends largely on whether Felkner was
challenged in the Town Council election and how much knowledge
voters had of Felkner prior to casting their vote. However,
regardless of whether the voters in Hopkinton truly weighed
Felkner's value as an elected official against the potential for
conflicts of interest, the doctrine of incompatibility represents a
characteristically paternalistic view of voters ability to choose
their elected officials.
14. Id. at 873-74.
15. R.I GEN. LAws 1956 § 16-2-9.1(a)(11); Felkner, 968 A.2d at 874.
16. Id. at 867- 68.
17. Id. at 872.
18. Id. at 874.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court uses traditional tenets of
statutory construction as well as the doctrine of incompatibility to
determine that an elected official may not hold both a position on
the Chariho Regional School Committee and the Hopkinton Town
Council. As a result, Plaintiff William Felkner fails in his petition
to assert his title to his former seat on the School Committee.
Carollynn J. Ward
Property Law. Cohen v. Duncan, 970 A.2d 550 (R.I. 2009).
Neighbor of hotel challenged granting of permits and zoning
approval for hotel renovations. The Superior Court, Newport
County, reversed the Newport zoning board's findings that the
renovations did not constitute an impermissible alteration to a
nonconforming use. Upon the hotel's appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that alterations to nonconforming uses are
permitted under the Newport zoning ordinance, the hotel's
renovations did not violate the Newport zoning ordinance, and the
renovations were permitted under the Rhode Island Zoning
Enabling Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The property on which the Chanler at Cliff Walk ("The
Chanler") sits has operated as a hotel since 1945.1 Under the
zoning scheme then in effect, The Chanler was allowed as a
conditional use.2  Subsequent changes to Newport's zoning
ordinance have allowed hotels in this zone only by special
exception and now, under the current ordinance, hotels are a
prohibited use.3
In 2000, following the purchase of the property by a new
owner, plans were made to renovate The Chanler.4 The only
renovations which have any bearing on this case concern the
reconfiguring of exterior deck space, the addition of four sets of
stairs and four courtyards on the building's east wing, 5 and the
1. Cohen v. Duncan, 970 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. Hotels which were previously established under prior zoning
schemes are permitted to continue as nonconforming uses. Id. at 554.
4. Id. The renovations were quite extensive and included a significant
amount of interior redesign as well as structural and architectural changes to
the outside of the building and a shifting of the parking area away from the
building and into the southwest corner of the property. Id. at 554-55.
5. The decks were reconfigured and the stairs and courtyards were
added to create a more upscale appearance for the east wing which previously
featured room doors off a common outdoor deck. Id. at 557. Under the
renovations, each of these four rooms would have a separate entrance and
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shifting of the parking area to the southwest corner.6
The plans for these renovations were submitted to the city
and The Chanler was granted building permits.7 Additionally, the
parking scheme required a zoning certificate. 8 Along with the
request, The Chanler sent the Newport Zoning Board ("Board") a
1999 Board decision9 which had determined that the southwest
corner of the property (where The Chanler had proposed moving
the parking area) had been used as overflow parking for the hotel
and as fee-based parking for non-guest beachgoers since 1945.10
In reliance on the historic use of the southwest corner as a
parking area, the Board issued the zoning certificate.11
Cohen, a neighbor of The Chanler,12 appealed the allowance
of the renovations, claiming the renovations constituted an
impermissible extension of a nonconforming use under the
ordinance.13 Following several hearings,14 the Board issued a
decision concluding that the renovations to The Chanler did not
violate the ordinance as the nonconforming use was not moved,
expanded, or changed.15 The Board found that the proposed
parking plan did not amount to a change of use. 16 The Board
found that the reconfigured decking and the new courtyards and
stairs did not expand or change the use of the property from that
of being a hotel.17 Additionally, the Board concluded that the
renovations included reducing the number of guest rooms and
would result in a decreased impact on the neighborhood. 18
stairway with additional privacy added by the courtyard's six to ten feet high
walls. Id.
6. Id. at 563.
7. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 554-55.
8. Id. at 555.
9. Previous owners of the hotel had sought permission from the Board to
create a commercial parking lot on this part of the property. Id. The Board
approved the plan but the commercial lot was never built. Id. at 555-56.
10. Id. at 555.
11. Id. at 556. The plans for the parking area were also subject to a
development plan review which required adding lights and walkways and
providing for water runoff mechanisms within the plans. Id. at 556, 567.
12. Id. at 553.
13. Id. at 556; see Newport, RI Municipal Code §17.72.030.
14. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 556.
15. Id. at 558-59.
16. Id. at 558.
17. Id. at 559.
18. Id.at 558-59.
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Cohen appealed the decision of the Board to the Superior
Court.19 Following oral arguments, the Superior Court reversed
the Board, finding errors of law and interpretation of the Newport
Zoning Ordinance ("Ordinance") and the Rhode Island Zoning
Enabling Act ("Enabling Act"). 20 Upon the Superior Court's
reversal, The Chanler filed for appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, The Chanler argued that the Superior Court
misconstrued the Ordinance in regards to the procedure by which
a nonconforming use may be altered.22 Additionally, The Chanler
argued that the Superior Court erred in its interpretation of the
meaning of the words of the Ordinance and acted beyond its
authority in reversing the Board's decision which was founded
upon the evidence and a reasonable interpretation of the
Ordinance.23
Whether the Renovations Violated Section 17.72.030 of the
Ordinance
The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court's
application of the prohibitive language of the Ordinance was in
error.24 The Superior Court found the renovation to the deck and
addition of stairs and courtyards constituted an expansion of the
nonconforming use and that shifting the parking area to the
southwest portion of the property was also a violation of the
Ordinance. 25
The Supreme Court, in a de novo review of the Board's
19. Id. at 559.
20. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 559-60; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-40; Newport,
RI Municipal Code §17.72.030. The only relevant section of the Newport
Zoning Ordinance is § 17.72.030 and the only relevant section of the Enabling
Act is § 45-24-40. Unless otherwise specified, any reference to either the
Ordinance or the Enabling Act is to the respective section solely.
21. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 560.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 564.
25. Id. It unclear from the opinion whether the Superior Court found the
shifting of the parking area constituted a move/extension, a change of use, or
both. See id.
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statutory construction, 26  determined that the Ordinance
prohibited five types of alterations to nonconforming use.27 Given
that no issue had been raised suggesting the structure of The
Chanler (meaning the physical building) was nonconforming, but
rather that it was its use as a hotel which was nonconforming, the
Court limited its focus in applying the Ordinance to whether the
renovations: 1) moved or extended the hotel use of The Chanler to
another part of the property not previously used in such a
manner; or 2) changed the use of the property from that of a hotel
to some other nonconforming use. 28
Decks, Stairs, and Courtyards
The Supreme Court looked first to the issue presented by the
aspect of the renovation concerning the decks, stairs, and
courtyards. 29  Though there is no concrete rule determining
whether an alteration constitutes an extension of a nonconforming
use, there are general principles from which to make a finding.30
Generally, an extension requires construction of a new building or
of an additional to an existing building, an extension of land
containing the nonconforming use, or a "significant physical
change" 31 in the structure housing the nonconforming use.32
The Supreme Court found no evidence to suggest the
26. Id. at 561.
27. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 562; see Newport, RI Municipal Code §17.72.030.
As found by the Court, the five prohibited alterations are: moving a
nonconforming use of land to another part of the property which was not
previously used in the nonconforming manner; moving or extending a
nonconforming use of a structure to another part of the structure not
previously used in the nonconforming manner; moving a structure containing
a nonconforming use, unless to rectify nonconformity; moving a
nonconforming structure, unless to rectify nonconformity; and changing a
nonconforming use of land or structure or changing a nonconforming
structure, unless to rectify nonconformity. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 562.
28. Id. at 563.
29. Id. at 564. As the record contained no indication that any part of the
renovation (other than the parking area) implicated the "moving" concern of
the Ordinance, the Supreme Court limited its focus for this issue to extension
of the nonconforming use. Id.; see Newport, RI Municipal Code §17.72.030B.
30. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 564.
31. Id. (quoting 4 Edward H. Ziegler, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING, § 73:16, at 73-75 (Thomson/West 2007)).
32. Id.
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renovations to the decks increased the building's footprint 33 and
the addition of the stairs could not be considered a significant
physical change to the structure as it did not extend the area
which accommodates the nonconforming use.34 Because of this,
the Supreme Court held that there is no evidence that the
renovations extended the nonconforming use of The Chanler and,
therefore, the renovations did not violate the Ordinance. 35
Next, the Supreme Court looked to the second question
concerning the deck, stairs, and courtyards. 36 The Ordinance
prohibits the changing of a use which is nonconforming, except to
rectify the nonconformance. 37 As the Board had found that The
Chanler was still a hotel, provided the same services, and neither
the amount of business nor The Chanler's effect on the
neighborhood had increased, the Supreme Court held that the
renovations did not constitute an impermissible change of use
under the Ordinance. 38
Parking Area
Though the Supreme Court evaluated the renovations in
terms of the exterior alterations and of the parking area
separately, the same rules for determining whether a
nonconforming use had been moved, extended, or changed
applied.3 9 Obviously, from a literal view, the parking area was
moved as part of the renovations. However, to be moved within
the meaning of the Ordinance, the part of the property to which a
nonconforming use is moved must not have been used previously
for such a use. 40 Here, as the Board found in its 1999 decision,
this part of the property, the southwest corner, to which the
parking area had been moved, had been utilized as parking for
both the hotel and for non-guest beachgoers since 1945.41 Because
33. The Supreme Court found Cohen's claim to the contrary unsupported.
Id.
34. Id. at 564-65.
35. Id. at 565.
36. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 565.
37. Newport, RI Municipal Code §17.72.030C.
38. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 565.
39. Id. at 566.
40. See Newport, RI Municipal Code §17.72.030B.
41. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 566.
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this area has historically been used for parking, it cannot be said
that this nonconforming use (hotel parking) has been moved to a
part of the property not previously used for such a purpose.42
Neither can it be said that the moving of the parking area
constituted an extension of this nonconforming use. 43 The record
does not suggest the new parking area takes up a greater area
than what had previously been used as parking and new parking
scheme reduces the number of parking spaces from one hundred
and fifty to only fifty.44 As such, the Superior Court's finding that
shifting the parking area constituted an extension of a
nonconforming use under the Ordinance is not supported by the
record. 45
The Supreme Court also found the Board was not in error
when it determined that moving the parking area did not amount
to an impermissible change of use under the Ordinance.46 Though
changed in appearance, this area of the property is still used for
the same purpose, namely for parking. 47
As such, the Supreme Court held that the Board's findings
that The Chanler did not violate the Ordinance by the renovations
to the decks, stairs, courtyards, and parking area were not clearly
erroneous and were not the product of any error of law.48
Therefore, the Superior Court exceeded its authority in reversing
the Board's decision on this issue.49
Whether the Renovations Were Permitted Under the Zoning
Enabling Act
Cohen's last argument, as accepted by the Superior Court, is
based on the language of the Enabling Act rather than that of the
Ordinance.50 The Newport zoning ordinance, as a whole, is
authorized to set standards for the alteration of nonconforming
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 566.
47. Id. at 566-67.
48. Id. at 562.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 568; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-40.
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uses by section 45-24-40 of the Enabling Act.5 ' Subsection (c) of
this section states, "[a] use established by variance or special use
permit shall not acquire the rights of this section."52 The Superior
Court reasoned that, as the hotel on the property was originally
created as a conditional use and such a procedure is the
predecessor of a special use permit, The Chanler is not a
nonconforming use under the meaning of the Enabling Act in
regards to the right to make any alterations.53 Essentially, the
state has not authorized, by the Enabling Act, the renovations to
The Chanler. 54
In response, The Chanler argued that subsection (c) of the
section meant only that uses allowed by variance or special use
under a current zoning scheme could not be altered under the
Enabling Act.5 5 According to The Chanler, once hotels were no
longer permitted by the ordinance,56 The Chanler became a
nonconforming use under the Enabling Act and is not to be
considered as created by special use permit.57
Instead of determining whether the Superior Court or The
Chanler was correct in regards to the meaning given to subsection
(c), the Supreme Court decided this issue by distinguishing the
right to which the section 45-24-40 of the Enabling Act referred. 58
By the language of the Enabling Act, an alteration, for the
purposes of the section, is limited to that which amounts to an
addition and enlargement, expansion, intensification, or a change
in use.59 As determined by the Supreme Court's review of the
Board's findings, none of The Chanler's renovations resulted in an
enlargement, expansion, intensification, or a change in use.60
Because the renovations do not constitute an alteration under this
section, the right denied to uses created by variance or special use
permit by the section was not extended, impermissibly or
51. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 568; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-40.
52. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24-40(c).
53. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 568.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The zoning ordinance was changed to prohibit hotels in 1977. Id.
at 553.
57. Id. at 568.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-40(a)(2).
60. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 568.
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otherwise, to The Chanler by allowance of the renovations. 61 The
Superior Court, therefore, was in error when it determined that
the renovations ran afoul of the Enabling Act.62
COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court went out of its way to avoid addressing
the substantive issue presented by the Superior Court's finding
that the renovations were not permitted under the Enabling Act
as section 45-24-40 denies the right to alter uses created by
variance or special permit.63 The issue of what types of uses are
actually referred to by subsection (c) seems to be one of some
importance and is likely to be presented again. Additionally, this
case offered a perfect opportunity in that such a determination
was essential to the disposition of the matter and two seemingly
reasonable interpretations were being offered by the opposing
sides, each advocating for its position. 64 Instead, the Supreme
Court cleverly, though perhaps dubiously,65 distinguished the
Enabling Act as inapplicable to this situation based on the
findings of the Board.66
This course of action begs the question of why. At best, this
only delays the resolution of this issue and this hardly seems to be
the type of sticky situation most often the object of judicial
"punting." The resolution of this issue has no attendant political
repercussions nor does it implicate sensitive matters such as
separation of powers or the like. This is simply a matter of
statutory construction, well within the purview of the Supreme
Court.
Also, upon consideration, it is clear that The Chanler's
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. It is certainly arguable whether an "alteration" under section 45-24-
40 of the Enabling Act is limited to those having the effects referred to by the
Supreme Court. See id. In fact, that limiting language appears only in
subsection 45-24-40(a)(2). Given that both the title of the section and the
main part of subsection (a) contain the word "alteration" or "alter" and in
light of the structure of the section as a whole, it seems unlikely the limiting
language cited by the Supreme Court was designed to modify
"alteration/alter" throughout the section. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-40.
66. Cohen, 970 A.2d at 568-69.
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reading of the section is far more accurate than that of Cohen's.
The distinctions to be drawn if Cohen's reading was accepted
would be arbitrary and not reflective of any practical concerns.
Under Cohen's theory, in 1945, had hotels been allowed by right
instead of by conditional use or if Newport had yet to adopt any
zoning ordinance, subsection (c) would apply here. 67 This is true
even though the situation in the present would be precisely the
same. It is the fact that hotels are not presently permitted within
the zone that creates this issue, not the conditions under which
the use was established. The Chanler must be correct in its
reading of subsection (c) in that its reading allows for a logical
distinction to be drawn between what uses are referred to and
which are not. Essentially, subsection (c) states only that uses
which currently exist and were created under a current zoning
scheme by either variance or special use permit are not
nonconforming uses under this section. 68 This is because the
section exists to give some rights, at the discretion of the crafters
of the individual municipal ordinances, to established
nonconforming uses. As the concerns presented by previously
established nonconforming uses and those uses created by
variance or special use permit under a current zoning scheme are
different, it makes sense that alterations allowed to them
respectively would be governed by different procedures. Because a
Cohen reading would lead to arbitrarily drawn distinctions
between uses (distinctions which have no practical import) it is
not to be followed.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that alterations for
nonconforming uses are permitted under the Newport zoning
ordinance. The hotel's renovations in the instant case did not
violate the Newport zoning ordinance. Additionally, the
renovations in the instant case were permitted under the Rhode
Island Zoning Enabling Act.
Daniel D. Hirseman
67. See id. at 568.
68. See id.
Statutory Construction. Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.,
965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009). Plaintiff worker filed suit against
defendant employer for no longer providing her either suitable
alternative employment or paying partial incapacity
compensation. Interpreting the Workers Compensation statute,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that suitable alternative
employment is partial incapacity compensation and is thus subject
to the 312-week maximum length that the employer is required to
pay compensation.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arose from the employment of Karyn Mumma, while
she was employed with Cumberland Farms, Inc. 1 During her
duties as a store manager, Ms. Mumma was injured on April 22,
1999.2 After her injury, Ms. Mumma and her employer entered a
"memorandum of agreement ... on December 6, 1999, [and] Ms.
Mumma began receiving weekly workers' compensation benefits
for her partial incapacity"3 under Rhode Island General Laws §
28-33-18 (1956).4 "On February 8, 2001 Cumberland Farms
1. Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437, 438 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-18 (1956) provides in relevant part:
(a) While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial,
the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation
equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the difference between his or
her spendable average weekly base wages, earnings, or salary before
the injury as computed pursuant to the provisions of § 28-38-20, and
his or her spendable weekly wages, earnings, salary, or earnings
capacity after that, but not more than the maximum weekly
compensation rate for total incapacity as set forth in § 28-33-17. The
provisions of this section are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2.
(b) For all injuries occurring on or after September 1, 1990, where an
employee's condition has reached maximum medical improvement
and the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial,
while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the
employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation
equal to seventy percent (70%) of the weekly compensation rate as
set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The court may, in its
407
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offered Ms. Mumma 'suitable alternative employment'5 . . . that
was 'closely tailored to meet [Ms. Mumma's] medical
restrictions."' 6  Ms. Mumma was assured that '[a]cceptance of
this employment [would] not result in an inequitable forfeiture or
loss of any benefits [she] accrued as an employee with the
[c]ompany."' 7 "Ms. Mumma accepted ... and on July 13, 2001, a
trial judge entered a consent decree recognizing [the] new position
as 'suitable alternative employment."'8
The parties agreed that Ms. Mumma "fully and faithfully
perform[ed] all job duties" required by her position. 9  "On
September 22, 2005, however, Cumberland Farms informed Ms.
Mumma of a substantial change in her employment that would be
implemented on October 24, 2005."1o As Ms. Mumma continued
to be unable "to work a forty-hour workweek, her employment
status was to be reclassified as part-time, which effectively
terminated her health insurance, vacation pay, and pension
benefits."11 The parties agreed that "Ms. Mumma had received
312 weeks of partial compensation and, [was] therefore no longer
entitled to weekly compensation benefits under [Rhode Island
General Laws] §§ 28-33-18 or 28-33-18.2."12
Ms. Mumma filed an "'Employee's Petition to Determine a
Controversy,"1 3 trying to restore the benefits she had been
discretion, take into consideration the performance of the employee's
duty to actively seek employment in scheduling the implementation
of the reduction. The provisions of this subsection are subject to the
provisions of § 28-33-18.2.
5. Rhode Island General Laws § 28-29-2(10) (1956) provides:
'Suitable alternative employment' means employment or an actual
offer of employment which the employee is physically able to perform
and will not exacerbate the employee's health condition and which
bears a reasonable relationship to the employee's qualifications,
background, education, and training. The employee's age alone shall
not be considered in determining the suitableness of the alternative
employment.
6. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 438 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-2(10)(1956)).
7. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-33-18.2(b)(1956)).
8. Id. at 438-39.
9. Id. at 439.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 439.
13. Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
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receiving from her suitable alternative employment.14 The
request was denied and Ms. Mumma filed a claim for a trial. 15 On
April 11, 2006, the trial judge, after reviewing all the facts and the
relevant statutes, declined to extend Ms. Mumma's benefits.16
The trial judge "reasoned that the benefits could not extend
beyond the 312-week period because the 'suitable alternative
employment' language of § 28-33-18.2 specifically applies to
workers who otherwise would receive benefits for partial disability
under § 28-33-18."17 "The trial judge concluded when reading the
two provisions together, an employee's right to 'suitable
alternative employment' terminates upon the expiration of her
right to partial incapacity benefits."18 Ms. Mumma appealed and
on March 22, 2007 the Appellate Division affirmedl 9 the trial
court's decision. 20 The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted
certiorari on January 31, 2008.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Statutory Construction
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews questions of
statutory construction de novo.22 However, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found "no valid reason to disturb the Appellate
Division's thorough and, . . . , statutorily correct treatment of the
relationship between §§ 28-33-18 and 28-33-18.2."23 The Court
found that the purpose of suitable alternative employment was to
create a mutually beneficial arrangement in which the partially
disabled employee can return to work. 24 The employer benefits by
getting some work product from the employee since it would have
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citation omitted).
18. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 440.
19. "[Tlhe Appellate Division, . .. also found no merit to her claim....
The Appellate Division declined to construe the statutes as granting an
employee more rights after the 312-week period expired than she would have
had if she had been terminated before that period expired." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 441.
23. Id.
24. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 441.
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to pay anyway and the "employee is able to maintain the dignity
of gainful employment and any pre-injury incidental benefits of
her position."25
Ms. Mumma's contention was that "§ 28-33-18.2 should be
read as entirely distinct from § 28-33-18 and that the General
Assembly's limitation of partial-incapacity benefits should have no
effect on the parameters of the suitable alternative
employment."26 The Court disagreed. 27 The Court believed that
"[s]ection 28-33-18(d) explicitly limits workers' compensation
benefits for partial incapacity to 312 weeks." 28 Both Subsections
(a) and (b) of the Rhode Island Generals Laws § 28-33-18 (1956)
are "'subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2' and therefore "are
effective unless the worker has accepted 'suitable alternative
employment' and then those subsections are inapplicable. 29
However, suitable alternative employment provides an alternative
to employers and employees that is more than paying
compensation benefits. 30 The employee does not need to accept
the suitable alternative employment and the employer is able to
terminate the position at any time. 31 The Court found that if this
were to happen, the employee is "entitled to be compensated from
the employer in whose employ he or she was injured at the rate to
which the employee was entitled prior to acceptance of the
employment."32 However, this is limited by "the 312-week cap for
the payment of partial incapacity benefits under § 28-33-18(d)
and the provisions of § 28-33-18.3 concerning the continuation of
partial incapacity benefits."33
Ms. Mumma's Claim
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews decrees from the
"Appellate Division for any error of law or equity pursuant to"
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 442.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 442.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-33-18.2(d) (1956)).
33. Id.
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Rhode Island General Laws § 28-35-30 (1956).34 In this case the
Court found that on "October 24, 2005, Cumberland Farms
modified the terms of Ms. Mumma's employment from full to part
time, thus terminating her suitable alternative employment."35
"The language of § 28-33-18.2 does not require an employer to
continue the terms of suitable alternative employment
indefinitely." 36 If this had occurred before the 312-week time
frame had run fully, Ms. Mumma would have been able to receive
partial incapacity compensation but "the parties stipulated that
she had 'received 312 weeks of partial compensation' and was
'entitled to no further weekly compensation benefits under
Sections 28-33-18.3 and 28-33-18."'37
The Court believed that it would be contrary to the intention
of the Rhode Island General Assembly to read the statute as
giving the employee more rights than if she was never offered
suitable alternative employment or terminated her employment
before the 312-week period.38 The Court was afraid that if this
were the statutory construction they were to find, employers
would no longer offer suitable alternative employment because
they would be committing themselves to payment of compensation
for an indefinite period of time.39 The Court found that the
suitable alternative employment was permissibly terminated and
Ms. Mumma is no longer entitled to partial incapacity benefits
because it was after the 312-week limit had run which meant
Cumberland Farms was no longer obligated to pay for Ms.
Mumma's partial disability. 40
34. Id. at 441.
35. Id. at 442.
36. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 442.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 443.
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Dissent
Justice Goldberg filed a dissent in this case with her main
argument being that the majority misinterpreted the statute and
the intention of the Rhode Island General Assembly. 41 In her
opinion since "the benefits calculation for an employee performing
suitable alternative employment markedly differs from weekly
benefits for partial incapacity and . . . has no relevance to partial
incapacity benefits."42 Under her view when the employee is
working in a suitable alternative position, the employee is no
longer receiving compensation for partial incapacity and "the 312-
week gate does not apply to a worker in a suitable alternative
employment position."43 She also believed that the Court should
not "read subsections of one statute into another in the absence of
a clear legislative intent to the contrary" and "partial incapacity
benefits are not the statutory or functional equivalent of suitable
alternative employment."44 Also, in her view, once the employee
has accepted the suitable alternative employment the employee is
no longer receiving workers compensation benefits, rather the
employee is employed and since the employee is not receiving
benefits the employee is not subject to the 312-week limitation. 45
Since the statute was misinterpreted, she believes that "this
decision is lacking in statutory support, is unjust, and is contrary
to our settled principles respecting statutory construction."46
COMMENTARY
The Court in Mumma has taken on the job of finding the
interplay between several sections of the same overarching
statute. The "Workers Compensation Statue" is really chapters 29
through 38 of title 28 of the Rhode Island General Laws.47 This
case in particular deals with how the separate provisions are to
read together. The Court finds that no matter how the person is
compensated, either through partial incapacity or suitable
41. Id. at 443-46.
42. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 443.
43. Id. at 444.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 445.
46. Id. at 446.
47. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-29-2.
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alternative employment, there is a time limit on how long an
employer has to pay benefits.48 The Court is sympathetic to Ms.
Mumma in this case and says that they "recognize the seemingly
harsh consequences with respect to this particular employee
resulting from the statutory regime."49  However, for policy
reasons, the Court decides that to keep employer's willingness to
offer the option of suitable alternative employment by having the
incentive to offer it rather than just pay the normal worker's
compensation benefits, there must be a limit to the length of the
benefits the employer is required to pay.50
The dissent in this case is much more sympathetic to the
employee and wants to establish a bright line rule that each of the
sections of the statute should be read strictly individually unless
they refer to another section within it's text. 51 This approach,
while very employee friendly, would have to be cut very narrowly
because there would be questions on the length of time in which
an employer would be required to pay benefits. The dissent seems
to look at the intent of the specific section on suitable alternative
employment 52 and read it individually while the majority seems to
look at the overall scheme of the "Workers Compensation
Statute."53 The majority seems more concerned with the purpose
of suitable alternative employment being frustrated by not
construing the statute the way they have. It seems to be a valid
concern and no employer would offer such a position if they were
required to pay compensation indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Mumma held that partial incapacity benefits are
required to be paid for only the 312-week maximum under Rhode
Island General Laws § 28-33-18(d) (1956) which includes the
benefits and payments received from suitable alternative
employment under Rhode Island General Laws § 28-33-18.2
(1956). Since both parties agreed that Ms. Mumma had received
48. See Mumma, 965 A.2d at 443.
49. Id. at 442.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 443-46.
52. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-33-18.2 (1956).
53. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-29-2 (1956) (The definitions for the
Workers Compensation Statute covers chapters 29 through 38 of title 28).
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312 weeks of partial compensation she was "therefore, no longer
was entitled to weekly compensation benefits under §§ 28-33-18
or 28-33-18.3."54
Ian Anderson
54. Mumma, 965 A.2d at 439.
Tort Law. Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288 (R.I. 2009). In
a slip and fall case where Plaintiff invitee slipped on ice and snow
that had accumulated as a result of an ongoing winter storm,
Defendant business invitor owed no duty to Plaintiff to make the
premises safe from the naturally occurring dangers associated
with the ongoing storm.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After about three hours of socializing and having drinks at
Lei's Bar & Grill, located at 1035 West Shore Road in Warwick,
Plaintiff Carlo P. Berardis and his friend set off to leave through
the entranceway from which they had come. 1 A winter storm had
been steady throughout the prior day and continued into the
morning hours of the night, producing a mixture of freezing rain
and snow, which created dangerous conditions on the state's
roadways, sidewalks, and walkways.2 Plaintiff had taken two
steps outside when he slipped and fell on a thick sheet of ice that
had naturally accumulated about one foot from the bar's
entrance.3 As a result, he allegedly suffered injuries to his elbow,
knee, and ankle.4
Defendants Bounthinh and Oudone Louangxay owned the
premises at the Warwick address and leased the property to
Louangxay, Inc., d/b/a Warwick Banquet Hall a/k/a Lei's Bar &
Grill, and their son, Sithisack Louangxay, who managed the
business.5 On June 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against
the Louangxays and Lei's Bar & Grill, alleging that Defendants
were negligent in failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition; that Defendants were negligent in causing a
1. Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1289 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id. To get to Lei's Bar & Grill, Plaintiffs friend drove the pair and
parked in the bar's parking lot. Id. "While the storm continued to produce a
mixture of freezing rain and snow, they proceeded to the restaurant along a
walkway, which was covered in ice and snow." Id.
3. Id. at 1289-90.
4. Id. at 1290.
5. Id. at 1289-90.
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dangerous and excessive amount of ice to accumulate on the
entranceway; and that Defendants were negligent in failing to
remove the ice or to warn Plaintiff of the danger. 6 Plaintiff also
alleged the other elements of a negligence claim: duty, causation,
and injury.7
Defendants timely filed a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, arguing that under the circumstances they owed no
duty to Plaintiff to clear the entranceway of ice and snow, or to
warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition.8 Plaintiff argued that
information in Defendant Lei's Bar & Grill's answers to
interrogatories showed that the general manager had shoveled the
walkway and applied ice melt around noon on March 13, 2005,
and that the general manager had inspected the walkway
approximately every two hours thereafter.9 Plaintiff asserted that
under these circumstances, Defendants owed him a duty of care
concerning the dangerous condition of the entranceway, even
though he admitted that the storm was ongoing as he left the bar
and alleged no facts to the contrary. 10
On January 14, 2008, a hearing was held in Superior Court
and the judge granted Defendant Lei's Bar & Grill's motion. 11
The judge found that at the time Plaintiff fell, the storm was
ongoing because snow and freezing rain were still falling, and as a
result, Defendant owed no duty, as a matter of law, to remove the
ice and snow from the walkway or entranceway because the storm
was continuing and no unusual circumstances existed to call for
6. Id. at 1290.
7. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1290.
8. Id.; R.I. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 56.
9. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1290. The Court mentions that the general
manager arrived on the premises for work around noon, but it is not clear
when the general manager's shift ended and when he left the premises.
However, he "did not notice any snow or ice on the walkways" when he left
the premises, according to defendant Lei's Bar and Grill's answers to
interrogatories. See id. Plaintiff slipped and fell outside the entranceway
shortly after midnight on March 14. See id. at 1289.
10. See id. at 1290, 1292 n.3.
11. Id. at 1290. The attorney for the Louangxays was not present at the
hearing, and the Court's record was not clear concerning when the Superior
Court judge heard the motion submitted by them. The Court did not have a
transcript of the hearing on their motion, but its decision noted that the judge
granted the Louangxays motion along with Lei's Bar & Grill in an order
dated January 17, 2008. Id. at 1290 n.2.
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Defendants to remove the ice and snow before the storm ended.12
On January 17, 2008, an order was entered granting all
Defendants' motions for summary judgment.13
On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the lower court judge erred in
finding (1) that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because, Plaintiff asserted, the fall occurred on the
entranceway, as opposed to a walkway or parking lot, and (2) that
there was no genuine issue of material fact about whether
Defendants increased the risk of harm to Plaintiff by periodically
inspecting, but not shoveling the entranceway.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Central to the Court's analysis was "whether a landlord or
business invitor owes a duty to an invitee to remove ice and snow
during a storm, when ice and snow has naturally accumulated on
the exterior entranceway to the building."15 If the Court finds no
legal duty, then 'the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a
motion for summary judgment must be granted."'16 Whether or
not a legal duty exists is a threshold question for Plaintiffs
negligence action. 17 "'Only when a party properly overcomes the
duty hurdle in a negligence action is he or she entitled to a factual
determination on each of the remaining elements: breach,
causation, and damages."1 8  Of course, if Defendants owed
Plaintiff no duty to remove the ice and snow, then despite
Plaintiffs alleged personal injuries, he would be left without a leg
to stand on.19
The Court reaffirmed that Rhode Island follows the
"Connecticut Rule," which "provides that a landlord or business
invitor owes a duty to a tenant or business invitee 'to use
12. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1290 (emphasis added).
13. Id. On January 22, 2008, final judgment was entered for Defendants
against Plaintiff, from which Plaintiff timely appealed. Id.
14. Id. at 1290-91.
15. Id. at 1291 (emphasis added).
16. Id. (quoting Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225
(R.I. 1987)).
17. See id.
18. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1291. (quoting Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 633
(R.I. 2009)).
19. See id.
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reasonable care to see that the common areas are kept reasonably
safe from the dangers created by an accumulation of snow and ice
which is attributed to purely natural causes."'20  Under the
Connecticut Rule, the landlord or business invitor is granted a
reasonable time after the storm has ended to remove the
accumulation, unless unusual circumstances arise before the end
of the storm, which may trigger a duty to remove the
accumulation. 21
The Supreme Court first adopted the Connecticut Rule in the
landlord-tenant context in Fuller v. Housing Authority of
Providence, and extended the rule to the business invitor-invitee
relationship in Terry v. Central Auto Radiators.22 On appeal, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Flaherty, disposed of this
case by answering two distinct questions. 23
Does the Connecticut Rule apply to Plaintiffs case?
The Court explained its rationale behind applying the
Connecticut Rule in response to Plaintiffs assertion that the rule
should not apply here simply because he fell just outside the
entranceway, as opposed to a walkway or parking lot.24 The
Court reasoned that an entranceway is similar to other premises
where it had applied the rule, including a parking lot, a road, or a
passageway. 25 The rationale behind the rule "does not depend on
how the location of the snow and ice is characterized, but rather
on the scope of the burden of the obligations imposed upon a
landowner, the relationship between the parties, the public policy
implications, and concerns about fairness."26
Therefore, the Court held that the fact that Plaintiff fell at the
entranceway does not distinguish this case from others that have
been decided under the Connecticut Rule, and that the rule does
20. Id. at 1291-92 (quoting Fuller v. Hous. Auth. of Providence, 279 A.2d
438, 440-41 (R.I. 1971)).
21. Id. at 1292 (citing Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I. 2006);
Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999)).
22. See id. at 1291-92; Terry, 732 A.2d at 716; Fuller, 279 A.2d at 440-41.
23. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1291-93.
24. Id. at 1292-93.
25. See id.; Benaski, 899 A.2d at 501; Terry, 732 A.2d at 715; Fuller, 279
A.2d at 439.
26. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1293 (citing Terry, 732 A.2d at 718-19).
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apply here.27  "'To require a landlord or other inviter to keep
walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or
snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is
inexpedient and impractical."'28 In other words, it would be
unreasonable to impose a duty on a landlord or business owner to
be "'required to be at his property, shovel in hand, catching the
flakes before they hit the ground."' 29  Losing on this issue,
Plaintiff next argued that there remains a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants created unusual
circumstances, under the Connecticut Rule, thereby triggering a
duty owed to Plaintiff to clear the entranceway of dangerous ice
and snow.30
Did Defendants owe Plaintiff a duty to clear the entranceway?
Here, the Court primarily analyzed the issue of duty triggered
by unusual circumstances by comparing Plaintiffs allegations to
two prior cases wherein it applied the Connecticut Rule: Terry and
Benaski.31
In Terry, the Court found unusual circumstances because
"Defendant's employee directed [Plaintiff] to walk a distance of
100 feet across an 'unknown and difficult terrain' to a rear lot
behind the premises, where she fell on rutted ice," even though
the employee had warned her of the accumulation of ice and
snow. 32  The Court held that Defendant "'exacerbated and
increased the risk"' by sending Plaintiff across hazardous ground
during an ongoing snowstorm, thereby creating unusual
circumstances and triggering a duty Defendant owed to Plaintiff
under the circumstances. 33
Conversely, in Benaski, the Court affirmed summary
judgment for Defendant business invitor, holding that Plaintiff
27. Id. at 1293.
28. Id. (quoting Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. 1989))
(emphasis added).
29. Id. (quoting Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503).
30. Id. at 1290-91, 1292
31. Id. at 1292-93 (citing Terry, 732 A.2d at 717 and Benaski, 899 A.2d at
503-04).
32. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292 (quoting Terry, 732 A.2d at 715, 718).
33. Id. (quoting Terry, 732 A.2d at 717-18).
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failed to show unusual circumstances. 34 The Court found that the
road Plaintiff slipped and fell on when she was leaving an office
park during an ongoing snowstorm, "was the only means of egress,
that the Defendant failed to plow the road before the offices
opened for the day, and that the Defendant had failed to inspect
the premises."35 Distinguishing the case from Terry, the Court
held "that these circumstances did not exacerbate the risks,
inherent in an ongoing severe winter storm, which the Plaintiff
had embraced by commuting to and from work in such
conditions."36 Therefore, the Court found that Defendant owed no
duty to Plaintiff under the circumstances. 37
Here, the Court held that the facts alleged amounted to a
Benaski case because Plaintiff Berardis alleged insufficient facts
to show that Defendant Lei's Bar & Grill had exacerbated and
increased the risk inherent in an ongoing storm, even after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.38
The Court held that Defendant's general manager's actions -
shoveling and applying ice melt to the walkway around noon,
followed by his periodic inspection of the premises without
removing further accumulation from the entranceway - did not
amount to unusual circumstances because the general manager's
actions did not increase the risks inherent to walking in or out of
the premises during an ongoing storm.3 9
COMMENTARY
"Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect
society from unnecessary danger," said Judge Andrews in his
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. dissent. 40 In applying the
Connecticut Rule, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that
snowstorms include inherent dangers from which landlords and
business owners cannot be expected to protect their tenants and
patrons. It would be unreasonable for landlords and business
34. Id.; see Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04.
35. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1293.
39. Id.
40. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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owners to insure society against the risks of naturally
accumulated snow and ice during an ongoing snowstorm, short of
unusual circumstances. On appeal from the lower court judge's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff had
to persuade the Court that Lei's Bar & Grill owed him
considerably more than a well-poured drink, a good bite, and a
convivial atmosphere in which to enjoy a temporary shelter from
the storm. Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to meet his
burden, as the snowstorm was still going when Berardis and his
friend alighted from the Warwick bar, and Defendants took no
action to exacerbate or increase the risks inherent to being out
and about during a winter storm. As then-Judge Cardozo said,
"[O]ne acts sometimes at one's peril."41
Rhode Island business invitors and landlords owe their
invitees and tenants many legal duties, ranging from the perhaps
trivial to the absolutely vital. Add the New England winter storm
season into the equation, and it's easy to see how the burdens of
doing business could outweigh the benefits. The Connecticut Rule
doesn't let business invitors and landlords completely off the hook
concerning snow and ice removal because they still have a duty to
make their premises safe once a reasonable time has passed after
a storm's end.42
Here, the Supreme Court could have been persuaded by
Plaintiffs argument that a bar's entranceway should be
distinguished from its walkway or parking lot. After all, revelers
who have given good consideration in return for the use and
enjoyment of a restaurant or bar's food, drink, and premises, may
not expect to be left hung out to dry the instant they leave the
establishment, even (perhaps especially) during a winter storm.
That said, the law protects business invitors and landlords from
liability arising from slip and falls caused by the natural
accumulation of ice and snow during a storm.43 Therein lays the
fairness of the Court's decision. Freezing rain and snow routinely
create treacherous conditions, and it is no secret that to be out and
about during a storm is risky, whether one is travelling by foot or
automobile. Walking on naturally snowy or icy sidewalks is
41. Id. at 100-01.
42. Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1291-92.
43. Id. at 1291.
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obviously dangerous, and when an invitee chooses to venture out
to a business establishment's premises the risk should not
mechanically shift onto the invitor or landlord, considering the
nearly impossible task of keeping premises safe during an ongoing
storm.
The Court's decision makes it clear that if business owners
choose to stay open during storms they may do so without
insuring their invitees against injuries from slip and fall accidents
on the premises caused by naturally accumulated snow or ice, so
long as the storm is ongoing and the invitor does not take steps to
increase the risk of being out and about on parking lots,
walkways, and entranceways under inherently risky, inclement
conditions. Thus, Rhode Islanders are to an extent both all in it
together - and all alone - when they choose to confront the
hazards of winter weather.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants because Plaintiff
Berardis failed to persuade the Court that Defendants, as the
owners and operators of Lei's Bar & Grill, owed him a duty to
clear the entranceway of naturally accumulated ice and snow
during an ongoing storm. In doing so, the Court extended the
Connecticut Rule to the entranceways of business invitors' and
landlords' premises, and ruled that the periodic inspection of
premises without removing ice or snow does not trigger a duty
under the "unusual circumstances" exception to the rule.
Shad Miller
Tort Law. Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630 (R.I. 2009). The driver of
an automobile does not have a duty to protect passengers from the
criminal acts of unknown third parties. In Rhode Island, there is
no set formula to determine whether a duty of care exists; its
determined on an ad hoc basis, taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances of the case. Membership in the same street
gang does not establish a special relationship between parties
sufficient to give rise to a duty of care.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant Khan Khea attended a New Year's Eve party on
December 31st, 2001, along with Heang Say, Thanaroeuth Ngim,
Peary Bun, and Angel Alvarez.1 When the five men, all members
of the Asian Boys gang, decided to leave the party, Khea heard
people talking across the street and noticed their attire appeared
to be that of a rival gang.2 Khea asked two fellow party guests to
go outside to determine if it was safe for them to leave. 3 A short
time later, the five men left the party and walked to Khea's car.4
The car had just begun to move when one of the passengers
shouted, "He's got a gun."5 Ngim had spotted a person with a
rifle, shooting at the vehicle. 6 Both Ngim and Say were struck by
bullets; Ngim was shot in the spinal cord, rendering him a
paraplegic and Say was fatally shot in the head.7 Khea attempted
to drive away, but lost control of the car and crashed into a tree.8
Khea, Bun, and Alvarez escaped on foot.9
Say's beneficiary, Monica Ouch, brought an action in Rhode
Island Superior Court for wrongful death, and Ouch, Ngim, Bun
1. Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 631 (R.I. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Ngim testified that the shooter was not among the people he'd
previously seen outside the party. Id. at 632 n.2.
7. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 632.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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and Alvarez sought compensatory damages, claiming that the
Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries.10
Defendant moved for partial summary judgment against Ouch,
arguing that he did not owe a duty of care to Say to protect him
from criminal assault.11 The court granted Defendant's motion,
finding that he had no duty of care to protect others from criminal
assault, and that there was no special relationship between the
parties which would vitiate the no-duty rule.12 Defendant later
moved for summary judgment against Ngim.13 Because the first
decision was not clearly erroneous and the record had not
expanded, the trial court adopted its earlier decision and granted
the motion.14 Final judgment was entered against Ouch and
Ngim, and Plaintiffs subsequently filed a timely appeal to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that Defendant was negligent in
operating his vehicle and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of their injuries. 16 Plaintiffs asserted that, as the operator
of the vehicle, Defendant breached a duty of care by driving near a
known danger (rival gang members).17 Alternatively, Plaintiffs
argued that Defendant's status as a member of the same street
gang created a special relationship that would give rise to a legal
duty.18 Upon de novo review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
Defendant.19 In its ruling, the Court held that Defendant did not
owe a duty of care to protect his passengers from the intentional
criminal actions of third parties.20 The Court also held that
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 632.
14. Bun and Alvarez were dismissed as plaintiffs when they failed to
appear at their depositions and their attorney was unable to contact them.
Id. n.3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 633.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 632.
20. Id. at 633.
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membership in the same street gang was not sufficient to support
a "special relationship" exception to the no-duty rule.21
The Court focused on whether the Defendant owed a duty of
care to the Plaintiffs to protect them from the criminal action of a
third party.22 In Rhode Island, to prevail on a negligence claim "a
plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a
defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate
causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the
actual loss or damage." 23 There is no set formula for determining
whether a duty exists; the Court instead turned to the facts of the
case and considered a number of factors, including the
relationship between the parties, the scope and burden of the
obligation, public policy and the foreseeability of the harm. 24 This
legal duty must be established before the Court will determine the
remaining elements of breach, causation and damages. 25
While drivers owe their passengers a duty to operate the car
in a safe manner, the Court was unconvinced that this duty
included protecting Defendants from the intentional criminal acts
of a third party.26 The Court cited Thanadabouth v. Kongmany,
in which it held that a landlord did not have a duty of care to
provide outdoor lighting to protect tenants from third party
criminal acts, even though the building was located in a high
crime district. 27  The Court contrasted the case of Volpe v.
Gallagher where it held that a landlord owed a legal duty to
protect her neighbor from the landlord's adult son, because she
had allowed her mentally ill son to maintain an arsenal of
weapons in her house, one of which he used to kill the neighbor.28
The Court found that the defendant owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care in controlling her son to prevent this type of
harm, and that she could have exercised such control by either
removing or having the weapons removed. 29
21. Id. at 634.
22. Id. at 633.
23. Id. (quoting Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 2005)).
24. Id. (quoting Selwyn, 879 A.2d at 887).
25. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 633.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Thanadabouth v. Kongmany, 712 A.2d 879, 880 (R.I.
1998)).
28. Id. (citing Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 702 (R.I. 2003)).
29. Id. (citing Volpe, 821 A.2d at 709).
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Finally, the Court referenced Martin v. Marciano, in which it
held that a special relationship between a defendant and a guest
whose injury was foreseeable created an exception to the general
rule that there is no duty to protect another from the criminal acts
of a third party.30 In Martin, the plaintiff was attacked by a
fellow guest at a graduation party hosted by the defendant. 31
Because the defendant furnished alcohol to under-aged guests,
including the plaintiff, the Court ruled that there was a special
relationship between the parties and, therefore, the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty to protect her from violence at the hands
of other attendees. 32
In the instant case, the Court failed to find the duty-
triggering factors seen in Volpe and Martin.33 The Court held
that the shooting was unforeseeable, and unrelated to the
Defendant's operation of his vehicle. 34 Unlike the defendant in
Volpe, the Defendant here had no control over the gunman's
actions. 35 Because testimony elicited at trial tended to show that
the gunman was not among the group of people first noticed by
the Defendant across the street from the party, the Court was not
convinced that the Defendant could have foreseen the particular
harm suffered by the Plaintiff.36
Turning to Plaintiffs' second argument, the Court declined to
find that a special relationship existed between members of the
same street gang.37 The Court stated, "[wihatever the fraternal
structure, if any, under which a street gang operates, we are not
prepared to elevate it into a special relationship sufficient to give
rise to a duty of care."38
30. Id. (citing Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005)).
31. Id. (citing Martin, 871 A.2d at 914).
32. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 633 (citing Martin, 871 A.2d at 915-16).
33. Id. (citing Martin, 871 A.2d at 915-16; Volpe, 821 A.2d 699 at 709).
34. Id. at 634.
35. See Volpe, 821 A.2d at 709.
36. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 634.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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COMMENTARY
While drivers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in
transporting their passengers, that duty does not extend to
protecting them from the criminal acts of third parties. The
determination of a defendant's duty to protect a plaintiff from
harm inflicted by a third party turns on foreseeability and control.
Here, the Court noted that the Defendant did not drive into an
area where he knew a gun battle was taking place. 39 Rather, he
neither knew nor could have known that his car was about to pass
through the sights of a rifleman. Neither could the Defendant
have exercised control over the attacker.40
In ruling that the Defendant did not have a duty to protect
the Plaintiffs from the gunman, the Court left open the question
whether such duty could have been established had the shooter
been one of the people the Defendant noticed before leaving the
party.41 Also unstated is whether merely driving within range of
known members of a rival gang could be sufficient to prove
foreseeability of harm.
An interesting aspect of this case is the Plaintiffs' argument
that gang membership, a status chiefly characterized by antisocial
and frequently criminal activity, somehow creates a special
relationship between gang members sufficient to give rise to a
duty of care. Obviously, there are sound policy reasons for not
recognizing such a relationship. The Court refused to "elevate"42
the relationship of gang members to special status, perhaps
because doing so would tend to legitimize gangs whose very
existence runs counter to the state's best interest.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that drivers do not owe
a duty of care to their passengers to protect them from the
criminal acts of unknown third parties. In determining the
liability of defendants for the criminal acts of third parties, the
Court will evaluate a defendant's ability to exercise control over
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ouch, 963 A.2d at 634.
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the third party as well as the foreseeability of the particular harm
to the plaintiff. Additionally, for strong policy reasons, the Court
held that membership in a street gang is not sufficient to establish
a special relationship between gang members sufficient to give
rise to a duty of care.
Jenna Wims Hashway
Tort Law. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653 (R.I.
2009). In this matter of first impression, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that treatment of an outpatient by a mental
health center did not create an affirmative duty to exercise control
over that patient to prevent a violent assault. Without any
uniform standard to apply, the Court approached the case ad hoc
and examined the specific facts in the case to determine that as a
matter of law, The Providence Center did not have a duty to
exercise control over the patient, and therefore, Plaintiff could not
prevail on her allegation of negligent supervision and summary
judgment was properly granted.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 26, 2004, while at work at Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., a
Providence dry-cleaning business, employee Zaida Santana
("Plaintiff') was working in the back area when she heard a
commotion in the front of the store.2  When she went to
investigate, Plaintiff witnessed David L. Kelly ("Kelly") attacking
her coworker. 3 Plaintiff pleaded with Kelly to stop, but Kelly
struck her in the head with a crowbar, resulting in severe head
and brain injuries that left her unconscious for two weeks. 4 Kelly
was arrested and charged with three counts of felony assault.5
Kelly lived in an apartment adjacent to Rainbow Cleaners and he
occasionally did odd jobs around the store. 6 Plaintiff and other
employees were well aware of Kelly's mental health issues due to
erratic behavior he had exhibited on prior occasions.7 Plaintiff
said she was afraid of Kelly, but one of the owners of the store told
her that he was harmless. 8 For years leading up to the attack,
1. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, 969 A2d. 653, 667 (R.I. 2009).
2. See id. at 655.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Santana, 969 A.2d at 655.
8. Id.
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Kelly had received outpatient mental health treatment at The
Providence Center ("Defendant Center"), a private, non-profit,
community health center.9 The last time Kelly had contact with
Defendant Center was four months before he attacked Plaintiff.1o
After Kelly's arrest, Defendant Center initiated certification
proceedings under the state's Mental Health Law,11 and Kelly was
later admitted to a mental health hospital, where he was deemed
incompetent to stand trial.12
On October 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed suit against Rainbow
Cleaners, Defendant Center, and "John Does I-X,"13 those who
treated Kelly.14 Plaintiff later amended her complaint to include
the owners of Rainbow Cleaners as defendants.15 Defendant
Center is the only party that remained in the appeal.16 In
Plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision, she alleged that
Defendant owed a duty to protect those who Kelly might come into
contact with because it knew or should have known that Kelly was
dangerous and needed supervision to prevent serious harm from
occurring.17 Plaintiff claimed that she was injured as a result of
Defendant Center's breach of this duty.18
Defendant Center filed a motion for summary judgment on
March 30, 2007, maintaining that it had no legal duty to commit
9. Id. The parties agree that Kelly's history revealed his mental health
disability and that he was frequently treated by The Providence Center. The
Court noted that it was hampered in its analysis of the case because none of
Kelly's medical records were part of the record on appeal. Id. at n.3.
10. Id. at 655.
11. R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 40.1.
12. Santana, 969 A.2d at 656.
13. The John Does included in the complaint were never identified, and
they were not parties to the appeal. Id. at 656 n.5.
14. Id. at 656.
15. Id. Plaintiff initially filed for benefits in Workers' Compensation
Court, which approved and entered and Plaintiff was paid $140,000 on behalf
of Rainbow Cleaners. Plaintiff executed a release but nevertheless included
Rainbow Cleaners in her complaint. On February 17, 2006, all claims against
Rainbow Cleaners were dismissed. After that dismissal, the store owners
entered into a settlement agreement with Plaintiff. Id. at 656 n.5.
16. Id. at 656.
17. Id.
18. Santana, 969 A.2d at 656. The Court noted that although it was not
explicit in the Complaint, one could infer that Plaintiffs claim included an
allegation of a breach of duty to exercise control over Kelly by initiating
emergency certification proceedings. Id.
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Kelly or to warn Plaintiff of his dangerousness.19 Defendant
Center argued that Plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that
supported her allegations and that she failed to offer any facts to
show that Kelly would have met the requirements for commitment
under the stringent requirements of the Mental Health Law.20
The motion judge found insufficient duty-triggering factors in the
case and granted Defendant Center's motion for summary
judgment.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Plaintiff
argued that the motion judge erred and that Defendant Center
owed her a duty because a special relationship existed between
Defendant and Kelly, the burden imposed on Defendant as a
result of the duty was reasonable and consistent with valid public
policy concerns, and the attack was foreseeable. 22
Duty
The Court addressed the elements of a negligence claim,
stating that a defendant cannot be liable under a negligence
theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.23 The
Court employed an ad hoc approach that examines the particular
facts and circumstances of a given case. 24 The Court noted that
ordinarily issues of negligence could not be resolved on summary
judgment, but that in the absence of a duty, the trier of fact has
nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must be
granted. 25
Controlling a Third Party's Conduct
The Court noted that it had not previously had the
opportunity to assess a duty in the context of an outpatient mental
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 657.
22. Id.
23. Santana, 969 A.2d. at 658.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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health provider and a patient.26  In addressing whether
Defendant Center had a duty in this case, the Court cited the
general rule that no duty arises to control a third party's conduct
to prevent harm to another individual. 27 However, the Court
recognized an exception to the rule when a defendant has a special
relationship with either the person whose conduct needs to be
controlled or with the intended victim. 28
Being a case was of first impression, the Court looked to other
jurisdictions for guidance. 29 The Court began its analysis with
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Califonia,30 in which the
California Supreme Court held that a mental health professional
may have an affirmative duty to protect a third party from the
actions of a violent person.3 1 The Court addressed other cases
that had recognized a duty to warn when a threat is directed
toward a specific or readily identifiable victim. 32 The Court
recognized that other courts generally require the existence of a
special relationship in which the defendant: "(1) knew or should
have known that the patient posed a serious risk of violence to
others; and (2) had the legal right and ability to control the
patient."33 Finally, the Court looked to other courts that have
suggested that mental health providers may have a duty to
exercise control by seeking commitment even when the patient is
an outpatient. 34
Commitment of the Mentally Disabled
The Court acknowledged that in harmony with the state's
public policy to protect the civil liberties of the mentally disabled,
the Mental Health Law makes commitment of a mentally disabled
individual a very difficult process. 35 Under Rhode Island law, a
26. Id. at 659.
27. Id. at 658.
28. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965)).
29. Santana, 969 A.2d. at 659.
30. 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
31. Id.
32. Santana, 969 A.2d at 659; see Thompson v. County of Almeda, 614
P.2d 728, 738 (Cal. 1980).
33. Id.; see Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184, 189 (8th Cir. 1985);
Hinkelman v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 403 N.W.2d 547, 551-52 (Mich. 1987).
34. Santana, 969 A.2d at 661.
35. Id.
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statute allows mental health professionals to seek the
commitment of an individual in both emergency and non-
emergency situations;36 however, the Court enumerated the
onerous actions that mental health providers must undergo to be
able to initiate a commitment of an individual. 37 Finally, the
Court reviewed a decision that held that a mental health
provider's duty may include initiating involuntary commitment
proceedings against an outpatient.38
The Factors in this Case Do Not Give Rise to a Legal Duty
Again recognizing the lack of uniform standards to apply in
cases involving legal duties of mental health professionals, the
Court examined the particular circumstances of this case. 39 The
Court listed the factors as: (1) the relationship between Kelly and
Defendant Center, (2) the foreseeability of harm to Plaintiff, (3)
the extent of the burden to Defendant Center and the
consequences of imposing a duty with resulting liability for
breach, and (4) public policy considerations. 40 While the Court
was not willing to state that an outpatient relationship would
never give rise to an affirmative duty to control a patient's
conduct, it was unwilling to accept Plaintiffs argument that the
relationship between a mental health provider and an outpatient
alone is sufficient to give rise to a duty to control the patient.41
The Court determined that Defendant Center did not have an
opportunity to exercise control over Kelly nor had the legal
36. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40.1-5-7, 40.1-5-8. The sections that provide for
the initiation of certification proceedings are discretionary; not mandatory.
Santana, 969 A.2d at 661; See Ferreira v. City of East Providence, 568
F.Supp.2d 197, 214 (D.R.I. 2008).
37. Santana, 969 A.2d at 662-63.
38. Id. (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 497 F.Supp. 185, 193-4
(D.Neb.1980))(where shortly after stopping therapy a mentally ill outpatient
fired into a nightclub killing a man, the court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and held that "when in accordance with the standards of his
profession, the therapist knows or should have known that his patient's
dangerous propensities present an unreasonable risk of harm to others, he
has an affirmative duty" to initiate precautions to protect potential victims of
his patient). Id.
39. Id. at 664.
40. Id. at 664-65.
41. Id. at 665.
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authority to do so.42 The Court noted the lack of information in
the record about Kelly's condition when Defendant Center treated
him four months prior to the assault.43
Based on the lack of evidence that Kelly could have been
committed, the Court could not conclude that Defendant Center
could have foreseen the harm suffered by Plaintiff.44 The Court
concluded that imposing a duty on Defendant Center would be
"manifestly unjust" due to the absence of evidence that Kelly
would have met the stringent requirements of the Mental Health
Law.45 The Court expressed concern that imposing liability in
this case would force mental health providers to initiate
certification proceedings against patients in the absence of
evidence that they would meet the statutory requirements of
commitment.46 The Court was troubled that this would result in
policies running contrary to state law to treat "patients in a
manner that places the least restraint on their liberty."47
Finally, the Court addressed the public policy concerns that
the decision would have on the vitally important and often
difficult services that community mental health centers of this
state provide in treating those afflicted with mental illnesses. 48
The Court balanced these concerns against the public's interest in
being protected from attacks such as the one against Plaintiff, as
well as the liberty interests of those suffering from mental
illness.49 In recognizing Kelly's constitutionally protected liberty
interest and the significant deprivation of liberty that a civil
commitment would entail, the Court cited the "carefully crafted"
Mental Health Law in Rhode Island that ensures that a patient's
liberty interests are "scrupulously protected."50  The Court
42. Id.
43. Santana, 969 A.2d at 666. The Court seemed especially concerned
with the lack of evidence provided by Plaintiff in her assertion that the
"defendant knew or should have known" about Kelly's dangerous
propensities. Id. The Court suggested that had Plaintiff provided supporting
physician or expert affidavits, she may have been able to show that
Defendant Center "should have known" about Kelly's dangerousness. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 666-67; see R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 40.1-8.5-1(a).
48. Santana, 969 A.2d at 667.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting In re Doe, 440 A.2d 712, 714 (R.I. 1982)).
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concluded that public policy concerns and notions of fairness
outweighed an imposition of a duty in this case. 51
COMMENTARY
In this matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court recognized the potential consequences of its decision and
correctly acknowledged the unreasonable implications of holding
an outpatient mental health center responsible for the actions of
one of its clients. In making its decision, the Court made a point to
approach the duty analysis based on the specific factors present in
the case 52 and to avoid making any bright line rule that could
change the relationship between outpatient mental health
providers and their patients in the future. The reluctance to hold
that a duty existed in this case was predicated on the difficulty of
controlling any third party's conduct without the presence of a
special relationship. 53 It was unreasonable and unfair to impose a
duty on Defendant Center, especially in light of the fact that
Kelly's only contact with Defendant Center was four months prior
to the attack.54 The Court was also reluctant to impose a duty that
may impede the liberties of individuals with mental disabilities.55
Although not found in this case, the Court suggested that an
affirmative duty to control an outpatient's conduct could arise in
other cases if a number of discussed factors are present. 56
51. Id.
52. Id. at 664.
53. Id. at 658.
54. See Santana, 969 A.2d at 655.
55. Id. at 667.
56. Id. at 666.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a mental health
center's treatment of an outpatient did not create an affirmative
duty to initiate certification proceedings in order to prevent a
violent assault. 57 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
granting of summary judgment by the Superior Court was
appropriate.58 Additionally, the Court refused to impose a bright
line rule in this matter of first impression but instead weighed the
individual factors present in this case in the duty analysis. 59
Because Defendant Center had no duty in this case, the Court
held that Plaintiff could not prevail on her allegation of negligent
supervision.60
Marissa L. Janton
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id. at 655.
59. Id. at 667.
60. Santana, 969 A.2d at 667.
